Posted on 07/21/2015 5:14:04 AM PDT by Homer_J_Simpson
Stalin wanted revenge for 1920, he was going to get his piece of Poland one way or the other.
Instead, Stalin wanted the Germans, French and British to spill copious amounts of blood to make all of Europe easy pickings for the Red Army.
It might have worked except for one thing, France falling pretty much without a fight which spared the British and German armies.
If you believe in patterns, this is exactly what Stalin did against Japan.
Look how the Soviet/Japan relations unfolded and then compare them with Germany and try to think what might have followed.
Vs Japan: a period of bad relations until 1939; then Japan starts moving towards a conflict with the Western powers; Stalin signs a non-agression pact with Japan in April 1941; then Japan attacks Pearl Harbor fights an exhausting war against US and Britain; then, when Japan was about to lose, Stalin attacks in Manchuria and install communist regimes in the Far East.
Now look at Germany: a period of bad relations until 1939; then, when Germany starts moving towards a conflict with the Western Powers, Stalin signs a non-agression pact with Germany; then Germany starts fighting an exhausting war against the Western Powers...
If we follow the pattern seen in the relationship with Japan, what was next?
And, btw, France fell quickly, thus the Wehrmacht was spared a bloodbath comparable to WW1, but the naval war in the Atlantic was no joke.
A naval war might be less bloody, but it consumes tremendous amounts of resources. Japan, after all, was defeated at sea. Let’s look at a single example what the Atlantic Battle meant for Germany: a Type VII Uboat cost as much as 35 Panther tanks. During the crucial years of the war against Soviet Union, Germany had about 200 Uboats at sea hunting British and American ships. If they did not have to built Uboats, the Germans could have increased the size of their tank forces by several thousand units during the key battles of Moscow, Stalingrad or Kursk. Just saying.
While it caused less casualties than the Eastern front, the war at sea and in the air against UK (and US) caused huge damage to the German economy, something which the Soviets never wanted to admit, with their constant complaints about “no second front” and how they were left to “fight alone” by the “nefarious capitalist vampires”.
According to the men who fought in them, the T-26 was a piece of junk. And it was. The armor was insufficient to stand up to 37mm AT guns, and the engine and transmissions were prone to breakdown. The Soviet Mechanized Corps that went into combat equipped with these vehicles lost more than half of them on the approach marches to the battlefield. When they got there, their soldiers found they were little better than steel coffins. The survivors were pretty adamant about that, too.
By 1941, the Germans were fielding improved Panzer III and IV, but half of their tank park still consisted of the older models. And the soviets were improving as well, with the new T-34 and KV.
Which was exactly my point. The Soviets were producing the KV and T-34 in quantity in June 1941, but that production had only just begun, and the new tanks were only just beginning to be delivered to the Mechanized Corps. Not to mention the fact that the soldiers who were expected to fight in them had not been trained in how to use them yet.
Because analysis of documentary evidence (which surfaced after 1991) indicate that the real problem of the Red Army in 1941 was the resentments of large masses of troops against the soviet power, which led to a massive collapse of morale and will to fight, in the context of the deterioration of the soviet command and control system in the summer of 1941.
You might want to ask the Germans about that. The one thing they found out was that when the French forces were surrounded, they would throw in the towel. Soviet forces, when surrounded, fought hard. Even though the Germans captured millions of them in the summer and fall of 1941, they rarely threw in the towel at the first opportunity. It was only after hard fighting. Also, a frequent problem for the Germans was keeping the pockets of surrounded Soviet troops “hermetically sealed,” something they repeatedly had difficulty doing. Don’t argue that it was because panzer divisions with little infantry could not seal the pockets. That does not explain why soldiers who didn’t want to fight for the USSR didn’t surrender, kept on fighting, or infiltrated back to Soviet lines in great numbers. Which they did, constantly. Most of the mass surrenders took place because a poorly trained, poorly equipped and poorly led mass of soldiers with poor command and control were left in situations that had deteriorated to the point where they didn’t have much choice.
Obviously, such a thing does not fit with the narrative of the Great Patriotic War, which insisted that all the soviet people fought to a man for the soviet regime, hence why the soviet government tried to obfuscate it after the war.
I would always take what the Soviets said with a grain of salt, just as I would the German memoirs. But you might want to take a look at the casualties suffered by the Germans; in the first 10 weeks of Operation Barbarossa, they suffered 440,000 casualties, of which 94,000 were killed. Two hundred German officers were being lost every day. These figures are from Halder’s War Diary, and he knew that the casualty rate, far higher than anticipated, was unsustainable. Somebody must have been fighting in the Red Army.
The Soviet Union produced 2,800 T-34 in 1941, 12,000 in 1942 and 15,000 in 1943. This process would have taken until the summer of 1943, at the very least. But, by that time, the old T-34/76 which were produced from 1940 onwards would have become obsolete as well! In the summer of 1943, as a result of the German upgrades, the Soviets were starting to design new models as well, which will result in the T-34/85 and IS-2.
I don’t think you can consider the low numbers of T-34s produced in 1941 as a valid projection of what the USSR would have produced if the Germans had not invaded. The German occupation of the then-existing Soviet industrial areas, and the dislocation caused by relocating them to the east, significantly reduced the production figures, which did not recover until later in 1942.
And, besides, on what basis should anyone assume that while the Red Army “expanded and modernized”, the German army would have done nothing?
In some of your arguments, you have ignored cause and effect. You assume if the Germans did not invade the USSR in 1941, they would still have made the same development and production decisions. I believe otherwise. Development of the 75mm/PAK40 did begin before Operation Barbarossa, but production was not pursued aggressively. In November 1940, they were only producing 15 models per month. It wasn’t until after June 22 1941 they were pressed to ramp up production when they realized that even the 50mmPAK was not sufficient to fight the T-34. Even then their production was so low that they were forced to use as many captured Soviet M1939 76.2mm guns as they could get their hands on. They even reverse-engineered production of anti-tank ammunition for these guns. The Germans were way too complacent in their armament production, not just after the fall of France, but throughout the war. They never really hit their stride in mobilization of industry until Speer’s reforms took full effect in 1944, and by then it was too late.
But the main thing instead of quibbling over trees is to look at the forest. The Red Army was clearly not prepared or ready for war in 1941 due to a number of structural deficiencies. Only a part of the deficiencies existed in their weapons systems. It was more of a general systemic issue. The officer corps had men who were afraid of being purged asked to command units two or three grades above their level of experience and proficiency, with far from minimal staff support. As a result, command and control was less than effective. Logistically, the network or supporting units simply did not exist, and basic supply and maintenance suffered. The large number of new conscripts were by and large untrained, and they lacked an experienced cadre of NCOs to hold them together.
The fact they inflicted 440,000 casualties on the Wehrmacht showed they were willing to fight. The fact they suffered millions of casualties of their own showed they didn’t know how.
There were huge qualitative deficits in the Red Army, given time, they were going to close that gap simply by becoming an army. The Germans would have improved, but were not under any particular pressure to do so, and would not have made the same strides as they did when faced with real combat. They certainly would not, and could not, have increased their superiority over the Red Army given another year.
This is based on the premise that Hitler would have started the war anyway if he was confronted by an alliance of UK, France and Soviet Union. The thing is, it does not matter whether England and France were serious in their intent to fight Germany. If such a alliance was concluded, it is perfectly possible the war would not have taken place at all.
Your premise violates henkster’s law on several matters. The fact was that the alliance between the USSR, France and Britain didn’t take place exactly because the French and British were not serious about either making an alliance with the USSR or shedding their own blood to stop Hitler. Stalin didn’t have to be particularly shrewd to figure that out. Even a dolt like Voroshilov, who did much of the negotiating with the Brits and French, could tell they weren’t serious. Their whole mission was a farce from the get-go. So of course Stalin is going to cut a deal he thinks will help him with the one guy he knows is serious. Stalin WANTS Hitler to fight the war Hitler obviously wants to fight. That’s exactly why Stalin cut his deal with Hitler. Your scenario asks that the French not be the French, the British not be the British, and more importantly, that Stalin not be Stalin. If there is any additional historical irony in how it all turned out, it’s that Stalin, the man who trusted no one, trusted Adolph Hitler, the man no one should trust.
Actually, I am of the opinion that Stalin never intended to join a French-British coalition (at least not in the initial stage of the war) and a careful analysis of how the negotiations unfolded clearly proves this.
Other than being contradictory to your statement above, it ignores that Stalin had Foreign Minister Litvinov propose a virtual alliance with Britain and France on April 17, 1939, just after the final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. A proposal that French diplomats thought exceed their highest hopes of getting out of the USSR. A proposal that Winston Churchill urged Chamberlain to accept. A proposal that pre-dated any overtures to Germany. However, Chamberlain would rather deal with Hitler than Stalin, and rejected the proposal outright. The rejection of the alliance caused the sacking of Litivinov, his replacement with Molotov, and the beginning of negotiations with Hitler. Meanwhile, the British vacillated with their vague and insubstantial offers; the ones you outlined. Again, had the British and French been serious about pursuing an alliance with Stalin, all they had to do was say “We accept” to Litvinov’s offer. They weren’t serious. The rejection of the alliance offer showed they weren’t serious as early as April. Stalin was only going to play ball with people who were serious.
Yes, the geographic/strategic issue of Poland was an intractable one. I can understand why the Poles would not want the Red Army on their soil. They knew the Red Army would not leave and they were going to bring the Commissars with them, which was what happened anyway, just five years and much suffering later. The alternative was being conquered by Hitler’s Germany. The Poles thought “with the Germans we lose our country, with the Russians we lose our soul.” But the point remains that had the allies been able to secure Polish consent to Soviet participation in a war against Germany, Stalin would have had much difficulty in rejecting an offer he had proposed.
The real reasons there was no Anglo-French alliance with the Soviet Union was that the British were the British, the French were the French, and the Poles were the Poles.
The German Generals were ticked when they found out about the “secret” Protocol to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement. It moved their troops 200 miles further away from Moscow.
‘According to the men who fought in them, the T-26 was a piece of junk’.
Who are these men you are refering to and what is your source?
“Piece of junk” as it was, the T-26 still fought with the Far East soviet forces in 1945. The Sixth Guards Tank Army had around 120 T-26 out of 1,000 tanks, they were involved in a far more difficult march over the Hingan Mountain Range in 1945 and, somehow, did not break down.
The T-26 served with the Finnish army until 1961.
In fact, the main characteristic of the T-26 was its reliability and ease to maintain.
“The armor was insufficient to stand up to 37mm AT guns, and the engine and transmissions were prone to breakdown.”
The armor of all the German tanks were also insufficient to stand up to the 45 mm Soviet antitank gun.
Why all these double standards? “Armor capable to stand up to enemy antitank guns” had been an exception during WW2, not the rule. In 1941, the German Army had NO tank capable to standing up to soviet antitank fire. Not a single one. For instance, during the 1944 and 1945 offensives, the Soviet T-34 were basically tanks with anti-bullet armor - they were not able to withstand german antitank weapons. Yet nobody considered them “coffins”. Ditto about the Shermans.
There is no such thing as perfect weaponry. Why a T-26 with 15-20 mm of armor is a “coffin”, but a Panzer II with 8-13 mm of armor isn’t?
“You might want to ask the Germans about that. The one thing they found out was that when the French forces were surrounded, they would throw in the towel. Soviet forces, when surrounded, fought hard. Even though the Germans captured millions of them in the summer and fall of 1941, they rarely threw in the towel at the first opportunity. It was only after hard fighting. “
The Soviet front reports tell otherwise. For instance, on 17 July 1941, a report by the NKVD representative on the South-Western Front indicated mass desertions and surrendering in the ranks. From July to September 1941, there were at least 4-5 orders signed by Stalin and the Soviet High Command confirming this was a general phenomenon.
“Most of the mass surrenders took place because a poorly trained, poorly equipped and poorly led mass of soldiers with poor command and control were left in situations that had deteriorated to the point where they didn’t have much choice.”
Not true. The total numbers of prisoners taken in tha major pockets (when they didn’t have much choice) was about 2 millions. By the end of 1941, the Germans had 4 million prisoners. Where do the other 2 millions come from, if they were not captured in the encirclements and everybody wanted to fight for the Soviet Union?
“But you might want to take a look at the casualties suffered by the Germans; in the first 10 weeks of Operation Barbarossa, they suffered 440,000 casualties, of which 94,000 were killed. Two hundred German officers were being lost every day. These figures are from Halder’s War Diary, and he knew that the casualty rate, far higher than anticipated, was unsustainable. Somebody must have been fighting in the Red Army. “
Even a collapsing army is capable of inflicting serious casualties on the enemies.
You just said that the “French, when surrounded, would throw in the towel”. In 6 weeks of combat in France, Germany suffered 160,000+ casualties. Basically, that means a casualty rate of 27,000 men per week.
The casualty rate during Barbarossa was 44,000 men per week. Considering that
1) the French put up only token resistance in the last 2 weeks, as they ceased to be an effective fighting force;
2)the Red Army had far more men and weapons that the Allied armies of 1940,
the comparison is actually in favor of the French and their allies. Based on casualty figures, the “surrendering” French fought better than the Soviets did.
Sorry, my original point stands.
“In some of your arguments, you have ignored cause and effect. “
This doesn’t change the fact that your original statement, that the Red Army needed to modernize its equipment, was and is factually wrong.
In 1941, the Red Army had a significant qualitative advantage in weapons over Germany. The data of the weapon system is easily available, so, sorry, it’s not up to debate. Even the soviet/russian historiography abandoned this idea (after they were exposed post-1991) and shifted to arguments which are harder to measure like “capabilities” or “logistics”.
“But the main thing instead of quibbling over trees is to look at the forest. The Red Army was clearly not prepared or ready for war in 1941 due to a number of structural deficiencies. Only a part of the deficiencies existed in their weapons systems.”
The main fault with this kind of argument is that there never is any comparison. By making such kind of statements about the Red Army and ignoring the Wehrmacht, it creates the impression that the Germans had everything spiffed up.
If the sky is the bar, then NO army is EVER prepared for war.
Look for instance at Germany:
Germany, demilitarized under the Versailles Treaty conditions, entered the year 1935 with 10 infantry divisions. In the field drills the tanks were indicated by cardboard dummies. In the summer of 1939 the Wehrmacht already had 51 divisions (including 5 tank and 4 mechanized), by the spring of 1940 the Wehrmacht formed 156 divisions, by June1 of 1941, 208. A dazzling headcount increase forced to put “under arms” totally unschooled draftees.
Wehrmacht’s tank divisions were formed on the base of the infantry groupings, and it was possible to man their command with no more than 50% of cadre officers. Of course, for the Wehrmacht 50% was a high index taking into account that the infantry divisions formed in the second half of the 1940’s and later had no more that 35% cadre officers.
Germany began the war with 5 tank divisions, by the spring of 1940 their number grew to 10, by the end of 1940 10 more tank divisions were formed. How many “years” did the commanders commanded these divisions? What kind of the “combat experience” could have the tank divisions formed after the completion of the campaign at the Western front? Out of the 17 tank divisions deployed in June of 1941at the USSR border only three divisions (1-st tank division, 3-rd tank division, 4-th tank division) participated in the Polish and French campaigns). Seven tank divisions (12-th tank division, 13-th tank division, 16-th tank division, 17-th tank division, 18-th tank division, 19-th tank division, 20-th tank division) did not even have the experience of the two-week long war in the Balkans, and 22 June became for them the first day of their combat actions as a tank grouping. (Source: Mark Solonin)
And since we’re speaking about logistics: The German panzer and motorized forced did not possess adequate maintenance capacity for a long campaign. The mechanical complexity of the tanks and APCs, coupled with numerous models with mutually incompatible parts, confounded the German supply and maintenance system. Worse still, earlier campaigns had depleted stocks of repair parts and trained maintenance personnel was also in short supply. (Source: Glantz, Siege of Leningrad).
“Your premise violates henkster’s law on several matters. The fact was that the alliance between the USSR, France and Britain didn’t take place exactly because the French and British were not serious about either making an alliance with the USSR or shedding their own blood to stop Hitler.”
If all was about France and England “not being serious”, then why was Stalin putting conditions which were unacceptabe to the former? Access to Polish territory was not the only one. Previously, the Soviets asked that a prospective alliance treaty between them and UK/France to England should include the theory of “indirect aggression”. Under it, it was required that the governments of eastern European countries which received guarantees from UK/France should allow the Red Army on their territory even absent a direct military threat from Germany. Basically, UK and France were required to recognize a Soviet right for armed intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbours.
“A proposal that pre-dated any overtures to Germany”
This is again false. On exactly the same day, 17 April 1939, the Merekalov-Weiszacker meeting occurred.
“France and Britain didn’t take place exactly because the French and British were not serious about either making an alliance with the USSR or shedding their own blood to stop Hitler.”
The statement is downright absurd, because it was not their choice to make.
It was possible for England to do this in WW2 because they were separated from Germany by the channel and Hitler had limited means to get at them.
After D-Day occurred, Germany made the main effort in the West, deploying their best panzer forces in that theater, even at the expense of weakening the Eastern Front during Bagration and Vistula-Oder offensive.
In 1939, France did not have that option.
“Again, had the British and French been serious about pursuing an alliance with Stalin, all they had to do was say “We accept” to Litvinov’s offer.”
That’s a very naive interpretation. They DID accept the Soviet offer, but in august, not in April. If they accepted the first one, the events would have unfolded the same way as they did later: Stalin would have put conditions which the Allies could not accept and that was the end of it.
“The real reasons there was no Anglo-French alliance with the Soviet Union was that the British were the British, the French were the French, and the Poles were the Poles.”
This statement is mind-boggling. The fact that Stalin pursued a similar annexionist policy as Hitler, which created an impossible dilemma for the Allies, probably had nothing to do with it, right?
“The large number of new conscripts were by and large untrained, and they lacked an experienced cadre of NCOs to hold them together. “
Here is another comparison of German and Soviet units in June 1941 (source: M.Solonin, Cask and the hoops):
In the German Army, “Regular officers in tank and motorized divisions made up 50% of command staff, and 35 down to 10% in infantry divisions... The rest were reservists, with their professional level much lower...” (189, p.72). It was only in Soviet propagandistic writings where the notorious “two-year experience of modern warfare” existed. Of the five tank divisions in the 1st Wehrmacht Tank Group:
- none of them participated in the Polish campaign;
- only two of them (the 9th and the 11th) participated in the invasion of France;
- the 14th td had one week of combat experience in Yugoslavia before the “Barbarossa”;
- the 13th and the 16th td (created in 1940 on the base of infantry divisions) had absolutely no combat experience by June 22, 1941.
The situation in the 4th, 8th and 15th Mechanized corps which counterattacked the 1 Panzer Group in June 1941 was much better.
Namely, the level of staffing of 15th Mechcorps’ divisions was 45-75% in junior command personnel, 50-87% in senior commanders, and the understaffing in command personnel was mainly due to the lack of political instructors and administrative staff. The so-called “big training session” helped to staff the 8th Mechcorps with personnel at 89% in June 1941 before the recall; its artillery regiments had 88% of the established amount of guns, the number of 45mm guns even exceeded the “regular level” (49 instead of 36).
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