The US Department of State (DoS) is the primary agency supervising FMS programs and provides justifications for the international arms trade. This justification statement is broadly policy-oriented and does not address specific US political-military and industry benefits of FMS. Referring to FMS, the DoS states: “The U.S. Government controls exports of sensitive equipment, software and technology as a means to promote our national security interests and foreign policy objectives.”
The Congressional Research Service issued a report that typifies usual justifications for FMS: “U.S. diplomacy benefits from the U.S. military’s capacity to project itself rapidly into extreme situations, such as disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, enhancing the U.S. image as a humanitarian actor. Humanitarian assistance, military training, and other forms of assistance also provide opportunities to cultivate good relations with foreign populations, militaries, and governments.”
The FMS Process (The How):
Broadly speaking, the US Embassy country team defines the Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) for a country. FMS is an element of the MSP.
When a country wishes to acquire FMS products/services from the US, the country officially requests from the US government a Price and Availability/Letter of Request (P&A/LOR). The US Embassy country team is the first US government entity that responds to the request. If the products/services requested support the MSP, then the country team takes steps to validate the request and verifies the country is approved for the product/services they are requesting. This is done, in part, by referring to a published list of approved customer countries. With US country team support, the P&A/LOR is then forwarded to several DoD agencies and the DoS, and from there the request is forwarded to the relevant military department (mil-dep) for staffing and congressional notification. In accordance with Presidential congressional notification requirements, the mil-dep explains to Congress how this potential sale affects the regional balance of power and enhances the national security interest of the US. US government-run bidding and proposal, source-selection and contract signing and execution begin after congressional approval.
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) outlines specific steps taken by the US country team when evaluating an FMS request received from a customer country. DAU does not contextualize the US national security benefits associated with the sale and makes no mention of access, influence and infrastructure benefits to the US. DAU describes the mechanics of the process:
“When defense articles or services are required, the requesting country's representative in the defense establishment of the country or stationed at the embassy in the U.S. provides a Letter of Request (LOR) to the representative's U.S. counterpart. The U.S. counterpart forwards an information copy of the request to the Department of State (DoS) Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The original is furnished to the DoD Military Department (MILDEP - Army, Navy, or Air Force) or Defense Agency which will prepare the response. The response may be in the form of Price and Availability (P&A) information or a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). Due to a shorter preparation and staffing cycle, P&A is normally used only for preliminary planning purposes. The LOA is a formal offer which, when accepted, forms the basis for the U.S. to provide the materiel and services offered.”
For FMS programs, the mil-dep issues the RFP, runs the source-selection process, selects the prime contractor and administers the program—from start to finish, too include being the arbiter of cost and accounting.
FMS is managed and operated by Department of Defense on a no-profit/no-loss basis. Countries pay for US defense articles and services prior to delivery at prices which ensure US costs are recovered, and this includes personnel costs, shipping, hardware and administrative fees.
US arms sold abroad are severely restricted in their use by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), section 505, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), section 3 (22 U.S.C. 2753) and section 4 (22 U.S.C. 2754).
Further controls are mandated in the terms and conditions of the sales contract (Letter of Offer and Assistance—LOA).
When compared to nations such as France, Russian, Ukraine, China, North Korea, etc., the US places onerous restrictions on the use and transfers of US arms. These restrictions are sometime the proximate cause for a potential customer country to threaten (or seek) alternative sources for products and services. If that threat is carried out the US defense industry may be harmed and US political-military power is reduced.
As stated above, a country must be approved by congress to receive certain military products and services. If they are on the approved list for defense articles and services then arms transfers may happen. . .provided congress received notification and approves.
If the country is not on the approved list for requested defense articles and services, the customer country must officially request a briefing on the FMS product they wish to obtain. In turn, the US country team in the requesting country, along with the DoS and associated mil-dep that would potentially contract and run the FMS program, must agree the potential sale falls within FMS guidelines for receiving the product. If the FMS product carries some level of classification, as most military products manufactured for export do, an “exception to national disclosure policy” (ENDP) is required.
Documentation of the process and transfers are many and everywhere, so there is no way they can be hidden (for long). Hundreds (maybe thousands) of people are involved and someone always talks.
Hitlery may have abetted arms transfers but it appears she did not do it in accordance with the law. . .and there are many others that KNOW this, people in the DoD and arms manufacturing world for example, and they will talk to avoid jail.
“.... Documentation of the process and transfers are many and everywhere,so there is no way they can be hidden (for long). Hundreds (maybe thousands) of people are involved and someone always talks.
Hitlery may have abetted arms transfers but it appears she did not do it in accordance with the law. . .and there are many others that KNOW this,people in the DoD and arms manufacturing world for example,and they will talk to avoid jail. ....”
Agreed, someone always talks.
Shrillary’s treason will out.