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Rand Paul is wrong. In short, Hussein was a threat, and vindictive, and perhaps capable and willing to put small amounts of poison/chemical/bio weapons in the hands of terrorists for delivery to large groups of gathered people in the west/USA. It couldn't be tolerated.

1. During the former president's visit to Kuwait to commemorate the coalition's victory over Iraq in the Gulf War, Kuwaiti authorities arrested 17 people allegedly involved in a car bomb plot to kill George H.W. Bush. Through interviews with the suspects and examinations of the bomb's circuitry and wiring, the FBI established that the plot had been directed by the Iraqi Intelligence Service. A Kuwaiti court later convicted all but one of the defendants.
In retaliation, President Clinton two months later ordered the firing of 23 cruise missiles at Iraqi Intelligence Service headquarters in Baghdad. The day before the attack U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine K. Albright went before the Security Council to present evidence of the Iraqi plot. And, after the U.S. attack, Vice President Gore said the attack "was intended to be a proportionate response at the place where this plot" to assassinate Bush "was hatched and implemented." http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/longroad/etc/assassination.html
2. 2008 Senate Report -- "The report also concluded that "Statements that Iraq provided safe haven for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qa'ida-related terrorist members were substantiated by the intelligence assessments. Intelligence assessments noted Zarqawi's presence in Iraq and his ability to travel and operate within the country. The intelligence community generally believed that Iraqi intelligence must have known about, and therefore at least tolerated, Zarqawi's presence in the country."[112]" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein_and_al-Qaeda_link_allegations
3. Colin Powell, in his February 5, 2003, presentation to the U.N. Security Council, revealed the activities of Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Reporting in the memo expands on Powell's case and might help explain some of the resistance the U.S. military is currently facing in Iraq.

37. Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of Oct. 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi's procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere.

38. According to sensitive reporting, a contact with good access who does not have an established reporting record: An Iraqi intelligence service officer said that as of mid-March the IIS was providing weapons to al Qaeda members located in northern Iraq, including rocket propelled grenade (RPG)-18 launchers. According to IIS information, northern Iraq-based al Qaeda members believed that the U.S. intended to strike al Qaeda targets during an anticipated assault against Ansar al-Islam positions.