Posted on 04/18/2015 12:42:16 PM PDT by UMCRevMom@aol.com
For the past few weeks we have been receiving reports from our insiders regarding massing of military equipment in Olenivka and Dokuchaievsk (Donetsk Oblast). At first glance it looks like a preparation for an offensive on Mariupol. However, since militants told they were going to reach the administrative borders of oblasts, further attack westwards is inevitable. Besides, they will need to cover the flanks of an attack in South-Western direction. It is most likely that they will accumulate military equipment to attack Olenivka — Andriivka via Paraskoviivka and Uspenivka. Taking into account information from eyewitnesses, we could say that they have up to one mechanized battalion there.
The advantage of such an attack is that they move along the water and come to the rear of the Ukrainian units based in Kurakhove and its vicinity. This attack required the militants to stretch out their communications (thus making logistics harder) and thus they will have to take care of their rears. If you look at the map, there is only one good road allowing to transfer military equipment fast: Vuhledar — Paraskoviivka. In order to gain control over this road, the militants will try to reach Vuhledar.
As for Volnovakha, the enemy has concentrated significant force in Starobesheve and Komsomolske (the exact amount of vehicles is not known, but according to reports of our insiders, the enemy has at least two brigades there). In addition, they have sizeable forces in Telmanove as well. Apparently, there will be no attack towards Telmanove — Hranitne — Volnovakha because of the natural water obstacle, i.e. the Kalmius River.
Besides, the moderate tempo of hostilities in that area gave the Ukrainian 72nd Brigade an opportunity to fortify. Now it will be quite difficult for the enemy to overrun our 72nd. Instead, everything that is located in Komsomolske and Starobesheve will be tossed towards Volnovakha. If the militants capture Volnovakha, only then will they be able to develop an offensive upon Mariupol and Hranitne, getting into the rear of the 72nd Brigade. In order to divert attention, the militants will likely attack towards Telmanove — Hranitne.
There is a direct route from Volnovakha to Mariupol. However, we should note that the distance is quite long, and the highway goes through the open plains in this area. This is why the enemy draws up air defence systems southwards. This air defence will cover the attacking Terrorussian group from Ukrainian SS-21 Scarab Tactical Operational Missile Complexes, as well as 9A52 Smerch and BM-27 Uragan MLRS. If the militants successfully reach Mariupol, they will not enter the city, but instead will try reaching Mangush in order to cut off supplies.
There is another argument supporting the theory of encircling attack, and it is military equipment leaving Petrovskiy district of Donetsk. We tried to find it everywhere. We were unable to check only the living block of the mine No. 29 and the area of the asphalt plant. It is possible that a small group of terrorists is located there. The task of this group will be to contain the attack of the ATO forces from Mariinka and to imitate the attack towards Mariinka — Kurakhove in order to divert attention from the main direction (Olenivka — Andriivka).
As for the Northern direction, militants are increasing their manpower in Horlivka. It could seem as if they are preparing for an attack upon Kostiantynivka. However, there is a natural obstacle complicating this, i.e. the Kleban-Byk natural landmark, beginning between Dobropillya and Kostiantynivka and ending near Artemivsk. There is still an option for the terrorists to attack towards Krasnoarmiisk and Dymytrov from Horlivka: there are steppes and very few water obstacles there.
Besides, this direction is at the turn of the two sectors. It might seem unwise to attack in that direction, until you take in mind the possibility of Olenivka — Andriivka attack. If the latter attack succeeds, the ‘Army of Novorossiya’ will close the pocket with almost entire Ukrainian Sector B inside. In order to deprive this Sector of the possibility to transfer its reserves for flank attacks and to cut off communications, the militants will probably initiate fights in the Donetsk Airport and Pisky, simulating an attack on Avdiivka.
As for Sector S, it will be unable to help because of the troubles it will have in the area of Artemivsk. Judging by the amount of military equipment and manpower which militants are transferring to Stakhanov, we conclude that they prepare for an attack northwards. If Putin approves the attack, they will deliver blows towards Horlivka — Maiorsk — Artemivsk and Pervomaisk — Artemivsk. Keep in mind that part of the forces of Sector S will be busy with fights in the Kalynove — Svitlodar direction.
Sector A is also in danger of an attack at the turn of the sectors. It is most likely that the militants are preparing for an attack on Lysyhansk. They will probably try to pin down Ukrainian forces in the area of Trokhizbenka, imitating crossing over the Siverskyi Donets River (using the forces accumulated in Stakhanov and Alchevsk). In addition, the ‘Army of Novorossiya’ will fight for Stanytsia Luhanska (the assault troops will come from Millerovo, Russian Federation but they will pretend infiltrating along the border). You can read about one of the crossings over Donets here, it is unknown how many such crossings exist. If the militants succeed with Lysychansk and Stanytsia Luhanska, they will move towards Shchastya from the North and South-East.
These were short term prospects. Speaking of long term ones, we should mention the possibility of an attack on Slovyansk from Artemivsk. Besides, there is a risk that the militants will use a secondary road to move from Dobropillya to Kramatorsk. The road is in good condition and has neither checkpoints of the Ukrainian Army nor the National Guard of Ukraine.
As for the long term prosects for Luhansk Oblast, the militants will not move northwards because they remember that the residents of Svatove and Starobelsk were not impressed by them back in 2014. Novorossiya failed in the North of Luhansk Oblast last year and is doomed to fail this year, should they dare to try.
Last but not least: spring has come, trees are becoming green. Forests will become green soon, and then militants could decide to attack towards Yampol and Krasnyi Lyman: the terrain is very suitable for that: the Severskyi Donets River with its banks studded with trees and large forestlands…
Original article by Artem Vasylenko and Timur Melik, translated by Oxana Tinko, edited by Gennadiy Kornev
Русский: https://informnapalm.org/7934-svodka-ot-komandy-informnapalm-po-sostoyanyyu-na-13-aprelya-2015
Deutsch: https://de.informnapalm.org/lagebericht-des-informnapalmteams-stand-13-april-2015/
Francais: https://fr.informnapalm.org/resume-de-l-equipe-d-informnapalm-au-13-avril-2015/
Espanol: https://es.informnapalm.org/los-boletines-de-ato-de-el-frente-de-la-guerra-de-liberacion-ucraniana/
Slovensky:https://sk.informnapalm.org/operativny-suhrn-situacie-v-zone-ato-k-13-04-2015/
We promised The Ukrainians we would in a treaty that we would help them from Russian aggression; and this administration has all but ignored them.
To which treaty are your referring?
BUDAPEST MEMORANDIUM under NPT:
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)—signed 1968, came into force 1970: An international treaty (currently with 189 member states) to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
The treaty has three main pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.
UKRAINE TREATY IS ONE OF THE FORMER Soviet states that disarmed and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states:
[Between 1946 and 1999, the United States completed nearly 16,000 international agreements. Only 912 of those agreements were treaties, submitted to the Senate for approval as outlined in Article II of the United States Constitution. Since the Franklin Roosevelt presidency, only 6% of international accords have been completed as Article II treaties. Most of these executive agreements consist of congressional-executive agreements.
[BTW: Between 1946 and 1999, the United States completed nearly 16,000 international agreements. Only 912 of those agreements were treaties, submitted to the Senate for approval as outlined in Article II of the United States Constitution.]
Ukraine had inherited physical, if not operational, control over the world’s third-largest stockpile of nukes—roughly 1800 warheads and an arsenal bigger than China, Britain and France combined. While Russia retained possession of most of the necessary infrastructure to make use of these nuclear armaments, the threat of nuclear proliferation had grown dramatically overnight. In a sweeping effort to consolidate and secure the former Soviet Union’s nuclear stockpiles, Russia, the UK, the US, and Ukraine concluded two years of negotiations with what came to be known as the Budapest Memorandum. All four governments signed it on December 5th, 1994.
Among other things the Memorandum—the full text of which can be found here—promised signatories would:
•“respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine”
•“refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”
•“refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind”
To be more precise, it was a “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)”, which is basicaly a treaty. It was the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances; in which Obama has not upheld our part to do something about Russia's aggression toward the Ukraine.
See post 4 as well.
A memorandum of understanding is an executive agreement and is NOT a treaty. Furthermore, there is no such thing as "basically a treaty" -- it either is or it isn't. The United States Constitution stipulates that any agreement must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate before it becomes a treaty and is therefore binding upon the United States of America. A president by himself does not have the authority to commit America to a legally binding agreement without the Senate's overwhelming (i.e. 2/3) approval through its Constitutional advise and consent power -- this is precisely what all the fuss over the Iranian nuke deal is all about.
President Clinton knew this when he signed the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 and never presented it to the Senate for a vote as a treaty. It was a cynical ploy and Kiev fell for it, and surrendered its nukes to Moscow. We may sympathize with Ukraine, but there is no treaty which compels the United States of America to intervene on its behalf.
OK, fine, you are technically correct in stating it's not a treaty - but it is an agreement in which congress would back up if we had a president with a backbone. Seems like these MOU's are only taking effect when it's a detriment to the US, like Obama following through with Bush's MOU to the time we pull out of Iraq.
Even though we are not compelled to do anything; we need to be doing something a lot more then we are now. Reagan began to put more military backing into NATO with nothing close to what is happening with the Ukraine; we need to do the same again. This is what bankrupted the USSR; it would do it again. They are much more afraid of beginning a nuke war than we are; and in the long run, it will prevent one - just as it did in the 1980's
Thank -God- the Kiev coup did not inherit 1800 nukes.
And any agreement was with the government of Ukraine at that time. A coup seizing power cannot expect to hold anyone to the agreements that the government they overthrew had signed.
Even though we are not compelled to do anything; we need to be doing something a lot more then we are now. Reagan began to put more military backing into NATO with nothing close to what is happening with the Ukraine; we need to do the same again. This is what bankrupted the USSR; it would do it again. They are much more afraid of beginning a nuke war than we are; and in the long run, it will prevent one - just as it did in the 1980's
You make a lot of assumptions about Congress and Reagan and how Russia might react to a hostile alliance's actions on its border. President Reagan was smart enough and wise enough to studiously avoid challenging Russia to any fight on its borders. While Reagan sent weapons and ammunition to anti-Communist rebels in places far from Russia itself, Reagan refused to send anything more powerful than copy machines to the Poles in the Gdansk uprising. It would be sheer lunacy to start a war against Russia on its own turf; for us it might begin as a limited adventure, but for the Russians from the outset it would pose an existential justifying all defensive means at its disposal. That is the kind of war that fools start by mistake, and that wise men studiously avoid.
President Reagan was smart enough and wise enough to studiously avoid challenging Russia to any fight on its borders.
I never stated we should "challenge Russia at its borders", the US should at least do what Reagan did, and build on NATO support that is directed against Russia.
Frankly, you guys can stick with Obama's idea; I'll stick with what Cruz's idea.
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