“The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force against such fleeing suspects.”
“For accreditation by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, a department must restrict the use of deadly force to situations where “the officer reasonably believes that the action is in defense of human life . . . or in defense of any person in immediate danger of serious physical injury.” Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies 1-2 (1983) (italics deleted)
Immediate and imminent are interchangeable terms in law and whenever there is a reference to “reasonable” means objective reasonableness.
Ah, the old “reasonableness” standards, just as fictional and subjectively used and interpreted as the “reasonable man” in many different venues in criminal and tort law. Thus, the reasonableness applied by the officer better not get trumped by the constitutional reasonableness; otherwise, he is in big trouble.
It should also be arguable that the fleeing felon would be an immediate threat to others, as reasonably determined by the officer, if the officer was actually assaulted.
“A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”
Here comes more reasonable interpretation by the officer in the heat of the moment. Was Brown non-dangerous? I would say he was dangerous. One need not wield a weapon to be dangerous. Another interesting case seemly open for interpretation by the lower courts, agencies, etc., and yet again may require another decision by the USSC via another cert.