Although lost their Army group, but it was still recoverable, as Mannstein was able to provide some stability. Else they would not have later gone on the offensive at Kursk.
“Else they would not have later gone on the offensive at Kursk.”
Guderian’s book provides some valuable insight into this.
Germany lost more than just a battle at Stalingrad, they lost invaluable EXPERIENCE. He noted how just the season before, the Panzers had been crewed by experienced and motivated MEN, and that now, just before Kursk they were inexperienced kids.
The Russians out-ran their supplies after Stalingrad, which allowed Manstein to stabilize the lines somewhat. Guderian argued hard against the Kursk Offensive, knowing that the Russians were building a deep defensive line, and had big forces behind it.
He advocated again for his “Mobile Defense” doctrine, but Hitler wouldn’t have it, especially given how little movement there had been in the North at this point. He was convinced that the Russians had run out of steam, and pushing them hard would cause them to fall apart again.
When the Allied invasion of Sicily forced Hitler to Divert an entire Air Fleet, and several of Germany’s best, newly re-equipped Mech Divisions to be diverted to Italy, Guderian argued even more strongly against Kursk, knowing that he was expending the last of Germany’s real reserve.
Needless to say, this earned him the ire of Hitler.