“But all the billions of $ of stealth will do no good on a clear day and a sharp eyed fighter pilot.”
True enough. . .if he survives to the merge.
Here’s a point worth considering: stealth works against fighters because it’s virtually impossible for air defense systems to locate, let along maintain tracking on stealth platforms.
From what I’ve heard, the B-2 briefly appears on (some) radars when it’s bomb-bay doors are open—and the exposure in minimal. Once the weapons are dropped, the B-2 disappears (again).
During my spook days, I used to listen to recordings of Iraqi GCI controllers attempting to vector fighters against coalition aircraft. It was almost comical; the Iraqis, using Russian intercept tactics, were completely wedded to the controller, relying on him to call even the simplest course correction. If the radar was targeted by an anti-radiation missile, or Compass Call was working its magic against the comm links, the fighter pilot was screwed.
I listened to several shoot-down intercepts from the days of the No Fly Zones and those guys literally didn’t have a clue. During engagements with F-15s or F-16s, neither the controller nor the pilot had any real idea where our guys were at, or how close the Flogger or Foxbat driver was to meeting Allah.
Now, put a pilot from that same training system in a scenario where he must find a VLO aircraft, operating well above 40,000 ft. The odds of a “successful” intercept are very, very low. These pilots simply can’t think their way through an intercept without GCI support and in many instances, that “support” is more of hinderance than help.
The Israelis operate drones over Syria on a near-constant basis, but you never hear about the IAF losing one of those platforms. It’s not that the Syrians don’t try to shoot them down—they just can’t find them and coordinate the intercept.