Here is the old post with slight formatting changes and more descriptive link names in a few cases:
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Consider the definition of "act of war" [Source: USLeagle.com, my bold below]:
"An act of war is an action by one country against another with an intention to provoke a war or an action that occurs during a declared war or armed conflict between military forces of any origin."
Without war Lincoln did not have the power under the Constitution to coerce states back into the Union or prevent additional secessions. He would not have sufficient revenue to run the government. If he could provoke the South to attack first, he could manipulate the country into war and bypass constitutional restrictions on his powers. Here are some of the actions he took to at Fort Pickens provoke war:
Violate Fort Pickens truce to provoke the South to attack
Truce Details. A Southern proposal was laid before President Buchanan that Fort Pickens would not be attacked if the fort was not reinforced by the North. The proposal was agreed to and signed by the US Secretaries of War and the Navy. This truce kept the peace and the status quo in Pensacola Harbor and prevented war. Here are the terms of the truce in January 29 instructions to Union commanders from the two Secretaries and the Secretary of War’s separate orders to the Army commander in Fort Pickens: [Official Records, Series 1, Volume 1, Part 1, pages 355-356].
March 5, Lincoln's first effort to violate the truce. The day after his inauguration Lincoln gave verbal orders to General Winfield Scott to "maintain" all forts with special directions concerning Fort Pickens. [Source 1 and Source 2]
March 5, Scott tells/reminds Lincoln of the truce. [Source] The truce had been mentioned in the press. New York Times, February 6, 1861: "Reported Truce at Pensacola", February 22, 1861: "The Truce at Fort Pickens," but the articles I've found didn't mention how high up in the US government the officials were who were involved in the negotiations.
Lincoln's second effort to violate the truce, March 11.
Lincoln’s written order to reinforce Fort Pickens. Finding that nothing had been done on his March 5 verbal orders, Lincoln gave a written order to General Scott that he should reinforce Fort Pickens. [Source] Source 2 above said that on March 11, Lincoln "once more gave special directions in regard to Pickens."
Scott issues an order to reinforce Pickens, March 12.. In response to Lincoln's order of the previous day, Scott sent secret written orders to reinforce Fort Pickens to his army commander on the Brooklyn, Captain Vogdes.
Scott's Order received by Vogdes, March 31. Vogdes received Scott's order to reinforce Fort Pickens on March 31. Vogdes then asked the senior naval officer in the harbor, Captain Adams, for boats to land his troops. Adams refuses to obey the order from Scott as he had written orders from the former Secretary of the Navy not to land troops at the fort unless the fort was attacked and besides, the order was old and it came from Scott and not from the Navy.
By the way, Vogdes called the truce an "armistice."
April 1. "not only a declaration but an act of war". On April 1, Adams writes Welles, the new Secretary of the Navy, saying he did not provide boats to reinforce Pickens and adding [Source: "Lincoln Takes Command" by Tilley, page 50 or Official Records of the Navies, Series 1, Vol. 4, pages 109-110]
it [reinforcing Fort Pickens] would be considered not only a declaration but an act of war. … While I can not take on myself under such insufficient authority as General Scott's order the fearful responsibility of an act which seems to render civil war inevitable, I am ready at all times to carry out whatever orders I may receive from the honorable Secretary of the Navy.
Lincoln's third effort to violate the truce, March 29
Lincoln's plan to hold Fort Pickens, March 29. Lincoln had not heard whether Fort Pickens had been reinforced as a result of Scott’s March 12 order, but he must have assumed that the fort had been or would be shortly. On March 29, Lincoln asked Army Captain Montgomery Meigs whether Fort Pickens could be held. Meigs thought it could unless the Navy had already lost it. At the same meeting, Seward asked Meigs to develop a plan for holding Pickens. [Source]
Scott issues orders to reinforce and hold Pickens, April 1. Lincoln approved the orders. Meigs was to go as the expedition's engineer. [Official Records, Series 1, Volume 1, Part 1, pages 365-366]
"This is the beginning of the war", April 6. As the Fort Pickens expedition authorized by Scott and Lincoln on April 1 is departing New York on April 6, Meigs, on board the expedition ship Atlantic, sends a note to Seward that says, "This is the beginning of the war". [Official Records, Series 1, Volume 1, Part 1, page 368]
Adams' notice of his refusal to offload troops at Pickens arrives in Washington on April 6. Adams communicated that he had not carried out Scott's order to reinforce Pickens as the order was in conflict with his earlier orders from the Navy.
Welles responds by ordering Adams to help reinforce Pickens, April 6. [Official Records of the Navies, Series 1, Vol. 4, pages 110-111]
Welles order gets to Adams. There are different versions of when troops reinforced Fort Pickens. Here's one that says in the evening of April 12th [Reign of Iron]. Here is another that says some troops were offloaded on shore after 9 pm on April 11. [Truth of the war conspiracy]
Worden did reach the Federal ship the Wyandotte on the 11th. Seas were too rough on April 11 to take Worden over the bar to Captain Adams' ship, the Sabine. Worden's report to the Acting Secretary of the Navy was that he was conveyed to Adams on April 12 and delivered the message then. However, signals could have been sent from the Wyandotte to Adams authorizing the offloading of some troops on the 11th (which would have been before the firing on Fort Sumter). Federal troops had earlier been offloaded onto Santa Rosa Island to relieve fort soldiers on picket duty [from memory].
Confirming information of April 11 reinforcement from a ship’s log.. [Official Records of the Navies, Series 1, Vol. 4, Log of the Ship Supply]:
April 11 -- At 9 p. m. the Brooklyn got underway and stood in towards the harbor, and during the night landed the troops and marines on board, to reenforce Fort Pickens.The date could be a typo, of course. Also, about March 31, the Brooklyn's troops were sent to Captain Adams' ship, the Sabine. The Brooklyn and the Wyandotte were the ships that delivered troops to Fort Pickens. On April 10, the fort sent a request for immediate reinforcement to Adams because of a possible impending attack. Adams replied that he wanted to see more details to justify the reinforcement.
FWIW, Vogdes was listed as in charge of Fort Pickens from April 1l to April 16. [1904 Bio of Vodges and West Point Class History]
1,211posted (originally) on Sunday, November 13, 2011 12:15:54 AMby rustbucket
Welles order gets to Adams. There are different versions of when troops reinforced Fort Pickens. Here's one that says in the evening of April 12th [Reign of Iron]. Here is another that says some troops were offloaded on shore after 9 pm on April 11. [Truth of the war conspiracy]
No time to figure out how things were on the ground or how the White House actually worked? No time to figure out what forces were available and muster them for the coming war? Not much time think out a strategy for the war or reflect on how it might go?
Maybe Abe was working it all out in the ten days he'd been in Washington, or further back on the train or in Springfield, but the idea that Lincoln was that single-minded and didn't consider other alternatives is at least a little silly.
Your definition of an "act of war" implies that the Confederacy was a country, something that many Americans didn't believe, and that any action that "provokes" any armed force is an "act of war." Surely, police going after criminals or troops breaking up a riot or rebellion isn't an "act of war." And most surely, bringing sandwiches to policemen or soldiers involved in a stand-off situation isn't by any means an "act of war." That leaves the tricky question of "intention" which isn't by any means clear in this case.
In reference to Captain Adams, I point out the inter-service rivalry aspect. He was not inclined to obey orders that didn't come from his direct superiors in the Navy Department. Perhaps he was also involved in personal relationships with Florida authorities who were on the other side and his view of things reflected that and differed from Washington's view.
In any case, so far as I know, whatever Union forces did at Fort Pickens did not provoke war, so either aggressive Abe failed in his evil plot or else shrewd Lincoln assessed the situation accurately and his moves successfully strengthened US positions without provoking war.
The question in early 1861 was whether the federal government would do anything at all to stand in the way of the secessionist tide or not, whether it would try to hold on to any legitimate federal property in the South or whether it would let it all go, whether it would make even a nominal or symbolic assertion of its authority or whether it would collapse completely. Holding on to a fort would be a way to assert the continuity of the union and national authority if the US chose to do so.
At the time many in both the South and the North would view any attempt to hold on to any federal property in the South as a violation of state or Confederate sovereignty and an act of war. Any measures to resupply or reinforce federal positions still in federal hands in the rebel states (or elsewhere) would likewise be regarded as belligerent acts. That accounts for many of the opinions you've found.
That left only the alternative of surrender and collapse so far as the United States's claims that secession was unconstitutional and the union unbroken. That also likely meant passivity in the face of future acts of secession. That was something Lincoln couldn't countenance.
Lincoln (and others in the North) wanted an assertion of continued federal authority in the face of secession movements and rebel theft and plunder. Such actions would be taken by some (even in Lincoln's own cabinet) as warlike moves, but if one wanted the union to take a stand one would have to draw the line somewhere. For Lincoln and his supporters, this was a moderate, measured step that stood in contrast to surrender on the one hand and beginning an aggressive war in support of the Constitution (as they understood it).
Since there were a limited number of installations outside of rebel hands and they all had their advantages and disadvantages it would require some complicated and awkward footwork to chose a place to make a stand and supply the troops on the ground with what they needed, even if it was only food or medicine and not weapons and ammunition. That accounts for at least some of the awkward manouevers that you consider belligerent.
If you believed the choice was between three alternatives, you might support Lincoln. If you believed there were only two alternatives -- complete passivity and withdrawal from all federal property in the rebel states or provoking a war, you would most likely condemn his strategy.
Barring some smoking gun, some admission by Lincoln that he was trying to start a war, how could you legitimately conclude that he was trying to provoke a war, rather than simply endeavoring to take a firm stand against what he regarded as unconstitutional secession? I don't think you can. And you really can't get away from interpretation either if your means of doing so is simply excluding or ignoring the possibility that Lincoln and his supporters were pursuing the middle strategy of firmness without provocation.
Of course that strategy didn't work. Efforts to stand in the way of the rebels seizing all federal property in the Deep South would be regarded by the state and Confederate governments as belligerent. In that sense, Lincoln was wrong. Still, that doesn't prove that trying to hold on to forts was intended to provoke a war.
The possibility of war was something that had to be on Lincoln's mind. And we know that he wanted to avoid firing the first shot, but I don't see how you can definitively conclude that it was his intention to start a war that he had little idea of how to fight and win.
For we also know that Lincoln believed that pro-secessionist sentiment in the South was thin and weak. It's not unreasonable to conclude that he believed that holding the line would cause the rebellion to collapse. He was wrong about that too, but what you're accusing him of goes far beyond misjudgment.
Interpretations like yours whitewash Jefferson Davis's responsibility. I don't say that you personally do that, but it is implied in what you write. It's as though he had no choice: faced with the resupply mission he just had to have the fort bombarded.
But really, this idea of Davis as a mechanical, knee-jerk creature with such a paucity of imagination and lack of resourcefulness makes him look quite bad -- worse than Lincoln, in fact. Attempts to make it look like Davis was "fooled" or "tricked" or "provoked" into war either deprive him of whatever free will and political savvy he had or admit that he actually was lacking in the categories that make for a competent national leader.