The clause [rb: the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution] manifestly contemplates the existence of a positive, unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no state law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control or restrain. The slave is not to be discharged from service or labor, in consequence of any state law or regulation.
Now certainly, without indulging in any nicety of criticism upon words, it may be fairly said, that any state law or state regulation which interrupts, limits, delays, or postpones the right of the owner of the slave to the immediate possession of the slave, and the immediate command of his service and labor, operates, pro tanto, a discharge of the slave therefrom.
I suspect some of the state laws resulted in blocking or greatly delaying the "immediate" return to service of the slave. As the Michigan legislature said, their law was intended to block the return of fugitive slaves.
Agree completely.
And Prigg revealed that state regulations which required little things like evidence, due process had the effect of both protecting people who did not owe service, and protecting slave catchers from liability from (surely inadvertant) kidnapping of innocent persons.
Prigg had kidnapped at least one person who had never been a slave, and was found innocent of kidnapping. Such was the deference given to the slave power in 1826.
In 1859, less deference was given to the slave power, and state officials were not required in their official capacity to aid. Individual citizens, when called up as a posse by the federal marshal were required.
Differences between the state power, and those who gave that pretended power less deference were obliged to be resolved peacefully by litigation. If a state was involved, it would be litigated at the Supreme Court as original jurisdiction.
Isn’t it amusing how ‘consent of the governed’ went out the window whenever the slave power demanded its obscene right to the objects of its lust.