The US State Department would rather forget Korea as in January Sec State Acheson, in a statement obviously coordinated with the White House, declared Korea outside the US sphere of interest. McArthur seconded this statement by a similar one.
The US Army, in particular, generally ignores the Korean War because of the wretched performance of many of the 8th army units deployed in the first weeks of the conflict. Soldiers who had maybe two weeks of tactical training a year and often fired less than a hundred rounds on the firing range in a year found themselves suddenly thrust into combat with a tough, well trained and motivated enemy generally better armed and equipped than the US Army. A great many officers at both company and field grade failed miserably as leaders. Some fleeing in confiscated vehicles abandoning their units. Virtually all Army personnel assets available in the Far East and Conus other than the 82nd ABN were tasked to fill gaps and flesh out the 8th Army as it was conducting both a fighting retreat and attempting to establish a firm defensive perimeter. The fighting on the Pusan Perimeter was a closer thing than is generally known even with the concentration of US air, naval and land resources. These initial traumas were eclipsed by the near disaster that the 8th Army suffered at the hands of the Chinese Communists in their surprise counter-offensive sprung a few days after Thanksgiving 1950 as US/UN forces kicked off what was to be the ‘victory’ offensive that McArthur confidently expected would enable him to begin withdrawing some US forces by the end of the year. In this offensive in which one US division (the 2nd Infantry) was virtually destroyed and another (the 25th Infantry Division) was seriously mauled plus numerous non divisional units being destroyed or seriously damaged, the Chinese came near to cutting off and destroying the bulk of the combat forces of the 8th Army. Amidst this chaos it appears the commander of the 8th Army, LTG Walton Walker, suffered a near collapse due to battle fatigue. Walkers disarray led to no real command direction on a structured retreat to defensible positions near Pyongyang. Instead US/UN forces began a virtual stampede to the south . This situation was compounded by the death of General Walker in a vehicle accident shortly before Christmas and the innefectuality of MG Coulter the senior US Army officer in the 8th
Army.
The Korean War ought be ever remembered both to commemorate the courage and sacrifice of many US servicemen and their allies. Further this war illuminates every major professional challenge military forces can anticipate meeting. A sudden and unforeseen outbreak of hostilities, an enemy who appears as a near peer material contender with outstanding cohesion, training, and morale and an utterly ruthless elan that motivates them to win at all costs, a primitive battlefield marked by extremes of weather and environment and challenges to the highest command authorities requiring extraordinary moral and intellectual fortitude and sagacity.
Let us not forget that North Korea was totally backed by China and even Russia (air force). South Korea had little more than a token military (if it could be called that) when the North invaded.
The fledgling Korean CIA was very helpful if not instrumental in helping set the stage for the Inchon landing.