I’m no lawyer, but I think it’s something like what you’re sayin’.
Cuz if it came out later if a search was unreasonable and there was no warrant, the searchee might have some legal recourse, i.e., the police or dept, etc., might be in some hot water.
This is where this whole situation is completely different from seizure of basically everyone’s phone bill extended call detail.
While it’s a nice fantasy for the Feds to have such data at their fingertips and have it be Constitutional, it’s very obvious that it’s an overreach of titanic proportions.
That would be nice in theory. Unfortunately, those in government often show little interest in prosecuting even patently illegitimate actions by government agents.
If I may use an analogy, suppose that in a baseball game, the first nine pitches by the home-team pitcher didn't even come within five feet of being over the plate, and batters made no move to swing at them, but the Home Plate Umpire nonetheless called "strike". Under the rules of baseball, those would be strikes.
Suppose further that the visiting pitcher then threw sixteen perfect pitches right down the middle, but the Home Plate Umpire called "ball", walking in a run after the sixteenth pitch. According to the rules of baseball, the First- or Third-Base Umpire may overrule a call of "ball", but only if in their judgment a batter swung at a pitch. If those officials were to start declaring that batters had swung at well-placed pitches, should such conduct be considered legitimate or illegitimate?
Suppose that after a few innings of such patently-unreasonable officiating, the visiting team walked off the field and went home. Would the game of baseball be better served by having the scorekeeper record it as having been forfeit by the visiting team, or as having been disrupted by natural disaster prior to the start of the first inning?
I would posit that it's impossible for any system of rules to fully anticipate malfeasance by those responsible for enforcement. If those who conduct searches without warrants were routinely punished in cases where they acted without clear probable causes, there might seldom be a need for warrants. On the other hand, the fact that governments seldom punish their own often makes it necessary for judges to invent remedies which go beyond anything expressly provided for in statute; such behavior by judges would be a good thing if they were more explicit about the fact that their actions have no direct statutory basis, but are instead compelled by the long-standing legal principle that criminals should not be allowed to profit by their actions (which should apply even when those criminals are agents of the state).