Good article!
To be honest, though, I wish the F-35B variant had never actually been hatched. The JSF was already a compromise design trying to meet the needs of both the USAF and the USN. Trying to make a variant that is STVOL as well has undoubtedly created many of the technical problems, delays, and cost overruns the JSF program has endured.
Now, I don’t blame the Marines for wanting a 21st century replacement for the Harrier, or the Brits for wanting the F-35B as a Harrier replace for their carriers (before they bailed out on the deal). I’m just sayin’ in retrospect, it probably would have been better and less expensive to start with a clean sheet of paper and create a design completely separate from the F-35 A and C versions. What we’re seeing now is bloat that makes McNamara’s adventure with the F-111 look like pocket change.
“To be honest, though, I wish the F-35B variant had never actually been hatched. The JSF was already a compromise design trying to meet the needs of both the USAF and the USN.”
I worked on the Future Combat System, the largest army procurement to date. For political reasons it was to be a design that satisfied all of the Army program command’s customers. It would have a front-line combat tank replacement, an ambulance, a scout car, all buit from the same platform. Anything that was not designed into the main vehicle would be, theoretically, paid for by the end Army customer. Well, the program command would never make a decision because each customer truly needed a unique vehicle and didn’t have the money to design their portion. So those customers would never sign off on a base design that wasn’t their complete vehicle.
To get the funding SAIC and Boing searched their pockets and came up with enough Senatorial votes. This meant that the “integrator of integrators” was actually two companies who refused to work together on anything.
The shecedule and spend rates were set in concrete but the documentation that would let the subs start building didn’t show up until a month before the preliminary design review. But those spend rates were met because the upper level bonuses were tied to them. So, companies hired unbelievable numbers of people the last three months of the year, who spent their time, for the most part, playing computer games. Then, they’d lay them off come January in the hopes the Army would eventually send us design documents.
The point of this is, for political reasons, you can’t have a pure design for anything as eventually even the Clean The Floors Command will be you customer. This is one of the basis for cost overruns.
Right, mismanagement of the JSF project coupled with Lockheed's ineptness has had nothing to do with technical problems, delays and cost overruns. Any idea why the F-35B is farther ahead than the A and C variants to the point that the B will achieve IOC prior to either?
(before they bailed out on the deal).
The Brits are once again procuring the B.