"The phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States."
Why don't you defer to the later Supreme Court who said that tiny bit of dicta you just quoted was ill-considered, inaccurate dicta?
[The United States Supreme Court, referring to the EXACT quote you just gave:]
This was wholly aside from the question in judgment and from the course of reasoning bearing upon that question. [Do you know what "wholly aside from the question in judgment and from the course of reasoning bearing upon that question" means? It means the comment was pure dicta.]
It was unsupported by any argument, or by any reference to authorities, and that it was not formulated with the same care and exactness as if the case before the court had called for an exact definition of the phrase is apparent from its classing foreign ministers and consuls together -- whereas it was then well settled law, as has since been recognized in a judgment of this court in which Mr. Justice Miller concurred, that consuls, as such, and unless expressly invested with a diplomatic character in addition to their ordinary powers, are not considered as entrusted with authority to represent their sovereign in his intercourse with foreign States or to vindicate his prerogatives, or entitled by the law of nations to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or public ministers, but are subject to the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, of the courts of the country in which they reside. 1 Kent Com. 44; Story Conflict of Laws § 48; Wheaton International Law (8th ed.) § 249; The Anne (1818), 3 Wheat. 435, 445, 446; Gittings v. Crawford (1838), Taney 1, 10; In re Baiz (1890), 135 U.S. 403, 424.
[So it was DICTA, and ILL-CONSIDERED dicta at that.]
In weighing a remark uttered under such circumstances, it is well to bear in mind the often quoted words of Chief Justice Marshall:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions in every opinion are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.
Cohens v. Virginia (1821), 6 Wheat. 264, 399.
That neither Mr. Justice Miller nor any of the justices who took part in the decision of The Slaughterhouse Cases understood the court to be committed to the view that all children born in the United States of citizens or subjects of foreign States were excluded from the operation of the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is manifest from a unanimous judgment of the Court, delivered but two years later, while all those judges but Chief Justice Chase were still on the bench, in which Chief Justice Waite said: "Allegiance and protection are, in this connection" (that is, in relation to citizenship), reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other: allegiance for protection, and protection for allegiance. . . . At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further, and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class, there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens.
And beyond that, the same Court DIDN'T ACTUALLY MEAN IT.
So it was dicta, it was ill-considered dicta, and the Court that said it didn't really mean it.
How many different possible ways could the United States Supreme Court tell you that the sentence you just quoted was totally and completely wrong?
You claimed, "Birthright citizenship wasn't extended to the children of some aliens until the U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark decision."
Sorry, but that tiny bit of totally wrongheaded dicta, clearly identified by the US Supreme Court as a tiny bit of totally wrongheaded dicta, doesn't cut it.
As I said before:
Produce one example of someone born on US soil to white non-citizen immigrant parents, who was declared not to be a United States citizen prior to 1880.
I don't need to. I'll refer you to U.S. Secretaries of State, executing the law exactly as Justice Miller described:
Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen determined Ludwig Hausding, though born in the U.S., was not born a U.S. citizen because he was subject to a foreign power at birth having been born to a Saxon subject alien father.
Similarly, Secretary of State Thomas Bayard determined Richard Greisser, though born in Ohio, was not born a U.S. citizen because Greisser's father, too, was an alien, a German subject at the time of Greisser's birth. Bayard specifically stated that Greisser was at birth 'subject to a foreign power,' therefore not "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Source: http://books.google.com/books?id=wdgxAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false
Justice Miller was indeed accurate.