That was one possibility. The other was that the rebels wouldn't fire on the fort. That would prolong the stand-off situation, and perhaps make it likely that cooler heads would prevail and the situation would be resolved. And that would also have suited Lincoln.
The idea that Lincoln wanted or needed to crush the South in all-out war could well be a conclusion reached afterward, after an all-out war that did crush the South. At the time, on taking office, Lincoln still believed that there were abundant reserves of pro-Union feeling in the South that might eventually prevail in the Southern states if the country could weather the immediate crisis. Didn't Davis need a war more than Lincoln did -- so that support for secession and his new government didn't just dry up?
The notion that somehow a differential in tariffs would immediately enrich the CSA and impoverish the USA doesn't work for me. Financial journalists may talk like that, but the tariff's effects would take longer to materialize. If anybody was in a hurry it wasn't for that reason -- not if they were in full possession of their senses, anyway. Moreover, such arguments cut both ways. One might as well argue that Davis needed to strike before his enslaved labor force ran off.
That Providence Daily Post editorial is here. It's a little confused. They believed that secession came because Lincoln didn't support non-interference with slavery in the territories and the rebellion would end if only Lincoln would break his party's platform and cave in to Southern demands. That wasn't going to happen. As I read it they don't come out and directly say that Lincoln had some evil plan, but that he gave into the demands of the abolitionists who did.
If a paper doesn't even seriously consider the idea that the federal government should stand up to the secessionists or that free-soilers could legitimately stand firm on the exclusion of slavery from a territory, that paper would naturally view Lincoln's actions in the worst possible light. They agreed that the federal government had a right to the forts, but they thought a surrender on slavery extension and other concessions would bring the rebels back into the union.
It would take some time to go through the material you cite and untangle what was going on when and what agreements were made with whom and how. I'm also wondering how much of the "this is the beginning of the war" sentiment was a considered judgment on policy and how much was what soldiers and sailors inevitably think when large numbers of troops are massed or mobilized. It's hard to say, for example, how much of Captain Adams's comment relates to the actual situation with the rebels and how much relates to bureaucratic Army-Navy rivalry or to his own private feelings about secession. I'd want to know a little more.
If one believed that the federal government should take some kind of stand -- even a purely symbolic one -- against the rebellion and Buchanan's government had spinelessly renounced even the most theoretical and nominal dissent or resistance to the demands and actions, then obviously there would be a change in policy. Or do you believe that everything the rebels demanded or got was hard and fast and everything the union had held was subject to secessionist demands and assaults? And, as happens when one administration succeeds another, there was confusion and uncertainty. It might not have been clear just what was promised by home and with what degree of authority.
This also applied to the Confederate side as well, though. Davis was in a hurry -- even more than Lincoln. Asking why the Confederates didn't strike earlier when the federals were confused and disoriented ignores the fact that they were confused as well. They had no real army yet, and they -- as much as the Union -- needed a rallying point. Didn't Davis also -- seen from the immediate perspective of the time -- benefit from a war? Didn't he benefit from a rallying point that war would give him?
My point still stands, though: if you think someone is trying to trick or provoke you into war and you give them that war, should you really be complaining or reproaching? Was there another course of action you could pursue that would not result in your firing the first shots and being the one to blame for the war? If you see a massive fleet coming at you, you might fire on the fleet or wait for the other side to fire first, but if you reduce a fort to rubble and it turns out that there were in fact only a few meager ships sent to reinforce the fort, isn't it an evasion to say afterwards that you were tricked? Rather, admit that you tricked yourself into starting the war.
I see Lincoln as pursuing a strategy similar to that of Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis: stand firm, but don't start shooting (assuming that is what Kennedy was doing then: so much of what was said about that crisis turned out not to be true). Such "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation wasn't something his contemporaries would have been familiar with. Whether or not Davis could have trusted Lincoln, he would probably have been better off following a similar strategy and foregoing the first shot (at least in my opinion).
You also said: “Didn't Davis need a war more than Lincoln did...”
Let's look at what Jefferson Davis had to say for himself just 17 days after Ft. Sumter:
“I cannot close this review of the acts of the Government of the United States without referring to a proclamation issued by their President, under date of the 19th instant, in which, after declaring that an insurrection has broken out in this Confederacy against the Government of the United States, he announces a blockade of all the ports of these States, and threatens to punish as pirates all persons who shall molest any vessel of the United States under letters of marque issued by this Government.
“Notwithstanding the authenticity of this proclamation you will concur with me that it is hard to believe it could have emanated from a President of the United States. Its announcement of a mere paper blockade is so manifestly a violation of the law of nations that it would seem incredible that it could have been issued by authority; but conceding this to be the case so far as the Executive is concerned, it will be difficult to satisfy the people of these States that their late confederates will sanction its declarations - will determine to ignore the usages of civilized nations, and will inaugurate a war of extermination on both sides by treating as pirates open enemies acting under the authority of commissions issued by an organized government.
“If such proclamation was issued, it could only have been published under the sudden influence of passion, and we may rest assured mankind will be spared the horrors of the conflict it seems to invite.”
Lincoln needed war authority to collect the tariffs and suspend Confederate trade with Europe. The US Treasury was in jeopardy as of April of 1861, and needed an immediate remedy.
[you]: That was one possibility. The other was that the rebels wouldn't fire on the fort. That would prolong the stand-off situation, and perhaps make it likely that cooler heads would prevail and the situation would be resolved. And that would also have suited Lincoln.
It appeared from his inaugural speech that that Lincoln would have been satisfied and wouldn't send obnoxious strangers down South if he could have all the tariff revenue from imports to the South, hold the forts the Union still held, and possibly reoccupy those taken by the South. His inaugural speech words were somewhat ambiguous and unclear about forts already taken by the South. Perhaps he simply wanted Union troops in those forts throughout the South which would basically make the South a military-occupied province. This was perhaps a step down from the colony status the South had held for years with respect to the extraction of Southern wealth via the tariff.
If Lincoln thought the South wouldn't fire, then he badly misjudged the attitude of the South and South Carolina. However, I don’t think he misjudged the South at all – he wasn't stupid – he expected the South to fight. Didn't Lamon and Hurlbut impart to Lincoln after their trip to Charleston that the South would fight?
Here is an April 6 article reporting the situation as seen from Charleston: [Richmond (VA) Daily Dispatch, April 9, 1861]:
I do not believe he [Anderson] will surrender unless his Government orders it, and, as I have all along said, I do not believe they will order it.--The truth is, the old (I was about to say Washington, but I will never again associate that dear name with the rotten and treacherous party now in power,) Government — the Black Republican Government --has become a stench in our nostrils. We put no confidence on earth in what they say. They declare they have no intention of reinforcing. Everything goes to prove that false; and I will predict that Pickens will be reinforced in a week, and that an attempt will be made here, too. I also predict, and you mark it, that Anderson will not come out of Sumter until he is shelled out. Mark another thing: that he will be shelled out in less than a week. We cannot bear it longer. Our sons, brothers, clerks and mechanics are all away from business, and we do not intend to bear with it longer.--Three fire-engines were sent to Morris' Island yesterday. Should the soldiers' quarters be fired by ball or shell, we will put it out. … (signed) Virginius
The author of that piece, Virginius, whoever he or she was, was spot on in those predictions.
One could perhaps judge what the South would do based on what they had already done. South Carolina had fired on the Star of the West that was trying to sneak 200 troops into Sumter in January. In late March Governor Pickens had told Lincoln’s messenger Lamon that any warship that entered the harbor would be fired at. On April 3, the Confederates fired on the Rhoda Shannon, an ice schooner from Boston, when it headed into the harbor and hoisted the Union flag after a shot across the bow [New York Times, April 8; Richmond Daily Dispatch, April 6].
With the permission of General Beauregard, Anderson sent Lieutenant Talbot to the Rhoda Shannon to find out what it was doing attempting to come into the harbor. Later, on April 7, Talbot met with the US Secretary of War, Lincoln, and General Scott in Washington [Brooklyn Eagle, April 8]. I imagine he mentioned the Shannon incident to them. The Richmond article above also mentioned the firing on the schooner.
The notion that somehow a differential in tariffs would immediately enrich the CSA and impoverish the USA doesn't work for me. Financial journalists may talk like that, but the tariff's effects would take longer to materialize.
Here is an April 2 article about how rapidly the negative effects began to materialize in New York City. This was a day after the Morrill Tariff’s higher rates started applying on April 1. Remember that at this point in April the nation thought Fort Sumter would be evacuated. The fort had not yet been attacked. [Source: The Memphis Daily Appeal, April 6, 1861]:
Effect of the Morrill Tariff
Washington, April 2. – The disastrous effects of the Morrill Tariff, which went into effect yesterday, are already becoming visible.
The news from New York is appalling to the Republican politicians here, and the Administration sympathizes with the dismay.
A letter just received from the collector of New York city (sic, no caps) says that that port is virtually in a state of blockade in consequence of the tariff, fully as much as if a hostile fleet were at the entrance of the harbor.
All importations are suspended, and the foreign trade is at a stand still.
I quoted a newspaper article in Post 313 about the effect of the Morrill Tariff on New York by May 1861. I have posted on these threads before about the decreased value of imports to New York in 1861 compared to 1860, but perhaps not to you. Here from one of my old posts are the month-by-month comparisons in the value of the Port of New York imports between 1861 and 1860 [Source: the 1865 Appleton’s Cyclopedia]. There was a significant decline in imports to New York in 1861 compare to 1860, partially no doubt due to the war and the uncertainty that brings and partially to the higher Morrill Tariff.
Month ... % change from 1860 to 1861
Jan ..... 23.5
Feb ..... -15.6
Mar ..... -22.8
Apr ..... -12.3
May ..... -11.5
Jun ..... -34.0
Jul ..... -40.0
Aug ..... -65.7
Sep ..... -55.1
Oct ..... -49.2
Nov ..... -37.5
Dec ..... -54.8
I didn’t post that the effect of the two tariffs on the South would have been large immediately (so we agree) although I think there should have been some fairly quick increase in imports. For the two tariffs to have a huge effect on the South, the South would have to develop a warehouse system like that in New York and Brooklyn where importers could store goods for up to three years without paying tariff duties. From a Brooklyn Daily Eagle article of February 5, 1861 about the Morrill Tariff bill and the warehouse system:
This bill especially affects New York. Under the provisions of the warehouse law, with its facilities for trade, shipping and monied interest has centered here. New York has become to the New World what London is to Europe – a great commercial centre, where vessels bring the produce of foreign nations and from whence they may be re-laden without payment of duties, in assorted cargoes and sail for any part of the world. Under the provisions of the present law a very large export trade is done with Mexico, South American provinces and the Canadas. There is also a very large transport trade from New York to the interior and sea board ports of our own country. This new law will alike affect the interests of the ship-owners, the bankers, the merchants and the capitalists.
It materially interferes with the interests of this city of Brooklyn, Upon our water front there are now built large and commodious warehouses for the storage of the heavier classes of merchandise; they were erected by our capitalists for bonded stores upon the supposition that the warehouse system would be a permanency. In New York there are in use 60 stores for bonded goods generally, and 52 cellars for bonded liquor. In this city 48 stores are used as bonded warehouses for general merchandise. These give employment to a large amount of capital and to hundreds of men. Each proprietor of a bonded store pays to the collector one hundred dollars per month for the salary of the officer of the revenue who is appointed by the government as storekeeper. The rent and all other expenses are held in bond at no expense to the government.
The Morrill Tariff as passed by the House in 1860 reduced the tariff-free period of the warehouses from three years to one month which would have been a heavy blow to the warehouse system; it was later lengthened by the Senate in the final bill.
Southern ports would have been closer to the Mexican and South American markets that New York had been supplying through the New York warehouse system. I think the South could have taken a large chuck of that business from New York if they had not been blockaded and had developed a warehouse system of their own.
I don’t know a whole lot about the actual impact of the two tariffs on the South. Obviously, Lincoln’s blockade had an effect after the blockade began. I did find a couple of mentions in the Richmond Daily Dispatch of early April, 1861 about business in Charleston Harbor:
- [Probably about April 1 or 2 as reported on April 5]: Charleston harbor is well stocked with shipping, and it is odd to see the Confederate flag flying from the Northern masts.
- [April 6 as reported on April 9]: Business is good; more buyers than goods by many.