I have worked on both commercial and military systems. There is a huge cultural difference. Air Force pilots understand they might be pushing the envelop to ensure our country is protected by the latest and greatest goodies. Passengers on a commercial plane just want to get where they are going safely. That is all they signed up for.
That said, it is a battery. Of course it is not the end of the world. Swap it for something that works, even a revised LION, and move on. But, perception matters. Part of why this was such a big mistake for Boeing was because of the knee jerk reaction. They blew some of their cache of public trust on this one. They still have more in the bank, but it is still damaging. Some people will not want to get on a 787 after this regardless of the fix. We can tell them they are stupid and dismiss them as handwringers, but our opinion of them does not effect the reality of public opinion. A lot of people just plain don’t want to be lab rats for Boeing’s technology tests. They need to fix this fast and then look real hard at how something this untested made it on a production design. Their development processes should never have let that happen.
I won't dispute the cultural differences or the issue of percceptions. Poor public perception killed the Electra II and the DC-10 although they both served the military very well for decades.
For a short period I worked on the DC-10/KC-10 mid-body.
Interestingly, I found that Mil-Q-9858 level requirements saw far more intervention applied by Govt inspectors than FAR requirements for the DC-10. We had DCAS review nearly all aspects of the military side while FAA inspectors were only visible occasionally. The DCAS guys said they had no interface or relationship with the FAA guys and no functional knowledge of their requirements.
These inspections were on the same components just different end item users.