There wasnt much point to bombing in daylight if all you wanted to do was carpet bomb. Much safer to do that at night, as LeMay did to Japan with his firebombs. In Europe it was the British, and Bomber Harris in particular, whose thing was carpet bombing - and they did that at night. According to
- Fire and Fury
- The Allied Bombing of Germany, 1942-1945
Randall Hansenthe British had excellent intelligence that the American anti-petroleum efforts were squeezing Germany effectively, and Harris was ordered by his British superiors to take every occasion to use his bombers to follow up at night on American efforts in that direction - but of course Harris had discretion, and he aggressively exploited it to evade that command and continue his anti-civilian bombing as his de facto priority until, indeed, there werent any more German cities which still constituted a viable target.
Part of the controversy over the Dresden raid was exactly that they had gone that far into the war without bombing it, and it seemed somewhat gratuitous to do it when they finally did. Had Harris hit Dresden a year earlier, it would have been only one more German city he had attempted to raze to the ground.
I was much taken by
- The New Dealers' War:
- FDR and the War Within World War II
by Thomas Fleming
Information there about the politics of WWII which I hadnt known, and also some military facts. Fleming asserts that the reputation of the Norden bombsight was deliberately overhyped for domestic American political purposes. There was then, as now, moral objection to carpet bombing civilians. But the Norden bombsight couldnt actually put a bomb in a pickle barrel as was then claimed. It is only now that weve started using bombs which are actually hi-tech guided missiles that putting a bomb in a pickle barrel is remotely descriptive of the accuracy actually attained in high-altitude level bombing.Not only for military effectiveness, about which the Americans and British disagreed, but also to assuage the conscience of the American civil population, the American Air Force promoted precision, daylight, bombing of military targets. That was a reflection of American culture - to such an extent that the American bomber flying leadership was shocked at the order to carpet bomb Dresden, and had to be bullied into it.
By the time it got to carpet bombing Tokyo, attitudes were different - not least because the Japanese, with their Banzai charges, had established the principle that their own lives were cheap. In addition to racism, which in the Pacific was a two-way street.
Except for occasions when the bombers were used as areal artillery as in the Normandy campaign,the USAAF preferred to concentrate on military targets, in as much as it could. Yes I’m familiar with the Norden Bombsight and it’s pros and cons but despite that the Eighth none the less hit their targets more often then not. Owing to the technology of the times Norden Bombsight was only affective in daylight. It was offered for use to the RAF but the RAF declined. I think maybe you’re confusing ‘’carpet bombing’’ with what the RAF called ‘’area bombing’’ which was basically get near enough(or not) to the target and let fly the bomb bay doors and Fritz was getting sleep that night. Aside from the ‘heavies’’ the USSAF also employed two engine light bombers like the B-25 and the Martin Marauder to hit those targets which constituted the tactical aspect of the war as opposed to the strategic . You can’t deny the stats for Americans lost in the air war over Europe. The Eighth lost some 47,000, 26,000 actual KIA. One in three American airman was a casualty