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Here is what Stevens wrote invalidating the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New York:

2. The Act’s cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause. Pp. 17-31.

(a) The Act empowers the President to cancel an “item of new direct spending” such as §4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act and a “limited tax benefit” such as §698 of the Taxpayer Relief Act, §691(a), specifying that such cancellation prevents a provision “from having legal force or effect,” §§691e(4)(B)-(C). Thus, in both legal and practical effect, the presidential actions at issue have amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each. Statutory repeals must conform with Art. I, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954, but there is no constitutional authorization for the President to amend or repeal. Under the Presentment Clause, after a bill has passed both Houses, but “before it become[s] a Law,” it must be presented to the President, who “shall sign it” if he approves it, but “return it,” i.e., “veto” it, if he does not. There are important differences between such a “return” and cancellation under the Act: The constitutional return is of the entire bill and takes place before it becomes law, whereas the statutory cancellation occurs after the bill becomes law and affects it only in part. There are powerful reasons for construing the constitutional silence on the profoundly important subject of presidential repeals as equivalent to an express prohibition. The Article I procedures governing statutory enactment were the product of the great debates and compromises that produced the Constitution itself. Familiar historical materials provide abundant support for the conclusion that the power to enact statutes may only “be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.” Chadha, 462 U.S., at 951. What has emerged in the present cases, however, are not the product of the “finely wrought” procedure that the Framers designed, but truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses. Pp. 17-24.

(b) The Court rejects two related Government arguments. First, the contention that the cancellations were merely exercises of the President’s discretionary authority under the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act, read in light of the previously enacted Line Item Veto Act, is unpersuasive. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693, on which the Government relies, suggests critical differences between this cancellation power and the President’s statutory power to suspend import duty exemptions that was there upheld: such suspension was contingent on a condition that did not predate its statute, the duty to suspend was absolute once the President determined the contingency had arisen, and the suspension executed congressional policy. In contrast, the Act at issue authorizes the President himself to effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing Article I, §7, procedures. Second, the contention that the cancellation authority is no greater than the President’s traditional statutory authority to decline to spend appropriated funds or to implement specified tax measures fails because this Act, unlike the earlier laws, gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes. Pp. 23-29.

(c) The profound importance of these cases makes it appropriate to emphasize three points. First, the Court expresses no opinion about the wisdom of the Act’s procedures and does not lightly conclude that the actions of the Congress that passed it, and the President who signed it into law, were unconstitutional. The Court has, however, twice had full argument and briefing on the question and has concluded that its duty is clear. Second, having concluded that the Act’s cancellation provisions violate Article I, §7, the Court finds it unnecessary to consider the District Court’s alternative holding that the Act impermissibly disrupts the balance of powers among the three branches of Government. Third, this decision rests on the narrow ground that the Act’s procedures are not authorized by the Constitution. If this Act were valid, it would authorize the President to create a law whose text was not voted on by either House or presented to the President for signature. That may or may not be desirable, but it is surely not a document that may “become a law” pursuant to Article I, §7. If there is to be a new procedure in which the President will play a different role, such change must come through the Article V amendment procedures. Pp. 29-31.

Stevens is CLEAR - the President MUST sign a bill before it becomes law. If they want to change it - it MUST go through the Article V process [amendment] ...