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To: TigersEye; All

I’m mostly working this weekend so I don’t have much time to research. Maybe you and / or others can answer a couple questions or speculate for me, and I’ll check back. Links are always appreciated!

The battle at the Consulate went on for several hours. The above timeline makes it 4.5 hours, elsewhere I have read “6 hours”, which may be an exaggeration... How far away in time would the closest U.S. (or allied) assets*, that could have made a difference**, be?

*Yes, I realize that air power only in a “tight” physical situation like this is dicey for the defenders - we don’t want to do the terrorists’ job for them.

I don’t see how we could have sent help in time to save Amb. Stevens. But the fighting at the annex might be a different story?

Do we know when the annex fell?

Is it possible that, the evening of the attack, someone upstream, hearing 1st reports of the attacks, assumed “protesters”, said that to others, and that quickly spread through a mindset in the Administration all too ready to think in that context? (Yes, this would be gross incompetence for sure, but that’s sort of a given.)

Alternately, is it possible that an agent or agents unknown “planted” the “protesters” story in the intelligence, on behalf of the attackers? Remember that the flow of information was bound to be somewhat confused and chaotic (combat situation) — yes, Col. Hunt describes well the upward passing of information to many people, but one would also think that there was “information” flying around all over the place. Rarely in these situations is the “picture” as clear as those who design the communication network expect it to be. AQ and other terrorist organizations surely know this and might try to take advantage of it. I’m usually doubtful of the more extreme conspiracy theories, but it certainly seems possible to me that there are AQ moles in our intelligence structure, by now, independent of what one thinks of Obama’s loyalty to his own country.

Just how many defenders (estimated total) were in action by, say, 10:10 pm?

Related: There has been a lot of criticism that the Libyan security “ran”, but given what we know, the small size of the total security force at the Consulate, and the overwhelming advantage of the attackers in both numbers (125 or more is what I have read), arms (mortars, rpg’s), and probably training (of the Libyans, that is), I don’t see that they did that badly. At least one we know of was put out of action almost immediately. Quite a few people escaped, too. In the face of an attack like that, retreating, buying time for others to escape, and going for help, is about all one could expect. The “help” when it arrived, fought, and eventually prevailed. Now, I’m not saying all the Libyan security guards did their job, but I think it is unfair to damn them all. IMO.

Along that line, do we know how many Libyan defenders were killed and injured?


234 posted on 10/13/2012 9:02:04 PM PDT by Paul R. (We are in a break in an Ice Age. A brief break at that...)
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To: Paul R.

Note: In a post above (while I was intermittently writing my post) I see that Ms. Lamb apparently said there were 3 Libyan guards at the compound. Was that 3 on duty, or just three in the whole place? Either way, good Lord... If it’s three total, then that makes 6 or 7 U.S. and Libyan security guards actually fighting 125 or more attackers armed with (at least some) heavier weaponry. (One Libyan guard, at least, was knocked out of action at the outset. I’m not sure who of our people was minding the comm room.)

I was trying to put myself in the shoes of a defender... Not a way to get a good night’s sleep, methinks.


236 posted on 10/13/2012 9:12:55 PM PDT by Paul R. (We are in a break in an Ice Age. A brief break at that...)
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To: Paul R.
... How far away in time would the closest U.S. (or allied) assets*, that could have made a difference**, be?

Some troops did arrive in time to fight off attacks at the "annex." Obviously someone knew this wasn't a rowdy protest and sent a plane with troops and a Libyan security team to rescue and evacuate the entire staff of the consulate. It flew in from Tripoli and must have arrived in under three hours after the first assault on the main building.

US diplomats, Marine rescue team were also attacked at safe house, Libyans say Sept. 12, 2012

'Six mortars' on path to villa

Of the eight American troops who had come from Tripoli, one was killed and two were wounded, Obeidi said. A Libyan deputy interior minister said a second American was also killed in the attack on the safe house. It was not clear if this was a diplomat or one of the consulate's original security detail.

"It began to rain down on us," Obeidi told Reuters, describing the moment the attack began -- just as the Libyan security force was starting up the 10 pickup trucks and sedans they had brought to ferry the Americans to the airport.

Libyan attacks said to be 2-part militant assault Sept. 13, 2012

BENGHAZI, Libya (AP) — The attack that killed four Americans in Libya, including the U.S. ambassador, was an organized two-part operation by heavily armed militants that included a precisely timed raid on a supposedly secret safe house just as Libyan and U.S. security forces were arriving to rescue evacuated consulate staff, a senior Libyan security official said on Thursday.

U.S. officials have said attackers broke into the main consulate building at around 10:15 p.m. and set the compound on fire.

After an hour, according to U.S. officials, U.S. and Libyan officials drove the attackers from the consulate.

The next attack came hours later. Around 30 American staffers along with Libyans had been evacuated to the safe house while a plane arrived from Tripoli with a joint U.S.-Libyan security group that was to fly them back to the capital, el-Sharef said.

El-Sharef said the original plan was for a separate Libyan security unit to escort the evacuees to the airport. Instead, the joint unit went from the airport to the safe house, possibly because they were under the impression they were dealing with a hostage situation, he said. The militant attack coincided with the joint team's arrival at the safe house, he said.

Remember that the flow of information was bound to be somewhat confused and chaotic (combat situation) — yes, Col. Hunt describes well the upward passing of information to many people, ...

Actually Col. Hunt explained that everyone up the chain would have necessarily been notified immediately and they would have had the same access as DAS Lamb. ie. they could have listened in on the phone conversations w/personnel on the ground and watched the live security video on their laptops. There is no doubt that that would be available to the Pres., VP, Sec. State, Pentagon brass, CIA chiefs and many others. They could also have spoken with personnel on the ground just as DAS Lamb did.

Now, I’m not saying all the Libyan security guards did their job, but I think it is unfair to damn them all. IMO.

I agree. I don't know who is condemning them but in this post I said that none of them should have survived given the odds they faced. Something about that carries suspicions of its own.

240 posted on 10/13/2012 9:48:47 PM PDT by TigersEye (dishonorabledisclosure.com - OPSEC (give them support))
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