“There was no way for us to keep that from happening”
If from the jump in Dec. 41 we had made it our goal to get to Berlin and beyond as quickly as possible, I think there was. Instead we dithered around in North Africa and Italy, botched if in Holland, and kept as wide a front as possible marching east so, I don’t know really, Eisenhower would look like a swell guy? Point is, we fought as if it were our expressed goal to give Stalin as much territory as possible. Then suddenly Churchill’s all “Oops, I forgot they’re evil.”
Too late. Revealing Katyn wouldn’t have amounted to jack. But there was a way, earlier. If we had timed it after the breakout at Sralingrad and took whatever route was quickest, we could’be done much better, anyway.
And then there was the little matter of General Sikorski
http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/Sikorski/Times040703.html
Our war machine wasn’t ready for large-scale ground combat until 1944, and even then we had to project our power a long way. We were also fighting a two-front war against Japan and Germany. Even though our declared strategy was “Germany first,” we committed a lot of resources against Japan.
Our lack of success in North Africa in late 1943 showed the American army was not ready for large-scale operations. We were well behind the Germans on the learning curve. An attempted invasion of the Continent in 1943 had every prospect of failure, mostly because in 1943 the Luftwaffe was still a potent force and we could not guarantee air superiority over the invasion beaches.
In reality, we are lucky we got as much of Europe as we did, coming late to the fight. In late 1943, when it was apparent there would be no “Second Front” that year, Stalin told his generals “we don’t need it, we can do it alone.” By then, he was probably right. It might have taken longer and cost more lives, but that didn’t matter to Stalin.