That’s it on judicial betrayal and on to Thomas’ new book?
What a jip...
:-( :-( :-(
I suppose we just go back and re-read his column:
“There are many speculations as to why Chief Justice Roberts did what he did, some attributing noble and far-sighted reasons, and others attributing petty and short-sighted reasons, including personal vanity. But all of that is ultimately irrelevant.
What he did was betray his oath to be faithful to the Constitution of the United States.
Who he betrayed were the hundreds of millions of Americans — past, present and future — whole generations in the past who have fought and died for a freedom that he has put in jeopardy, in a moment of intellectual inspiration and moral forgetfulness, 300 million Americans today whose lives are to be regimented by Washington bureaucrats, and generations yet unborn who may never know the individual freedoms that their ancestors took for granted.”
http://townhall.com/columnists/thomassowell/2012/07/04/judicial_betrayal/page/full/
I agree. Veru dissappointing.
...Or, the dissenting opinion
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~`
“The dissent in NFIB v. Sebelius, written jointly by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, is one of the finest judicial opinions I’ve ever read, if not the single finest. That this opinion was only one vote shy of being a majority opinion that would bind the government and the nation going forward is a tragedy of Shakespearean magnitude.”
As the dissenting justices concluded their opinion:
The Court today decides to save a statute Congress did not write. It rules that what the statute declares to be a requirement with a penalty is instead an option subject to a tax. And it changes the intentionally coercive sanction of a total cut-off of Medicaid funds to a supposedly noncoercive cut-off of only the incremental funds that the Act makes available.
The Court regards its strained statutory interpretation as judicial modesty. It is not. It amounts instead to a vast judicial overreaching. It creates a debilitated, inoperable version of health-care regulation that Congress did not enact and the public does not expect. It makes enactment of sensible health-care regulation more difficult, since Congress cannot start afresh but must take as its point of departure a jumble of now senseless provisions, provisions that certain interests favored under the Court’s new design will struggle to retain. And it leaves the public and the States to expend vast sums of money on requirements that may or may not survive the necessary congressional revision.
The Court’s disposition, invented and atextual as it is, does not even have the merit of avoiding constitutional difficulties. It creates them.