Not directly, but they are both part of a larger principle that has been at work over the last 80 years.
For many decades the Supreme Court pretended basically that the Commerce Clause did not limit the scope of what the federal government could do, at least in any meaningful way.
For those powerful interests who wish to convert the federal government into a central government with complete authority over the American people, the Commerce Clause became a handy catch-all with which to legally justify the power grab.
Want the power to order every American to buy health insurance? Use the Commerce Clause. Want the power to get involved in local crimes, where it might be politically useful in order to conduct federal show trials or to persecute politically-unfavored classes of persons? Use the Commerce Clause.
In recent years the Supreme Court has started to read meaningful limitations into the Commerce Clause, and it’s hard to see how the new version of the federal hate crimes law can be sustained as an exercise of the Commerce Clause.
Didn't Raich pretty much reverse those limitations?
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...the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce.
Scalia concurring in Raich
Thank you for your insights. Interesting.
This brings up the question of what would happen if we passed an amendment repealing the commerce clause.
Specifically, would existent laws deriving their ‘justification’ from that clause be null and void automatically; or would each law have to be challenged individually (also giving the government the time/ability to justify that law via some other route)?