Nuclear Realities

NRO ^ | 2/21/2012 | Victor Davis Hanson

[WPaCon]

Given the worrying over nuclear Iran, it is timely to review the rules of nuclear proliferation.

NUCLEAR CRED Otherwise insignificant nations and failed states gain credibility by shorting their own people to divert billions of dollars to acquiring a bomb. Take away that fact from Pakistan, and the United States would probably have reduced aid to such a de facto belligerent long ago. Without the ongoing appearance of possessing nukes, North Korea would probably earn about as much foreign aid as Chad or Niger. What makes France a world player, in a way that the much larger and richer Germany is not, is not just the burdens of German guilt, but also the fact of a nuclear France. The bomb sometimes achieves what even GDP, population, strategic location, or natural resources cannot.

MADNESS AS FORCE MULTIPLIER Presumed madness is a force multiplier of nuclear capability, especially in an Islamic apocalyptic context. Under conventional nuclear deterrence, rough nuclear parity, and the assurance that neither side has a first-strike capability sufficient to render its opponent nuclearly impotent, prevent both wars and nuclear blackmail. But if a head of state can feign insanity, or, better yet, convincingly announce a wish for the apocalypse, then he can, in theory, circumvent some traditional rules of deterrence. An Iranian theocrat’s supposed willingness to use his sole nuclear weapon to wipe out tiny Israel — at the cost of losing 30 million Iranians from retaliation — yields a cheap way to obtain not just parity with Israel, but potentially a nuclear advantage.

[Repeal The 17th]

From page 2:
“...The reason why Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are not nuclear is not a matter of technology or finance; indeed, all four could this year alone create nukes as they do BMWs or Hondas.

It is not just an American nuclear umbrella but rather a large American nuclear umbrella that assures such countries that they can rest secure without their own deterrent stockpiles.

In other words, if the Obama administration were to take us down to a few hundred bombs, it might send a signal to our allies that we could not possibly deter all their enemies simultaneously — and that they would be wiser to fend for themselves by obtaining their own nuclear arsenals.

For each dozen bombs we retire, our allies might feel it necessary to make up the difference on their own...”

[G Larry]

It’s very simple....

Iran MUST be dealt with!

Would you prefer to do that before or after they have working/deliverable nuclear weapons?

Is there ANY evidence that “sanctions” will ever work on Iran?

Add this to the “Things to do before midnight 21 Jan. 2013” list....

[JimRed]

Take away that fact from Pakistan, and the United States would probably have reduced aid to such a de facto belligerent long ago. Without the ongoing appearance of possessing nukes, North Korea would probably earn about as much foreign aid as Chad or Niger.

Which is way more than they deserve...