“Ahmad Bradshaw, hard-running halfback for the Giants, was aware of the situation, and tried valiantly to stop at the one yard-line, but he was unable to do so.”
The fact is that Bradshaw had complete control of his body at all times. He very deliberately stopped inches in front of the goal line, pirouetted 180 degrees, then, after much deliberation, he sat down in the end zone for six points.
On his way to the goal line, Bradshaw had a flashback of what happened to Baltimore and their attempt at an “automatic” 3 points in the AFC championship game. This made him realize that scoring a touchdown would leave New England with the necessity to score an answering touchdown within 57 seconds to win the game, whereas if he did it Coughlin’s way Brady could have had about thirty seconds to get his team into position win it with a field goal.
In any case, Ahmad was right and Coughlin was wrong, and Coughlin knew it. One only had to look at the smile on Coach’s face after Brady’s last Hail Mary hit the ground to tell you that. If Bradshaw had done what Coughlin had told him, and New England moved the ball into field goal range and won it with a second left on the clock, and Coughlin would now be trying to sneak out of the country disguised as Madonna.
There's less than 2 min in the game, you're losing, and you have a chance to score. What's there to think about? You put the ball in the endzone, every single time. Too much can go wrong.
And as for the "genius" of Belichick's move...... Probably between the three of us, we've played in what? A zillion football games? HS, College, playground, whatever? When drawing the play up in the dirt, have you ever, EVER, heard the strategy, "OK, First we let the other team score....."
There was at least one other play to run and a 25 yard field goal is not automatic. Plenty can go wrong. Belichick really outsmarted himself, and it says a lot about the Patriots' athleticism that they overcame his "coaching" and actually made it close on the last play.
With all due respect, let’s look at the probabilities here. If Bradshaw stays down at the one yard-line, it will take a few seconds for the play to be blown dead, or until one of the Patriots finally realizes what he’s doing and covers him up. Let’s say 5 seconds for that to occur, after which Belichick calls his last time out, with 52 ticks left.
Now Eli runs a keeper out of the Victory Formation, lining the ball up in the center of the field at the two or three yard line. This play takes about 4 seconds, leaving 48 to go. It is now fourth down. The Giants allow the entire 40-second time clock to run down and attempt to kick what is essentially an extra point, which (with a very high probability—more about that later) clears the uprights with 5 seconds to go.
At that point, the only play left in the Belichick playbook on the kickoff return is the California tuba-player special, multiple laterals until somebody is tackled, fumbles or scores a touchdown.
Okay, back to probabilities. The probability of kicking a 19 yard-field goal from the center of the field (the exact spot from which extra points are attempted) is north of 99% in the NFL. You want to subtract a little due to the pressure of the situation—fine. But it’s the same kick that has to be made when your team trails by 7 late in the game, and then scores a touchdown. The extra point is still made nearly all of the time, pressure or not. As far as the the chances of New England receiving a kickoff and being able to kick a field goal with under ten seconds left when the ball is kicked, and no time outs: again, virtually nil,
like the chances of missing an extra point.
The opposite side of the equation is: What are the chances of Tom Brady being able to engineer a touchdown drive that starts with receiving a kickoff with 57 seconds left, and still owning a timeout? As you saw last night, even with a few drops, the percentages are way more than nil. I’d much rather take my chances on a professional kicker being able to make a (virtual) extra point than giving Brady the ball with just under a minute to go and a timeout in hand. Every time. Coughlin knew it. Bradshaw was told it (hence his hesitation.) He just couldn’t help himself. Had that last Hail Mary been snagged by Gronkowski, Bradshaw would be living with a Bill Buckneresque stigma for the rest of his life.