Posted on 12/16/2011 6:02:07 PM PST by SunkenCiv
The records show that New Delhi had no prior intention of dismembering Pakistan. However, events moved rapidly in East Pakistan. At the end of January 1971, RAW confirmed that the Awami League leadership was not very optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations on a new constitution and was preparing to launch a mass movement for an independent Bangladesh if the talks proved abortive...
India was not taken by surprise by the Pakistani crackdown on the Bengalis on March 25. She was not prepared, however, for the savagery of the onslaught. This drew impassioned condemnation from all sections of the Indian public. It also resulted in a refugee influx on a totally unexpected and unprecedented scale... These cerebral reasons were powerfully reinforced by the moral outrage caused by Pakistan army atrocities and the strong public support for intervention on behalf of the victims. After March 25, Indian public opinion was unanimous in demanding that the government should extend full assistance to the Bangladesh freedom struggle.
At the beginning of the year, India had hoped for a united Pakistan in which the eastern wing exercised a degree of influence proportionate to its population. The prospect of secession was viewed with some misgiving. It soon became evident, however, that secession was a very real possibility as the dominant forces in Pakistan were not prepared to accept the six-point programme. The brutal crackdown of March 25 sealed the fate of a united Pakistan. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh was inevitable after the massacre. Public sympathy for the people of Bangladesh and India's national interests demanded that full cooperation be extended to the freedom struggle in order to ensure its speedy success.
(Excerpt) Read more at thehindu.com ...
Bengali man and boys massacred by the West Pakistani regime. ['Gendercide Watch: Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971' -- "In what became province-wide acts of genocide, Hindus were sought out and killed on the spot. As a matter of course, soldiers would check males for the obligated circumcision among Moslems. If circumcised, they might live; if not, sure death."]
Quest for liberty: Celebrations at Comilla in Bangladesh after the town was freed by Indian forces. Photo: The Hindu Photo Library
‘Nixon’s Pak-China tilt behind India n-test’
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/nixons-pakchina-tilt-behind-india-ntest/884788/0
Posted: Wed Dec 07 2011, 00:10 hrs
The US tilt towards Pakistan and its overtures to China in the early 70s apparently led India to go ahead with the decision to conduct its first nuclear test in Pokharan in 1974, which caught the entire Western intelligence by surprise.
A secret State Department intelligence note, dated January 14, 1972, acknowledged that US policy had an impact on India’s decision making on nuclear weapons, saying there was “little doubt” that the then president Richard Nixon’s announcement of his trip to China changed New Delhi’s calculations.
The late US President, who was forced to step down in the wake of the Watergate scandal, had troubled relations with India because of his tilt towards Pakistan in the 1971 Indo-Pak war and his moves to reconcile with China.
Declassified American documents of the era reveal that as of early 1971, all evidence indicated that the Government of India had decided to defer indefinitely the development and explosion of a test device.
“In early August, however, the Cabinet undertook a review of Indian nuclear policy in the wake of President Nixon’s July 16 announcement of his proposed trip to China. There can be little doubt that the July 16 announcement has had major implications for India’s security calculations and its nuclear policy,” the six-page intelligence note said, which was released by the National Security Archive.
“In New Delhi’s view, the announcement appeared to rule out all hope that India (not a signatory to the NPT) could anticipate a joint US-Soviet umbrella against the threat of Chinese nuclear attack,” it said, adding that the decision to detonate a nuclear device may have been triggered by the deepening crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations.
“India may have concluded that an early test would demonstrate its increasing military strength to Pakistan and remind the latter’s Chinese and American friends of its potential power,” the intelligence note said. “Although the immediate issue with Pakistan has been settled, a test still would probably be regarded as very useful by the Indians,” it added.
The documents claim that US assessment was that a nuclear test would constitute dramatic support for India’s contention that it is the only important power on the subcontinent.
“India also may hope that a demonstrated nuclear capability would quash any thoughts of revenge the Pakistanis might still entertain,” the State department said.
Six months later in June 1972, the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, wrote to President Nixon about intelligence reports which also came from other sources that India has decided to go nuclear.
US forces had orders to target Indian Army in 1971
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2806128/posts
NEW DELHI: A set of freshly declassified top secret papers on the 1971 war show that US hostility towards India during the war with Pakistan was far more intense than known until now.
The documents reveal that Indira Gandhi went ahead with her plan to liberate Bangladesh despite inputs that the Nixon Administration had kept three battalions of Marines on standby to deter India, and that the American aircraft carrier USS Enterprise had orders to target Indian Army facilities
PHOTO IN ARTICLE.
(Pakistani Army Commander in the Eastern Command, Lt General AAK Niazi, signing the Instrument of Surrender in front of General Officer Commanding in Chief of India and Bangladesh Forces in the Eastern Theatre, Lt General Jagjit Singh Aurora on December 16, 1971.)
The bold leadership that the former PM showed during the 1971 war is well known. But the declassified documents further burnish the portrait of her courageous defiance.
The documents show how Americans held back communication regarding Pakistan’s desire to surrender in Dhaka by almost a day.
That the American establishment had mobilized their 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to evacuate US nationals, is public knowledge. But the declassified papers show Washington had planned to use the 7th Fleet to attack the Indian Army.
They also show that Nixon administration kept arming Pakistan despite having imposed an embargo on providing both Islamabad and New Delhi military hardware and support.
They suggest that India, exasperated by continuing flow of American arms and ammunition, had considered intercepting three Pakistani vessels carrying war stores months before the war. The plan was dropped against the backdrop of the Indian foreign ministry’s assessment that the interception could trigger hostilities.
The pro-Pak bias of the then US President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is vividly brought out by their decision to keep three battalions of Marines on standby: a decision which has so far not found mention in any record of the 1971 war.
Documents blame Richard Nixon for Pakistan tilt
A six-page note prepared by India’s foreign ministry holds then American president Richard Nixon responsible for the pro-Pakistan tilt during India’s 1971 war with her neighbour.
“The assessment of our embassy reveal (sic) that the decision to brand India as an ‘aggressor’ and to send the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal was taken personally by Nixon,” says the note. The note further says, the Indian embassy: “feel (sic) that the bomber force aboard the Enterprise had the US President’s authority to undertake bombing of Indian Army’s communications, if necessary.” As early as June 1971, New Delhi weighed the possibility of intercepting three Pakistani ships loaded with US weapons. This leaves only two other courses regarding interception: That India may intercept the ships before they reach Karachi, or impose a blockade of the Bay of Bengal. Either of these might involve the use of force and would be treated as acts of war, wrote the director (legal and treaties) of MEA.
On December 14, Gen A A K Niazi, Pakistan’s military commander for erstwhile East Pakistan, told the American consul-general in Dhaka that he was willing to surrender. The message was relayed to Washington, but it took the US 19 hours to relay it to New Delhi. Files suggest senior Indian diplomats suspected the delay was because Washington was possibly contemplating military action against India.
The Russians supplied India with armaments when America refused to sell them, and even forced Britain to stop such sales - one of the Soviet premiers famously gave India’s Nehru tours of Russian aircraft factories with promises of supplying India with the latest of Russian weaponry - at a time when the West refused to entertain any such efforts.
The American bet was on a religiously “cohesive” Pakistan to survive over the long term, in comparison with what was thought to be a very unstable, secular India. On top of that, the Russians quite early on shored up support for India in booting out French and Portuguese territorial claims from within her territory - especially Goa.
Things turned out quite differently, for all parties, through the years. India, no doubt, acted in India’s interests and stuck with it.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.
