The place where a person has fixed his ordinary dwelling, without a present intention of removal.and from US government rules
Domicile is a complex issue and must be determined on a case-by-case basis...and
must have a principal residence in the U.S. and intend to maintain that residence for the foreseeable future.So it's "complex" and gray. To be intellectually honest, I will grant you that some definitions do use the word "permanent."
However, you are still misreading, because Gray doesn't give it as a requirement, he is stating the situation of the appellant. You can tell that from the beginning of what you quoted:
.the single question stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parent of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United StatesMeaning the single question is about this particular individual with his particular situation. And the quotes I included in my last post show that the Court interpreted the Constitution in light of English common law, which says "
That means it continued to prevail under the Constitution. Unless it's been changed by the Constitution, it prevails today.therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.
Sorry for the red font, a complete accident.
I already pointed out it was at the beginning of the decision ... and at the end ... AND that domicil as a criteria of the subject clause of the 14th amendment was mentioned on multiple occasions in the decision. It's not just a situational mention because the concept of domicil in relation to the subject clause is cited from other cases. Second, at least one of the citations jibes with the definition of domicil you offered about intending to maintain the residence for the foreseeable future.
In Lem Moon Sing v. United States, the same principles were reaffirmed, and were applied to a Chinese person, born in China, who had acquired a commercial domicil in the United States and who, having voluntarily left the country on a temporary visit to China, and with the intention of returning to and continuing his residence in this country, claimed the right under a statute or treaty to reenter it ...
Chinese persons, born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the Emperor of China, and not having become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of, and owe allegiance to, the United States so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here, and are " subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States.
And look at how many times Gray talks about domicil and residence in the opening paragraph. This isn't just a situational mention. And all this comes before he addresses the question before the court, once more including the mention about residence and domicil. Wouldn't the one mention cover it??
His father and mother were persons of Chinese descent, and subjects of the Emperor of China; they were at the time of his birth domiciled residents of the United States, having previously established and still enjoying a permanent domicil and residence therein at San Francisco; they continued to reside and remain in the United States until 1890, when they departed for China, and during all the time of their residence in the United States, they were engaged in business, and were never employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China. Wong Kim Ark, ever since his birth, has had but one residence, to-wit, in California, within the United States, and has there resided, claiming to be a citizen of the United States, and has never lost or changed that residence, or gained or acquired another residence, and neither he nor his parents acting for him ever renounced his allegiance to the United States, or did or committed any act or thing to exclude him [p653] therefrom. In 1890 (when he must have been about seventeen years of age), he departed for China on a temporary visit and with the intention of returning to the United States, and did return thereto by sea in the same year, and was permitted by the collector of customs to enter the United States upon the sole ground that he was a native-born citizen of the United States.