You've swallowed the liberal line of thinking on Gibbons. Gibbons clearly laid out boundaries between state and federal power over commerce. This relationship basically held until the Wickard decision. Justice Thomas explained it well in US v Lopez:
In my view, the dissent is wrong about the holding and reasoning of Gibbons. Because this error leads the dissent to characterize the first 150 years of this Court's case law as a "wrong turn," I feel compelled to put the last 50 years in proper perspective.
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Moreover, while suggesting that the Constitution might not permit States to regulate interstate or foreign commerce, the Court observed that "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State" were but a small part "of that immense mass of legislation . . . not surrendered to a general government." Id., at 203.
From an early moment, the Court rejected the notion that Congress can regulate everything that affects interstate commerce. That the internal commerce of the States and the numerous state inspection, quarantine, and health laws had substantial effects on interstate commerce cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, they were not "surrendered to the general government."
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I am aware of no cases prior to the New Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our substantial effects test. My review of the case law indicates that the substantial effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century.
Full decision at http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/93-1260.ZC1.html
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Now, how do you reconcile your support for federal laws based on the New Deal Commerce Clause with your claim to support the Clause's original meaning?
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
In order to accept the premise of the substantial effects doctrine you first must rationalize that no such commerce is possible, which results in a paradoxical conclusion that Marshall didn't know what the hell he was talking about and makes the entire decision questionable.