Iraqi Army division begins to mechanize

KIRKUSH MILITARY TRAINING BASE, Iraq – Iraqi army soldiers selected from four brigades of 5th IA Division conducted operator training on the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier vehicle with assistance from U.S. soldiers from 2nd Advise and Assist Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Kirkush Military Training Base, Iraq, April 27.

During the M113 training cycle, focused on training the IA on becoming master drivers and vehicle maintenance specialists, students learned basic operating procedures and vehicle maneuvering skills, as well as troubleshooting vehicle malfunctions.

“The M113 course lasts ten days, so there is a good amount of information to fit into that time period,” said Maj. Rasheed Muwwakkil, a logistics advisor to the Iraqi security forces. “All of the IA attending the course are extremely motivated to learn and take an active part in the class, especially when it comes to the anything hands-on and getting a familiarity with the vehicle.”

The M113 is one of the most widely used infantry vehicles in military history. Introduced in 1962, it was the primary armored vehicle used by American forces during the Vietnam War.

M2 and M3 Bradley fighting vehicles replaced the M113 as a front-line combat vehicle in the U.S. Army, but the M113 is still used by U.S. Soldiers in support roles in many of its variations, such as mortar carriers and armored ambulances.

While the 10-day M113 APC driver and maintenance course is aimed at successfully producing Iraqi army soldiers who can be called subject matter experts on operating and conducting user-level maintenance, that is not the course’s only purpose, said Muwwakkil.

“This training course, like many of the training courses here at KMTB, has a purpose outside simple instruction,” said Muwwakkil. “This 10-day course is actually meant to be a train-the-trainer course. We want these guys to be able to take the training that we provide to them and be able to retrain soldiers in their own units later.”

“This is the fourth M113 course we have done, and it seems this way across the board, but the IA soldiers that come through really are getting better and better with each passing rotation,” said Sgt. William Swift, an instructor for M113 driver and maintenance training with Company B, Brigade Support Battalion, 2nd AAB, 25th Inf. Div.

“Since this is a train-the-trainer course, we have left all the logistics for the course to the IA, so they are troubleshooting all of their own problems and arranging for fuel, food, and parts if something were to happen to a vehicle,” said Swift. “They are essentially facilitating their own training.”

Iraqi military leaders chose the 5th IA Division to become one of the first divisions to be mechanized. All of the training and advising with IA units at KMTB has been to prepare soldiers for the new mission they will take on once U.S. forces transition out of Iraq later this year, Muwwakkil explained.

“This is all about getting them ready to take on the conventional mission set of a nation’s army—things like border defense and protecting the people,” he added. “That’s why this division has been selected to become modernized and mechanized.”

“All of the training here at KMTB is slowly coming together; the end product will be a modernized, well-trained division that is prepared to defend its nation,” Muwwakkil said. “Things like the M113 APC training is just one step closer to that end goal.”

The first link is from when the UK was still in Basrah - Before the formation of the 14th IA Div. 2 of its brigades were disbanded and replacement Brigades built in 2008-2009. Those were the 40th [former 4-10] and the 52nd [former 3-10]. You obviously didn’t hear but, the US had to retrain the 10th IA Div after the UK left. The UK had been cooking the books in the south.

The second link was from 2006, when the policy changed from training for external to getting a credible internal security force. That data is completely obsolete. They only restarted external training in Nov 2010. COIN is not even close to the level of intensity and coordination needed for external defense.

The third link from 2006 is also obsolete. All of the SIBs [19 bns] have since then been purged [2008], sent back to bootcamp [2009-2010], and started over mostly as the 12th Div [commisioned with 2 reformed brigades and a HQ in 2009]. The elements of the 4th Div listed there were broke up to provide cadre during this reformation. Effectively, that force is receiving retraining.

The fourth link is one of the COIN training evolutions. Notice only half of the 10th Div was involved. There are 4 brigades in an IA Div. That is because the rest of 10th Div’s battalions are in external training at Ali Base. COIN CPXs are not even close to coordinating a division in combined arms against an external enemy. There is good reasons why COIN is also called Low Intensity Conflict.

The fifth link is a battalion level exercise of the 12th Division’s Commando Battalion supported by a mortar battery. Supports my point.

If those are supposed to support your point, then where is the Corps and Division level exercises in external defense. COIN is not even a close comparison.

The IA does not have the communications to coordinate at Division, they are still forming Divisional Communications Battalions.

The IA only formed its first divisional field artillery battalion - each division rates a FA Brigade. You can’t train on what you don’t have.

The IA is still building divisional engineers up.

The IA Brigades do not have Brigade Support Battalions except in 9th Div. You can get away with that for COIN - not for external.

The first Chem Defense Company in the IA only formed 8 months ago. Each Brigade requires a Chem Co and each Div a Chem Bn.

Then there is the fact that the IA does not have any Corps or corps-level troops/support. They were scheduled to form in 2008-2011 but, the budget crunch postponed that.

A bit more current, as in this year:

http://www.defense.gov/Blog_files/Blog_assets/BRT%20MajGenBUCHANAN.pdf

“Sustainment and logistics is a — is another example. The MOD, in particular, has funded about 10 percent of what we think is required, for the last two years, for maintenance.”

“And the last area I want to highlight has to do with combined arms and their ability to integrate combined arms. Because they’ve been focused almost entirely on counterinsurgency operations, they have not yet been able to — and have not had to — integrate the various effects of combined arms from infantry, artillery, attack aviation, armored forces — you know, to have the optimum effect that they’re looking for because they haven’t been facing threats that require that. We’ve maintained the responsibility for external defense of the country. And so we’re working now — and I can go into this a little bit later — but we’re working very hard to help give them some of those basic capabilities that they can build on so that they can better meet their security needs for the future.”

http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/90/

This is the interview link that goes with my article - in case you don’t trust my writing.
http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2011/03/u-s-army-bloggers-roundtable-operation-new-day/

You might try reading some of my other articles about the IA from this year as opposed to old puff-pieces from 2006.

http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/89/

http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/84/

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