Decoding India's MMRCA Decision

India ’s rejection of the F-16IN Super Viper and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in its hotly contested medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) competition has disappointed many in the United States. Because there were great expectations that New Delhi would leverage this fly-off to cement its strategic partnership with Washington — particularly in the aftermath of the herculean American efforts to consummate the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement — India’s selection of two European platforms, the Eurofighter and the Rafale, as the finalists for the multirole component of its air force led many American observers to conclude that the country had settled for an airplane, not a relationship.

Many analysts have explained India’s decision as an expression of concern over America’s reliability as an arms supplier, or representing dissatisfaction with potential transfers of key technologies, or even an attempt to distance itself from the United States. In a new article in Force, Carnegie’s Ashley J. Tellis concludes that these explanations are incorrect, and describes how India’s “down-select” decision was made entirely on technical grounds. The two-step procurement procedure adopted by the Indian Ministry of Defense precluded political, strategic, or financial considerations from intervening in any way. Though this process might not serve India’s larger national security interests in an age of limited resources and numerous threats, India’s decision does not represent a strategic setback for U.S.-Indian defense cooperation over the long term.

A new monograph from Ashley Tellis with tidbits on performance issues-

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Decoding_Indias_MMRCA_Decision.pdf

The last paragraph from his previous thesis

No matter which way India leans in the MMRCA contest, keeping the
IAF’s interests consistently front and center will ensure that its ultimate choice
will be the right one. A selection process that is transparent, speedy, and focused
on the right metrics will not only strengthen the IAF’s combat capabilities, but
it will also earn the respect of all the competing vendors and their national
patrons. Some of them will be disappointed by India’s fi nal choice, but those,
alas, are the rules of the game.

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/dogfight.pdf

The befuddling aspect of Ashley’s analysis is the relevance and/or pertinence of the ‘India chose a plane rather than a relationship’ statement that Ashley keeps throwing about. India made the right decision selecting the best options available. Whatever the final selection is, be it the Eurofighter Typhoon or the Rafale, it will provide the Indian Airforce with a solution that is not only technologically capable against its adjacent neighbors, but also a solution that has a lot of future growth capacity (something that the F-16, for example, does not have) plus a lot of technology transfer and accessibility to advanced Western knowhow (something that neither of the American offerings would have provided due to restrictions on what can be given to the Indians as compared to what the Europeans were willing to provide).

As for the ‘relationship’ part, the simple question would be what relationship? India has already spent billions of Dollars on American equipment, and will spend billions more. Missing out on the M-MRCA deal will not break any relationship, and for the matter a lot of money is heading Boeing’s and Lockheed’s way. Billions of it. Thus, the argument that India did not settle for a relationship is moot.

India made the best choice – the Eurofighter and the Rafale were the best choices, and this will be seen more and more as time progresses (both in terms of aircraft development, as well as technology infusion into the Indian aerospace/defence/advanced sector). The F/A-18E/F would also have been a good choice all things being equal (and all things were obviously not equal). As for the F-16, I still maintain that the only aircraft that would have been a (far) worse choice was the MiG-35.

I actually just finished reading his report (my prior post had been based on his previous report. I have also noticed the change from his previous report, and to be honest his statement that the IAF was only after ‘hot rod performance’ is not just disingenuous but silly. Who does he think he is fooling? The part about the 1.2 degree difference in sustained turn-rate is also quite infantile …maybe he should touch on other areas like acceleration, the (in)ability for the F-18 to go (even) supersonic at certain altitudes (while the Typhoon, for instance, is capable of supercruise with an A2A loadout), instantaneous turn rates, etc. He also makes a big deal that the IAF may receive ‘potentially effective’ weapons if they get ‘approval,’ which is something he had raised in his prior piece when he doubted that weapons like the Meteor would be approved. Again, who does he think he is fooling …the Meteor will be going to India, and furthermore as for being ‘potentially effective’ the fact is it is 3 times as effective as the AMRAAM. Then there is the issue of a ‘lack of AESA’ technology for the Eurocarnards, and their ‘inability’ to perform in the BVR regime (as if they are only WVR ‘hot rods’). Amazing then that those planes would have BVR missiles like the Meteor, with a much longer range and kinematic envelop than the AMRAAM, if they are useless in BVR! Then there are the comments that even within WVR the American planes are more capable because of ‘superior sensors and high off-bore missiles.’ Well, I guess the Europeans do not have helmet mounted sights and HOB missiles then, right? I guess missiles like the IRIS-T and the ASRAAM, every bit as advanced (and in some way more so) than the AIM-9X are not HOB missiles, huh? Simply put, Ashley is stretching things so far that the only reason I cannot call it lying is because it is too silly to be that.

India’s selection of two European platforms, the Eurofighter and the Rafale, as the finalists for the multirole component of its air force led many American observers to conclude that the country had settled for an airplane, not a relationship.

Given the costs of the European platforms compared to the American platforms, and any added performance gained for that cost differential, I'd say it was just the opposite: India settled for a relationship, not an airplane.

I think the “relationship” being referred to here is just another word for American protective umbrella. I don't think India wants an American protective umbrella (àla Taiwan, Japan, Australia, SK) but rather the independent capability to defend her airspace. All of the above countries have a “relationship” with the US with regards to defense. None of the above countries have an independent capability to defend their airspace against China.

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