Posted on 02/07/2011 1:37:31 PM PST by devattel
SYNOPSIS:
Vattel’s Law of Nations was translated anonymously into English several times in the eighteenth century. The first edition of 1760 was based on the French original Droit des gens of 1758. A Dublin translation of 1787 is remarkably fluent and elegant, but it does not include the substantive notes of the original nor, more importantly, the notes added to the posthumous French edition of 1773 and intended by Vattel for a second edition he did not live to complete. Several English editions, including the 1916 Classics of International Law edition, are similarly flawed and based on the edition of 1760. However, two English editions from the end of the eighteenth century include Vattel’s later thoughts. One, from 1793, contains a pagination error. This has been corrected in the revised version, London 1797, and the latter forms the basis for the present edition. The 1797 edition has the benefit of a detailed table of contents and margin titles for subsections.
There is no modern edition of The Law of Nations, but facsimiles of the popular nineteenth-century editions by the London barrister Joseph Chitty have appeared in recent times. These annotated editions (first in 1834) and their reissue with further notes by Edward Ingraham (first in 1852) were based on the 1797 London edition. Chitty helpfully identified the notes that distinguished the 1797 edition from the earlier English translation. He sought, however, to add much more to the text, as he explained in a preface written in Chancery Lane in November 1833:
Many years have elapsed since the original work was published, long before the invaluable decisions of Sir William Scott, Sir C. Robinson, and Sir John Nichol, and other eminent Judges in the Courts of Admiralty, and Prize and other Courts; and the last edition upon which any care was bestowed, was published in ad 1797; since which time, and especially during the last general war, many most important rules respecting the Law of Nations were established. The object of the present Editor has, therefore, been to collect and condense, in numerous notes, the modern rules and decisions, and to fortify the positions in the text by references to other authors of eminence, and by which he hopes that this edition will be found of more practical utility, without interfering with the text, or materially increasing its size.
In consequence, Chitty’s text is overloaded with legal citations based on the case law of the sea that emerged in the Napoleonic era. Vattel’s work had become a textbook for law students in both Britain and North America.
Some of Chitty’s notes remain useful and have on occasion been incorporated into the editorial apparatus for this edition. The present edition includes new footnotes, elucidating dates, events, works, and persons referred to by Vattel. Posthumous additions to the French edition of 1773, which were then translated in the edition of 1797, are identified as such in the new notes. Translations of Vattel’s Latin citations have come from the best modern editions, particularly from the Loeb Classical Library. For each translation, reference to the edition used can be found in the bibliography of authors cited. In cases where no translation could be found, or where the context of Vattel’s work required an amended translation, the editors undertook the translation, and this is signaled in the text by “trans. Eds.” All of the preceding new material has been added to the 1797 text as numbered notes or as double square-bracketed inserts within Vattel’s original notes.
Chitty lamented in 1833 that “he proposed to form an Index, so as to render the work more readily accessible; but, in that desire, he has been overruled by the publishers.” The present edition adds bibliographical and biographical details of authors cited in the text, following up Vattel’s own sometimes obscure references. The bibliography of authors cited includes and explains the short titles employed by Vattel in his footnotes.
Page breaks in the 1797 edition have been indicated in the body of the text by the use of angle brackets. For example, page 112 begins after <112>.
“This raises another interesting point. How can a child born under the ligeance of two nations be subjects to two kings? In other words, how can a dual citizen be “natural-born” when his allegiance is split between the jurisdiction of two nations?”
Here is how the Supreme Court puts things:
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in the same year, reviewing the whole matter, said:
By the common law of England, every person born within the dominions of the Crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.
Cockburn on Nationality, 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics:
“British subject” means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the Crown. “Permanent” allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a British subject from the allegiance of an alien who, because he is within the British dominions, owes “temporary” allegiance to the Crown. “Natural-born British subject” means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.” “Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any person who (whatever the nationality of his parents) is born within the British dominions is a natural-born British subject. This rule contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British nationality.
The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two:
1. Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such [p658] person’s birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien.
2. Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person’s birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the Crown by the Sovereign of a foreign State is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.
And he adds:
The exceptional and unimportant instances in which birth within the British dominions does not of itself confer British nationality are due to the fact that, though at common law nationality or allegiance in substance depended on the place of a person’s birth, it in theory, at least, depended not upon the locality of a man’s birth, but upon his being born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the King of England, and it might occasionally happen that a person was born within the dominions without being born within the allegiance, or, in other words, under the protection and control of, the Crown.
Dicey Conflict of Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
It thus clearly appears that, by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction of the English Sovereign, and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign State or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English Colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution as originally established.
In the early case of The Charming Betsy, (1804) it appears to have been assumed by this court that all persons born in the United States were citizens of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall saying:
Whether a person born within the United States, or becoming a citizen according to the established laws of the country, can divest himself absolutely of [p659] that character otherwise than in such manner as may be prescribed by law is a question which it is not necessary at present to decide.
2 Cranch 64, 119.
In Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor (1833), 3 Pet. 99, in which the plaintiff was born in the city of New York about the time of the Declaration of Independence, the justices of this court (while differing in opinion upon other points) all agreed that the law of England as to citizenship by birth was the law of the English Colonies in America. Mr. Justice Thompson, speaking for the majority of the court, said:
It is universally admitted, both in the English courts and in those of our own country, that all persons born within the Colonies of North America, whilst subject to the Crown of Great Britain, are natural-born British subjects.
3 Pet. 120. Mr. Justice Johnson said: “He was entitled to inherit as a citizen born of the State of New York.” 3 Pet. 136. Mr. Justice Story stated the reasons upon this point more at large, referring to Calvin’s Case, Blackstone’s Commentaries, and Doe v. Jones, above cited, and saying:
Allegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is, and allegiance by birth is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship: first, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign, and secondly, birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the allegiance of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born within a place where the sovereign is at the time in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must also, at his birth, derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign, as such, de facto. There are some exceptions which are founded upon peculiar reasons, and which, indeed, illustrate and confirm the general doctrine. Thus, a person who is born on the ocean is a subject of the prince to whom his parents then owe allegiance; for he is still deemed under the protection of his sovereign, and born in a place where he has dominion in common with all other sovereigns. So the children of an ambassador are held to be [p660] subjects of the prince whom he represents, although born under the actual protection and in the dominions of a foreign prince.
3 Pet. 155. “The children of enemies, born in a place within the dominions of another sovereign, then occupied by them by conquest, are still aliens.” 3 Pet. 156.
Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.
3 Pet. 164.
In Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, decided (as appears by the records of this court) on the same day as the last case, it was held that a woman born in South Carolina before the Declaration of Independence, married to an English officer in Charleston during its occupation by the British forces in the Revolutionary War, and accompanying her husband on his return to England, and there remaining until her death, was a British subject within the meaning of the Treaty of Peace of 1783, so that her title to land in South Carolina, by descent cast before that treaty, was protected thereby. It was of such a case that Mr. Justice Story, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
The incapacities of femes covert, provided by the common law, apply to their civil rights, and are for their protection and interest. But they do not reach their political rights, nor prevent their acquiring or losing a national character. Those political rights do not stand upon the mere doctrines of municipal law, applicable to ordinary transactions, but stand upon the more general principles of the law of nations.
3 Pet. 248. This last sentence was relied on by the counsel for the United States as showing that the question whether a person is a citizen of a particular country is to be determined not by the law of that country, but by the principles of international law. But Mr. Justice Story certainly did not mean to suggest that, independently of treaty, there was any principle of international law which could defeat the operation of the established rule of citizenship by birth within the United States; for he referred (p. 245) to the contemporaneous opinions in Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, [p661] above cited, in which this rule had been distinctly recognized, and in which he had said (p. 162) that “each government had a right to decide for itself who should be admitted or deemed citizens,” and, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws, published in 1834, he said that, in respect to residence in different countries or sovereignties, “there are certain principles which have been generally recognized by tribunals administering public law” [adding, in later editions “or the law of nations”] “as of unquestionable authority,” and stated, as the first of those principles, “Persons who are born in a country are generally deemed citizens and subjects of that country.” Story, Conflict of Laws, § 48.
The English statute of 11 & 12 Will. III (1700). c. 6, entitled
An act to enable His Majesty’s natural-born subjects to inherit the estate of their ancestors, either lineal or collateral, notwithstanding their father or mother were aliens,
enacted that “all and every person or persons, being the King’s natural-born subject or subjects, within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” might and should thereafter lawfully inherit and make their titles by descent to any lands
from any of their ancestors, lineal or collateral, although the father and mother, or father or mother, or other ancestor, of such person or persons, by, from, through or under whom
title should be made or derived, had been or should be “born out of the King’s allegiance, and out of is Majesty’s realms and dominions,” as fully and effectually, as if such parents or ancestors “had been naturalized or natural-born subject or subjects within the King’s dominions.” 7 Statutes of the Realm, 90. It may be observed that, throughout that statute, persons born within the realm, although children of alien parents, were called “natural-born subjects.” As that statute included persons born “within any of the King’s realms or dominions,” it, of course, extended to the Colonies, and, not having been repealed in Maryland, was in force there. In McCreery v. Somerville, (1824) 9 Wheat. 354, which concerned the title to land in the State of Maryland, it was assumed that children born in that State of an alien who was still living, and who had not been naturalized, were “native-born citizens of the [p662] United States,” and, without such assumption, the case would not have presented the question decided by the court, which, as stated by Mr. Justice Story in delivering the opinion, was
whether the statute applies to the case of a living alien ancestor, so as to create a title by heirship where none would exist by the common law if the ancestor were a natural-born subject.
9 Wheat. 356.
Again, in Levy v. McCartee (1832), 6 Pet. 102, 112, 113, 115, which concerned a descent cast since the American Revolution, in the State of New York, where the statute of 11 & 12 Will. III had been repealed, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Story, held that the case must rest for its decision exclusively upon the principles of the common law, and treated it as unquestionable that, by that law, a child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, quoting the statement of Lord Coke in Co.Lit. 8a, that,
if an alien cometh into England and hath issue two sons, these two sons are indigenae, subjects born, because they are born within the realm,
and saying that such a child “was a native-born subject, according to the principles of the common law stated by this court in McCreery v. Somervlle, 9 Wheat. 354.”
In Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393, Mr. Justice Curtis said:
The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, “a natural-born citizen.” It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.
19 How. 576. And, to this extent, no different opinion was expressed or intimated by any of the other judges.
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said:
All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion [p663] that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.
1 Abbott (U.S.) 28, 40, 41.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice (afterwards Chief Justice) Sewall, early held that the determination of the question whether a man was a citizen or an alien was “to be governed altogether by the principles of the common law,” and that it was established, with few exceptions,
that a man born within the jurisdiction of the common law is a citizen of the country wherein he is born. By this circumstance of his birth, he is subjected to the duty of allegiance which is claimed and enforced by the sovereign of his native land, and becomes reciprocally entitled to the protection of that sovereign, and to the other rights and advantages which are included in the term “citizenship.”
Garder v. Ward (1805), 2 Mass. 244, note. And again:
The doctrine of the common law is that every man born within its jurisdiction is a subject of the sovereign of the country where he is born, and allegiance is not personal to the sovereign in the extent that has been contended for; it is due to him in his political capacity of sovereign of the territory where the person owing the allegiance as born.
Kilham v. Ward (1806), 2 Mass. 236, 265. It may here be observed that, in a recent English case, Lord Coleridge expressed the opinion of the Queen’s Bench Division that the statutes of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 1, and 13 Geo. III (1773), c. 21, (hereinafter referred to) “clearly recognize that to the King in his politic, and not in his personal, capacity is the allegiance of his subjects due.” Isaacson v. Durant, 17 Q.B.D. 54, 65.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, speaking by Mr; Justice Gaston, said:
Before our Revolution, all free persons born within the dominions of the King of Great Britain, whatever their color or complexion, were native-born British subjects; those born out of his allegiance were aliens. . . . Upon the Revolution, no other change took place in the law of North Carolina than was consequent upon the transition from a colony dependent on an European King to a free and sovereign [p664] State; . . . British subjects in North Carolina became North Carolina freemen; . . . and all free persons born within the State are born citizens of the State. . . . The term “citizen,” as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term “subject” in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people, and he who before as a “subject of the king” is now “a citizen of the State.”
State v. Manuel (1838), 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 24-26.
That all children born within the dominion of the United States of foreign parents holding no diplomatic office became citizens at the time of their birth does not appear to have been contested or doubted until more than fifty years after the adoption of the Constitution, when the matter was elaborately argued in the Court of Chancery of New York and decided upon full consideration by Vice Chancellor Sandford in favor of their citizenship. Lynch v. Clark, (1844) 1 Sandf.Ch. 583.
The same doctrine was repeatedly affirmed in the executive departments, as, for instance, by Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, in 1854, 2 Whart.Int.Dig. (2d ed.) p. 394; by Attorney General Black in 1859, 9 Opinions, 373, and by Attorney General Bates in 1862, 10 Opinions, 328, 382, 394, 396.
Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, speaking of the “general division of the inhabitants of every country under the comprehensive title of aliens and natives,” says:
Natives are all persons born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States. This is the rule of the common law, without any regard or reference to the political condition or allegiance of their parents, with the exception of the children of ambassadors, who are in theory born within the allegiance of the foreign power they represent. . . . To create allegiance by birth, the party must be born not only within the territory, but within the ligeance of the government. If a portion of the country be taken and held by conquest in war, the conqueror acquires the rights of the conquered as to its dominion and government, and children born in the armies of a State, while [p665] abroad and occupying a foreign country, are deemed to be born in the allegiance of the sovereign to whom the army belongs. It is equally the doctrine of the English common law that, during such hostile occupation of a territory, and the parents be adhering to the enemy as subjects de facto, their children, born under such a temporary dominion, are not born under the ligeance of the conquered.
2 Kent Com. (6th ed.) 39, 42. And he elsewhere says:
And if, at common law, all human beings born within the ligeance of the King, and under the King’s obedience, were natural-born subjects, and not aliens, I do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to these United States, in all cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the contrary. . . . Subject and citizen are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives, and though the term citizen seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, subjects, for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.
2 Kent Com. 258, note.
Mr. Binney, in the second edition of a paper on the Alienigenae of the United States, printed in pamphlet at Philadelphia, with a preface bearing his signature and the date of December 1, 1853, said:
The common law principle of allegiance was the law of all the States at the time of the Revolution and at the adoption of the Constitution, and, by that principle, the citizens o the United States are, with the exceptions before mentioned,
(namely, foreign-born children of citizens, under statutes to be presently referred to)
such only as are either born or made so, born within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States or naturalized by the authority of law, either in one of the States before the Constitution or, since that time, by virtue of an act of the Congress of the United States.
P. 20.
The right of citizenship never descends in the legal sense, either by the common law or under the common naturalization acts. It is incident to birth in the country, or it is given personally by statute. The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle. [p666]
P. 22, note. This paper, without Mr. Binney’s name and with the note in a less complete form and not containing the passage last cited, was published (perhaps from the first edition) in the American Law Register for February, 1854. 2 Amer.Law Reg.193, 203, 204.
“I managed to get a peek at this version from a collector back in 2007”
“I can not take photos of this version because it was read in 2007”
“Natural Born Citizen” is firmly planted in plain english in this edition.”
“Yes. I read the entire book. Yes, it clearly defines what a natural-born citizen, or native, is.”
“I did not read the copy of the one in at the Library of Congress”
Can you explain the “I managed to get a peek in 2007” and “I read the entire book”
No need to discuss the other editions and word definitions we know them. We know Dumas.
In 2007..you peeked at the 1787 edition and it was sold. You have the read the 1787 edition in the Library of Congress.
So...when and where did you read the entire book?
It defines the original intent of NBC, based on how the term would have been understood by the Framers.
If you can’t figure it out, I suggest re-reading it.
LC Control No.: 41038703
Type of Material: Book (Print, Microform, Electronic, etc.)
Personal Name: Vattel, Emer de, 1714-1767.
Uniform Title: Droit des gens. English
Main Title: The law of nations, or, Principles of the law of nature
applied to the conduct and affairs of nations and
sovereigns / by M. de Vattel ; a work tending to display
the true interest of powers.
Portion of Title: Principles of the law of nature applied to the conduct and
affairs of nations and sovereigns
Published/Created: New York : Printed for Messrs. Berry and Rogers ..., 1787.
Related Names: American Imprint Collection (Library of Congress)
Description: ixxiv (i.e. lxxiv), 728 p. ; 22 cm. (8vo)
Notes: Signatures: A⸠b-d⸠eâ´ [f]1 B-2Z⸠3Aâ´.
References: Bristol B6618
Subjects: International relations—Early works to 1800.
War (International law)—Early works to 1800.
LC Classification: JX2414 .E5 1787
Language Code: eng fre
______________________________
CALL NUMBER: JX2414 .E5 1787 Am Imp
Copy 1
— Request in: Rare Book/Special Collections Reading Room (Jefferson LJ239
— Status: Not Charged
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ONLINE CATALOG
Library of Congress
101 Independence Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20540
Questions? Ask a Librarian:
http://www.loc.gov/rr/askalib/ask-digital.html
Did you get the 1797 Edition?
Quoting whole sections of Wong Kim Ark is an old strategy, probably intended to stifle discussion which might inform readers. Filling many paragraphs with the flowery language of Wong Kim is like dominating a discussion by talking too much and too loudly. Most people stop paying attention, which is their objective. Bushpilot, Danae, rxsid, Patlin, and several other regular contributors to constitutional questions have become, if they weren't before 2009, experts on Article II, citizenship, framers and founders, and the history of the time. It sounds as if you may be too; I hope so.
There are no rules for dealing with trolls beyond those of FR, though administrators have sometimes removed blatant trolls. Usually, a comment to identify our trolls is sufficient. They repeat the same misleading information time and again, making it clear the truth is not their objective. Sometimes Mr. Rogers, or James777 (who I haven't noticed on this thread) make a point worth thinking about or explaining, but realize that they will never concede a point. It is not unlike the Islamic concept of Tacquia.
The objective of trolls is to help maintain ignorance about our foundations. Some of them are paid by the group run by Robert Bauer's wife, Anita, the one inspired by Mao and Mother Theresa, or Theresa Heinz Kerry. We know what to expect from Mr. Rogers, but we want readers to learn the truth, because our ignorance enables their destruction of our Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
I might have missed it if another writer pointed this out, but the other implication, certainly one Mr. Rogers expects readers to miss, is that a corollary of Calvin's case (which Gray was citing in Wong Kim) is that it confirms that Mr. Obama is undoubtedly a natural born subject of the Crown.
While the terms used in translations of Vattel are certainly of interest, the concept is ancient. If one decides to call Maxwell's Equations, Fedorov’s Equations, or Big Bird's Equations, the principles remain. One of the most eloquent descriptions of classes of citizenship is in Dr. Ramsay's 1789 “Dissertation on Citizenship” (found at Scribd.com, undeadrevolution.org or puzo1.blogspot.com). Dr. Ramsay's brilliant explication of the dramatic difference between subjects and citizens should be taught everywhere. "A Subject is under the power of another. A citizen is a unit of a mass of free people, who collectively, possess sovereignty." Ramsay used the term "Birthright Citizen," but used the same description, born to citizens on our soil.
Vattel's Law of Nations (there were other authors) was our first law book, designated by Jefferson as the core text at our first law school, William and Mary, in 1779. Marshall, Tyler, and Munroe attended William and Mary (as did Washington and Jefferson, but not as law students) meaning they studied Vattel as law students. Vattel was Hamilton's preferred source for legal philosophy, by far, and Hamilton was Washington's principal legal advisor, and Treasury Secretary. Hamilton's letter to Washington on September 15, 1790, explains exactly that, and compares Vattel to Pufendorf, Grotius, Grotyndiek.
The scholars at FR frequently share their discoveries about our founders and framers. James Wilson wrote with an erudition which is sometimes exhausting. He "proves" points with citations, which is reasonable since human behavior does not have axiomatic rules. He too regarded Vattel as the most useful reference for natural law and the ripe foundation called law of nations from which our Constitution and Declaration were derived. But Wilson was disappointed that Vattel did not write more like himself, with hundreds of pages of historical referemces, many in Latin and French, to prove his points. Reading the Liberty Fund 1797 Law of Nations to which editors Kapossy and Whatmore have added Vattel’s posthumous Latin citations from 1773, it appears that the author, Nugent, of the 1797 translation took Wilson's 1790 criticism to heart, and added lots of explanatory material and more Latin translations (which my children find great fun to show off their Latin skills)
Looking for Wilson's citation I came across Wilson's own explanation, one of many in his works, illustrating the reasoning behind the framer's addition of natural born citizenship. It is in Wilson's chapter “Of Citizens and Aliens” in Volume II of his collected works, and citing English law. I won't quote all of it because... But here is the gist from founder, framer, signer of both the Declaration and Constitution, and second behind Madison responsible for implementing the Constitution and Declaration:
“Between a subject naturalized and subject natural born, the distinction is merely nominal as to private rights: it applies only to the manner, in which those rights are devolved. On one they are devolved by his birth: on the other, by the consent of the nation, expressed in the parliament. With regard, however, to publick rights, the case is widely different. By statutes made even since the revolution, no subject naturalized can be a member of parliament; and no bill for naturalization can be received in either house of parliament, without such a disabling clause.”
As Mr. Apuzzo has stated, citing many authorities, there are two fundamental classes of citizenship, natural born and naturalized. The “disabling clause” referred to by Mr. Wilson, referring to English common law, was implemented in our Constitution by the natural born citizen requirement for our “Prince.” The more one reads Vattel, the more apparent it becomes that it is the blueprint, the set of requirements which our framers implemented to create the first constitutional republic. Vattel actually anticipated such a republic, and most of the rules we would need to protect those unalienable rights. Mr. Obama is clearly, and self-identified, as a natural born British subject, clearly not a natural born U.S. citizen, and just as clearly, doesn't care that we know, as long as he has time to effect the changes long in the planning, because by then the Constitution won't matter.
“Let me capture some of the important items of this flawed argument citing what the court “thought” the intent of the framers to be: “
Let’s go thru your complete misunderstanding:
“The framers did not understand the differences between a monarchy and a republic”
They did. There is a reason they used NBC instead of natural born subject. The change in government necessitated the change in terminology.
“As such, the framers relied on British common law instead of advanced republican models available at the time, such as those mentioned de Vattel’s the Law of Nations”
Incorrect. What the Court says common law provided was the lingua franca of law - that the legal meaning of legal terms using in 1787 was their established legal meaning, found in common law. They do NOT say that the US is modeled or restricted by English common law. It just provides the meaning of legal terms used.
“The framers believed that citizens and subjects were the same, and therefore citizens of the United States were forced into citizenship at birth just like King George had been doing for decades”
They believed they were strictly analogous, according to the Court. And yes, they believed that birth determined citizenship, with rare exceptions, although they also believed a CITIZEN could choose to change citizenship.
“Americans were to be subjects to the crown of the United States”
Already dealt with.
The Court dealt at length with NBS because it was an established legal term with a precise meaning, and that meaning, they believed, was carried over by the Framer’s intent into the Constitution.
It defines the original intent of NBC, based on how the term would have been understood by the Framers.
___________________________________________________________________
If you want to use the term as it is defined in the actual Constitution. It is natural born Citizen nbC not Natural Born Citizen or NBC. It is also not natural-born C/citizen.
Citizen was and is a defined term in the Constitution. The attempts to redefine the term or create a new term that is actually not in the Constitution in order to ridicule it are deplorable.
It is ‘natural born Citizen’. ‘natural’ and ‘born’ both stand alone in their descriptions.
Sorry, but this is still absolutely false same as it was the last time I debunked your claim and the five times before that.
The Wong Kim Ark decision quoted and affirmed the Minor definition of natural-born citizen. That's the very last point in the decision where it uses the term NBC. Also, it recognized in that same context that a child's citizenship in the U.S. DID depend on the citizenship status of the parents.
"Minor v. Happersett (1874), 21 Wall. 162, 166-168. The decision in that case was that a woman born of citizen parents within the United States was a citizen of the United States, ..."
Obviously Ark didn't fit those requirements, so Gray had to use a different means for declaring Ark to be what he called a "citizen at birth" AND he had to come up with a justification for declaring the 14th amendment as outweighing a treaty with another nation (in this case China). This is why he spent a great deal of time on English common law and the topic of allegiance. In the end, he noted that the parents needed to have permanent domicil and residence in order to meet the requirements of the subject clause in the 14th amendment.
Here is the link to WKA for anyone to read. I know you will never understand it, but others ought to read it for themselves. There is a reason why the Supreme Court won’t listen to these challenges, and it isn’t cowardice.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0169_0649_ZO.html
I post a variety of quotes from the WKA decision all the time, except that I don’t make up a false interpretation of what it says like faithers do.
Thanks for the ping.
ping
I wonder if Marx lifted and tweeked this concept of common property to create his horror...
I wonder if Marx lifted and tweaked this concept to create his horror...
You betcha!
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