[justlurking]

Vinson actually said that an injunction should not be necessary -- not that a declaratory judgment is functionally equivalent to an injunction.

Whoops, my bad. Vinson did actually say that.

He was citing "Committee on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 542 F.3d 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008)".

He also added: "declaratory judgment is, in a context such as this where federal officers are defendants, the practical equivalent of specific relief such as an injunction . . . since it must be presumed that federal officers will adhere to the law as declared by the court" (Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8 D.C. Cir. 1985)

But, here's the problem: he is assuming that the Obama administration will obey the law. The same administration has been cited for contempt for disobeying an injunction against the moratorium on offshore drilling, so I don't have any confidence they will "honor" a declaratory judgment.

And from what I can find, despite the presumption of abiding by the declaration, there doesn't appear to be any penalties for doing so. I'll check those decisions and see if there is.

[alancarp]

But, here's the problem: he is assuming that the Obama administration will obey the law.

Bingo. And at the time I read that in the decision, I was wondering how 'tongue-in-cheek' he meant it!

Of course, as I'm typing this, Rush is speaking about the Contempt citation that was just issued by Judge Martin Feldman regarding the Gulf of Mexico oil drilling moratorium ruling from last summer, so of course Vinson didn't really expect Obama to comply with THIS ruling... but unlike Obama, Vinson exercised proper restraint... for now!

[justlurking]

I did some digging, and found this one:

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY OF U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES v. MIERS 542 F.3d 909 (2008)

It's a bit convoluted, but I think this is what happened:

1. The Committee subpoena'ed Miers and Bolten to appear and testify or produce documents
2. Bush asserted executive privilege
3. Miers and Bolten refused to comply
4. The House voted to hold Miers and Bolten in contempt of COngress and authorized a suit to enforce compliance
5. The Committee filed suit in district court
6. Te court declaries that Miers is obligated to appear, but can decline to answer specific questions
7. Miers and Bolten filed a notice of appeal and moved for a stay pending disposition
8. The Committee claims that since no injunction was issued, the order cannot be appealed
9. This ruling says that since Miers and Bolten are ordered to perform specific actions, the decision can be appealed.

The ruling then added the statement that is cited. But, he left out the prefacing statement:

As to Ms. Miers's testimony, the court framed its decree as a declaratory judgment. But Ms. Miers acted in compliance with the instruction of President Bush,"

So, I don't see this citation as being an obvious precedent. The situation is quite a bit different. It wouldn't be the first time a citation would be incorrect: I remember a citation in US v. Miller that was just completely wrong: the Court took the words out of context and interpreted them completely contrary to the original decision.

The statement from Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan is here:

8. We note in this regard that the discretionary relief of declaratory judgment is, in a context such as this where federal officers are defendants, the practical equivalent of specific relief such as injunction or mandamus, since it must be presumed that federal officers will adhere to the law as declared by the court. Such equivalence of effect dictates an equivalence of criteria for issuance. See Samuels v. Mackell,401 U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 768, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971).

It's a footnote to this statement:

At least where the authority for our interjection into so sensitive a foreign affairs matter as this are statutes no more specifically addressed to such concerns than the Alien Tort Statute and the APA, we think it would be an abuse of our discretion to provide discretionary relief.

And here's the statement I believe it references:

We therefore hold that, in cases where the state criminal prosecution was begun prior to the federal suit, the same equitable principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction must be taken into consideration by federal district courts in determining whether to issue a declaratory judgment, and that where an injunction would be impressible under these principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well. We do not mean to suggest that a declaratory judgment should never be issued in cases of this type if it has been concluded that injunctive relief would be improper. There may be unusual circumstances in which an injunction might be withheld because, despite a plaintiff's strong claim for relief under the established standards, the injunctive remedy seemed particularly intrusive or offensive; in such a situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate and might not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines governing the availability of relief. Ordinarily, however, the practical effect of the two forms of relief will be virtually identical, and the basic policy against federal interference with pending state criminal prosecutions will be frustrated as much by a declaratory judgment as it would be by an injunction.

What does it all mean? I'm not sure. I need to spend more time reading through the entire decision and ones that have cited it to understand. But, I've run out of time today.

If you have the time, I'm be curious what you find.