Ah, finally! Someone that can do more than repeat talking points. :-)
I understand the concept of binding precedent, although I didn't explain it very well. But, I don't understand how it can be enforceable law outside the district. It runs contrary to everything I've read about jurisdiction and venue.
How did the other states become party to the suit? I know about consolidation of multiple districts for pretrial proceedings, but that is supposed to push the actions back to their originating district courts. Would you point me to something authoritative that explains how this works?
I've also been trying to find the difference between declaratory judgments and injunctions, and despite all the claims (and citation) they are the effectively the same, they don't seem to be. Penalties for non-compliance is the big difference.
What makes it so confusing? There are two other existing District Court opinions that came to the exact opposite conclusion on the exact same question of law, and on the exact same federal statute.
This is what I thought was the exact reason for the rules about jurisdiction, venue, and scope. With 98 (?) districts and 12 circuits, you can't expect them all to agree all the time, and that's why we have the hierarchical system.
Of course, I think it's unrealistic to expect the Obama administration to comply with the ruling only in part of the country (whatever part that might be allowed). But, I wouldn't be surprised if they try.
District Court judges can enjoin the federal government, nationally. Just a few weeks ago, a District Court judge somewhere found that DADT was unconstitutional (that's the declaratory judgment), and then enjoined the government from enforcing the DADT anywhere and not just against the plaintiff in that case (that's injunctive relief). That injunctive relief did not withstand appellate review (but as a theoretical matter, it could have), at least not in the short-term. A stay was granted, I believe by the 9th Circuit (could be wrong).
What makes this case so odd, is the novel approach Vinson took when he asserted a de facto injunction, based entirely on the premise that there's a presumption the federal government will abide by the declaratory judgment. The problem is which declaratory judgment? The one Vinson issued, or the two others that reached entirely opposite opinions?
"How did the other states become party to the suit?"
They didn't. But, Vinson argues that his declamatory judgment in this facial challenge is a de facto injunction on the federal government prohibiting them from implementing Obamacare anywhere, not just in the states party to the litigation. Unlike another poster, I don't believe it accurate to say that Vinson's ruling then prohibits the government from defending themselves in similar lawsuits (if they either exist now, or in the future) with other states not party to this particular suit. It wouldn't.
The government is only bound by the decision (from a litigation standpoint) with these particular plaintiffs on this particular question of law. That's it.
Like I said, this is an incredibly unique case, not just because of the principles of law at question, but the fact that we have competing civil cases against the same unique defendant (fedgov), brought by multiple states and relatively simultaneously.