[skeeter]

Given US public opinion regarding overseas wars pre 12/7/41, the Japanese very much thought they could make any offensive in the Pacific so cost-prohibitive that we would've chose not to undertake one.

Much the same as the Vietnamese & Taliban who, never hoping to defeat us, thought/think they could bleed us white.

Sure there are differences between these situations, but the basic idea is the same.

[EyeGuy]

“Given US public opinion regarding overseas wars pre 12/7/41”

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Which I think, gets at the crucial fulcrum on which my question is based.

My point was that the very NATURE of the attack changed that equation, (Yes, even IF the Japanese diplomatic Corps had arrived an hour earlier to deliver their declaration).

I think America was changed fundamentally, regardless of material losses and was in no mood for acquiescence, a gross miscalculation of the American mind on the part of the Japanese.

Did they really expect us to roll over. I mean really?

[skeeter]

the Japanese very much thought they could make any offensive in the Pacific so cost-prohibitive that we would've chose not to undertake one.

Lastly I'd add that the horrific tactics the Japanese adapted starting with Peleliu and continuing through Okinawa had by '45 begun to turn US public opinion towards the war - the slaughter was such that groups back home were beginning to question Pacific war policy.

The really interesting question is what would have been the ultimate US response if Japan had left the US Pacific Fleet & Philippines out of their plans for conquest in 1941-42.