FReeper Book Club: The Debate over the Constitution, Federalist #55

In the fourth of seven essays, Madison lists the objections to the makeup of the House of Representatives and answers them in detail.

² The number of which the House of Representatives is to consist forms another, and a very interesting, point of view under which this branch of the Federal Legislature may be contemplated.

³ Scarce any article indeed in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed.

⁵ In general it may be remarked on this subject that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature, nor is there any point on which the policy of the several states is more at variance, whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents.

⁶ Passing over the difference between the smallest and largest states, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and four hundred, a very considerable difference is observable among states nearly equal in population.

⁷ The number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one-fifth of that in the state last mentioned.

⁸ New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one-third of the number of representatives.

⁹ As great a disparity prevails between the states of Georgia, and Delaware or Rhode Island.

¹⁰ In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a greater proportion to their constituents than of one for every four or five thousand.

¹¹ In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of at least one for every thousand.

¹² And according to the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of the other states.

¹³ Another general remark to be made is that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous, as where they are very few.

¹⁴ Were the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they would at this time amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence to a thousand.

¹⁵ On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the state of Delaware, would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members.

¹⁶ Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles.

¹⁷ Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven.

¹⁸ But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary.

¹⁹ And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed.

²⁰ The truth is that, in all cases, a certain number, at least, seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes, as on the other hand the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude.

²¹ In all very numerous assemblies of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason.

²² Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.

²³ It is necessary also to recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of biennial elections.

²⁴ For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the state legislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safely might otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other legislative bodies.

²⁵ With these general ideas in our mind, let us weigh the objections which have been stated against the number of members proposed for the House of Representatives.

²⁶ It is said in the first place that so small a number cannot be safely trusted with so much power.

²⁷ The number of which this branch of the legislature is to consist at the outset of the government will be 65.

²⁸ Within three years a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants, and within every successive period of ten years the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation.

²⁹ It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred.

³⁰ Estimating the Negroes in the proportion of three-fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will by that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions.

³¹ At the expiration of 25 years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to 200, and of 50 years, to 400.

³² This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body.

³³ I take for granted here what I shall, in answering the fourth objection, hereafter show: that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution.

³⁴ On a contrary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed.

³⁵ The true question to be decided, then, is whether the smallness of the number as a temporary regulation be dangerous to the public liberty?

³⁶ Whether 65 members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States?

³⁷ I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of America, the spirit which actuates the state legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens; I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present temper or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year repeat, the choice of 65 or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery.

³⁸ I am unable to conceive that the state legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch, and which possess so many means of counteracting the Federal Legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against the liberties of their common constituents.

³⁹ I am equally unable to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United States any 65 or a hundred men capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at large who would either desire or dare, within the short space of two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them.

⁴⁰ What change of circumstances, time and a fuller population of our country may produce requires a prophetic spirit to declare which makes no part of my pretensions.

⁴¹ But judging from the circumstances now before us and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of time, I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution.

⁴⁴ If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation?

⁴⁵ The Congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor responsible to, their fellow citizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were generally continued for three years, and prior to the ratification of the federal Articles, for a still longer term.

⁴⁶ They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever be the case with our future representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party which lost it, it may well be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled.

⁴⁷ Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed, nor has the purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny.

⁴⁸ Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government?

⁴⁹ But where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both?

⁵⁰ Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more than suffice for very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger.

⁵¹ The only means, then, which they can possess will be in the dispensation of appointments.

⁵³ Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the Senate.

⁵⁵ The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension.

⁵⁷ The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election.

⁵⁸ No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties, and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy with which all reasoning must be vain.

⁵⁹ The sincere friends of liberty who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion are not aware of the injury they do their own cause.

⁶⁰ As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.

⁶¹ Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.

⁶² Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government, and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.

As the only branch of the federal government that was to be directly elected under the terms of the proposed Constitution, the House of Representatives drew an attention within these essays that might seem disproportionate to the modern reader, accustomed as he or she is to a Senate that is also directly elected and a President who, through the Electoral College, is one derivative body away. But by the plan of the proposed Constitution, the state governments were to select the Senate, and the voters would have only so direct a voice in the election of the President as the state governments permitted. It was the House, therefore, that upheld the republican ideal of representatives elected by, and directly accountable to, the citizens.

It was also the House whose membership experienced the withering scrutiny of the critic jealous of his sovereignty and deeply suspicious of the motivations of its members. The questions were the obvious ones: is the number contemplated so small as to encourage corruption, can that small a number of members accurately reflect the preferences in policy of the electorate, can they avoid trying to become a ruling elite, and will the country outgrow the limitations of the proposed numbers in government? (4)

To be sure, the intended numbers of the House were small to begin with – some 65 members (27) – and due to this, certain critics, Brutus for one, had created scenarios that alarmed them. In Brutus #4, he pointed out that a majority of a quorum meant very few people under the proposed arrangement: 17 congressmen, for example, might under the right conditions make law for the entire country with the others looking on helplessly. Imaginable, certainly, but how likely? Madison will argue that probabilities do matter in a plan that must mix practical with theoretical politics.

First, as far as the membership of the House, why the number 65? Madison does not even attempt to cast this as anything but an arbitrary, interim number based on a best guess of the relative populations of the states involved. Between 6 and 12 he demonstrates that the various states have followed various systems with no discernable pattern, and even, at 13, shows that the broadest of arithmetical principles cannot be applied across a body of states as diverse as those who must vote on ratification. These are, in their literal form, principles that must be discarded.

¹⁶ Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles.

But that does not invalidate the reasoning behind those principles, merely its application. That reasoning is based on a continuum of efficiency: too few representatives may be subject to the pressures of coercion and the temptations of corruption; too many may result in a government too unwieldy to govern.

¹⁷ Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven.

¹⁸ But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary.

¹⁹ And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed.

Hence the necessity of a sweet spot somewhere in between, and Madison has a plan whereby it might be derived. That hinged around a census, to be taken within three years after ratification (28), which would increase the size of the House by a rule that was at least preferable to the arbitrary. The rule of thumb would be one representative for every 30,000 citizens in the beginning (29), and Madison was convinced that it would result in an initial expansion of the House to “at least one hundred” – in fact, the number would be 105 in 1793. Madison expects this to expand as the population of the growing nation expands.

³¹ At the expiration of 25 years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to 200, and of 50 years, to 400.

One must remember that Madison had no access to the modern science of demographics; even so, this prediction was remarkably accurate in the short term and somewhat less so in the long. At the 25-year point, that number would be, as he predicted, 213. At Madison’s 50-year point, however, the number would be 242. It would not reach 400 until the year 1913, some 125 years hence.

When it did so, it would plateau to the current number of 435, possibly that sweet spot between the danger of a very powerful few and the paralysis of the vociferous many. One notes that had the original formula been followed, the House would, at the present time, consist of over 10,000 members. Madison has stated quite specifically that it would be too many.

But the idea was that the prospect of growth would address the potential dangers of having too small a House (32). So what to depend on in the interim to guard the Republic against the dangers Brutus so vividly expressed? What structural mechanism, what set of rules, codes, controls and safeguards would suffice?

None, as it turns out. Madison is playing a hand and says so, but he thinks it is a sufficiently strong hand, based on the nature of both the citizens composing the new nation and that of the representatives they were likely to send to office (37). From where do the opponents of the proposed Constitution fear that a destructive influence will issue? Foreign gold (42)? Surely were it an imminent threat, it already would have happened (46). The other branches of the government (48)? There are safeguards against such an influence, based on limitations on the abilities of existing offices to expand their influence (50, 56).

Madison concludes, in the nature of the Americans themselves, that those who have just bought independence in blood and are unlikely to sell it for a mess of pottage. Brutus is a pessimist concerning the human condition, and Madison, an optimist, rebukes him for lack of faith while admitting that he must be partially correct.

Madison was betting on the latter. In fact, the form of government in which he believed would depend upon it.

⁶¹ Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form.

This was not simply naïve idealism, but formal political theory from the pen of Montesquieu. In his formulation, the three broad categories of government depended on different qualities of the human character: monarchies, on honor; despotisms, on fear; republics, on virtue. It is in the lack of those qualities that those governments fall. For Montesquieu, the failure of personal honor in the aristocracy was an observable fact, but he would not live to see its result in the form of the French Revolution. It is very clear to the survivors of the 20th Century that the failure of fear truly does result in the ultimate failure of despotism.

What then of the failure of virtue that is corruption, which is, according to Montesquieu and Madison, the prime peril of representative government? Madison argues that it is unlikely in the short term, and that the expansion of the House in the long term will help guard against it. It is a hopeful point of view upheld, albeit rather imperfectly, by the events of the ensuing two centuries. But Madison is an optimist.

The latter is a point of view about which Madison can joke, but that would be taken in a literal sense by the despots of the 20th Century and their adherents. They would pay for the failure of fear with the downfall of their champion. Their republican counterparts might yet pay a similar price for the failure of virtue.

At 42 through 47, Madison brings up the danger of foreign influence by means of bribery or payoffs. This resonates, as there has been evidence of foreign money in American elections going all the way back to the Seventies. Foreign influence over the past several decades has been particularly egregious. Madison never foresaw the modern media campaign and the tremendous costs attached to it, thus failing to foresee just how critical large amounts of money would become to the political process. What can be done to correct the problem and maintain the integrity of elections?

This essay sidesteps the true problem with the House of Representatives. The House, directly elected by the people, demonstrates beyond question that this new system of government was to be a consolidated, complete government. It demonstrates beyond any doubt that federalism, properly defined, was dead.

Madison can prattle on all he wants about mixed sovereignty, a system part-national, part-federal. I argue, and history supports me, that a part-national system is a national system.

The federalist (properly defined) aspects of this system were window-dressing. They took as much from the states as they could get away with politically, and laid the groundwork to get the rest later.

Arguing over the proportion of representation was definitely rearranging deck chairs.

I think Madison is entirely accurate in this piece and the House of Representatives could function exactly as intended IF it were populated with folks who actually understood their powers and the oath they swear when they become members of that body.

Federalism is suffering death by a thousand cuts starting with the G. Washington, J. Adams, J.Q. Adams, A. Lincoln, T. Roosevelt, W. Wilson, F. Roosevelt, H. Truman, D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, G.H.W Bush, W. Clinton, G.W. Bush, and B. Obama administrations and isn’t going to be restored until WE the people INSIST that it be done!

Should read:

Federalism is suffering death by a thousand cuts administered by the G. Washington, J. Adams, J.Q. Adams, A. Lincoln, T. Roosevelt, W. Wilson, F. Roosevelt, H. Truman, D. Eisenhower, J. Kennedy, G.H.W Bush, W. Clinton, G.W. Bush, and B. Obama administrations and isn’t going to be restored until WE the people INSIST that it be done!

Back in them-thar days, the people were concerned with liberty. How times change.

Madison writes: " If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation?"

Well, that was at his time.

We now have "federal gold" being used by the rulers, which enables them to gain tremendous power by ensnaring the majority of their constituents; liberty loses.

It is interesting how the Federalists and Washington wrote of the perils of popular governments; yet, while they did this they gave the House equal footing with the Senate.

When all is said and done, the design of a government does not matter when it is run by corrupt individuals...which leads to a corrupt party....which leads to a corrupt government. Once you corrupt the judges, you have the Tim Donaghy scenario, where the best efforts of those who play by the rules are absolutely trashed in favor of the flow of corrupt money.

“When all is said and done, the design of a government does not matter when it is run by corrupt individuals...which leads to a corrupt party....which leads to a corrupt government.”

Too true. No matter how well thought out the constitution could be, it can’t survive without commonly held virtue.

“they gave the House equal footing with the Senate.”

They even gave the house a bit more than equal footing, in one area, as all taxes must originate in the house. I think they should have gone farther, i.e. all bills should have to originate in the House.

While I agree in spirit, I do have a few comments. First Federalism exists if the national government allows it. It isn’t fairing so well these days. Second, in the Constitutional Convention, once ratification by the states was agreed to then the real federalists (as opposed to the nationalists) had the upper hand for state powers to be included in the constitution.

That’s not to say I think you’re wrong. In fact, Madison’s Viginia Plan won over time.

“Madison never foresaw the modern media campaign and the tremendous costs attached to it, thus failing to foresee just how critical large amounts of money would become to the political process. What can be done to correct the problem and maintain the integrity of elections?”

I don’t think a constitutional remedy is required.

I have been toying with some ideas. First, I think candidates should be beholden to their constituents. (Radical, I know) So.... pass a law that at least 1/2 of their campaign money must come from their district.

Second, Axelrod’s objections aside, I do think third parties should have to disclose who they are when they offer their opinion through campaign commercials, opinion commercials, etc.

Third, and this doesn’t directly relate to your question, those who receive checks from the government, business or individuals, should not be able to contribute to campaigns.

Section 7

All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

“Raising revenue” can be appropriations, not just taxes. Therefore I posted the quote from the Constitution for the other readers’ benefit.

On the other matter: My point is that regulating financing does NOT solve a damned thing. It is a red herring. It grants far too many powers to government and its dark side....as it has for years. Who would enforce it? The Press? Another Government Agency with Lawyers? the ACLU? Those who control Congress?

The blowback would be tremendous.....and it would not be a constitutional application of government.

I got your point. You think that having candidates raise money in their districts rather from their party, unions or businesses would make no difference in their focus and is a red herring. You think that I might propose that the press or the ACLU would enforce it. You think that it would be declared unconstitutional despite numerous decisions in favor of limiting where candidates get their money.

Come on, be fair. I asked questions, I expected answers.

Instead, I got a bunch of “you think’s”. I would appreciate it if you would follow the dialogue.

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