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If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed, and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government, but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

Simply one of the greatest ideas ever put to paper.

Which Madison admittedly violates with this idea,

In the constitution of the Judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.

Gah! It, "the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications" is even less true today, in the age of the internet and other media. We know our representatives much better than ever before. We are fully able to select our USSC justices. Also, I think we would all agree that judicial appointments for life have proven to be inadequate in separating the Judicial branch from the Executive branch. Of course Madison, et. al. thought that the temperament of the executive branch might be more administrative than it is today.

27 In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.

This is not the only time Madison or other Federalists and Anti-Federalists state this. They all thought that it was the nature of the Legislative branch to be supreme. This is why he had the Judicial branch appointed by the other popularly elected branch, the Executive branch, i.e. to maintain a check on the Legislative branch.

38 In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.

You know, I don’t know if he meant exactly this but one can think of the National Government as two strong parts, the House and the President, and two weaker branches, the Senate and the Supreme Court. I’m thinking more and more that the Judicial branch is too weak due to the fact that it’s appointment is from the Executive branch.

for the sort of men who will be the politicians, the sort of men who are not suspicious of power but fond of it

Hamilton, Are you listening? We’re talking about you!

Legislative branch that is most likely to accrue power, both through its closeness to the people – it is, according to the proposed Constitution, the only one to be popularly elected

What about the electoral college?

be easy for a political figure to transition from one to the other, House to Senate…. That has remained largely the case despite the inception of the popular election of Senators which culminated in the 17th Amendment in 1913.

Hmmm. I can’t quite go there with you. Granted, Governors have a better shot at becoming Senators but just like all Senators dream of being President, all House members dream of being Senators. (almost) The ambition is there.

he suggested that the power of the weaker Executive be enhanced (30), but not by a complete veto on the actions of the Legislative or even such a partial one as to encourage the Executive aligning itself with one House of Congress or another (34).

You should post the personal notes from the convention some time. They deliberated on veto power and their feelings about tangential issues are revealing.

political power flows from the individual who simultaneously might be a member of many different classes and whose own interests must therefore be more or less unique.

It is the desire of the Socialists and the Marxists to take the human uniqueness and quantify it, classify it and objectify it thus making it subordinate to their reason. God bless them.

Executive aligning itself with one House of Congress or another.

Some day you should do a post on the only logical flaw in the constitution.

Madison, brilliant as he is, continuously confounds me in trying to figure out exactly what ground he is standing on at any given point in time.

I think he is always consistent with one exception, when he arguing the case for the Senate. The State control of the Senate was not his ideal and he opposed it. He largely ignores it when he’s talking about the theory of the constitution. I do agree with you that there is a remarkable sameness between the people in all three branches of government.

Discussion Topic

Is Madison’s analysis on target, or are there other ways of parsing the design of a government divided by departments?

You know my thoughts on this. The progressives, in their desire to pass sweeping laws without regard for their consequence, have delegated their authority to the Executive branch through the regulatory process, aided by a judiciary that is made of people selected due to their deference to the Executive branch. There are many remedies. One is in the "Contract with America, i.e. all regulations costing more than $100mm must be approved by congress.* The $100mm is arbitrary of course and by it’s arbitrary nature gives away the importance of that number being $0. This is my favorite as it provides for accountability and clarity. This does not answer your question though as it is simply a return to the original intent. One could amend the constitution with such a rule but that is icky.

A second remedy is electing USSC judges to sixteen year terms, every two years, as selected by an electoral college. Popularly electing judges is being argued in Iowa by none other than Sandra Day O'Connor over their gay marriage ruling. Lot’s of good articles can be found through Google. That would make the judicial branch stronger as it would have more popular legitimacy and make its separation from the other two branches much cleaner.

A third remedy is amending the constitution such that the states can remove a Senator at any time for any reason. This would once again make the Senators beholden to the state governments yet retain their popular election. Most states would be reluctant to remove a popularly elected Senator until he’s on the outs with the people. The downside is that the churn in the Senate would be against Madison’s principle that the Senate’s opinion should be formed over a long time while the House’s should be more current. I’ve grown not to like this idea for that reason.

* It was quite the pleasant surprise to see that idea in there. I didn’t even know it was being considered.