Replies

Discussion Topics

At 20, Madison argues that the people’s primary affinity will be to the state governments unless the federal government is better at administration. That turned out to be wrong. It became a matter of money and largesse, not able administration. Where, when and how did it all go wrong?
At 21, Madison points out that the federal government has only limited power. Trace the steps by which this failed.
At 36 through 42, Madison shows how the states could resist a tyrannical move from the federal government. Yet by 1865, this was no longer operative. What means do the states have today to resist federal encroachment?
At 57 through 72, Madison argues that the states have the raw military power to resist federal encroachment. He did not foresee the establishment of a standing army and weapons of mass destruction. At 59, he failed to see that the process of accumulating power would take centuries, not one or two presidential terms. Why did he get this one so wrong?

Key paragraphs (to me):

20 If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the state governments, the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will overcome all their antecedent propensities.

21 And in that case, the people ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be most due, but even in that case the state governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.

Key point I want to argue with:

One sees evidence in the speculation that is inherent in the extrapolation of the model; suddenly the terms "would" and "will" start flying as if the author has glimpsed the unalterable future path of history.

I’m not sure that he becomes enamored with his own ideas. I think he is arguing on thin ice here and he knows it. He knows that the House and the President will be chosen according to popular will. He knows the President will appoint a Supreme Court that is sympathetic to things Presidents like to do and have the power of the Necessary and Proper Clause to enable the National Government. Never once does he mention the Senate, which is supposed to be a check on national popular will. (My strong sense reading through this and other documents is that the Senate was never meant to be a strong body.) He knows that the USSC will be the court of last resort, even for the states and that the national government will be able to do as it pleases baring popular revolts.

No, I think he is arguing by assertion, not objectively, and knows that he is saying it simply isn’t practical for the Federal Government to replace the state governments. Since these arguments were made, we have found that the National Government has grown into every nook and cranny of state government using them as a sort of ManPower Services to carry out federal mandates. In fact, it is the practicality of the state governments that enables the federal government to be so intrusive.

That’s my response to the Discussion Topics. The Founders knew that the National Government would be supreme and knew that the state governments would be lower and as "the people should in future become more partial to the federal than to the state governments," the state governments would lose legitimacy. I think this Federalist Paper #46 is written in a disingenuous spirit.

Note that at the time state governments were not held in high regard. The founders had to co-opt them but that was a practical, not a philosophical, issue.

PS - Props to central_va for making a negative reference to Hamilton and the Whiskey Rebellion! (I think)