Posted on 07/07/2010 9:57:33 AM PDT by xzins
Early in 2008, the Atlantic Council released a report over the signature of its chairman, retired U.S. Marine Gen. James L. Jones that began, "Make no mistake: NATO is not winning in Afghanistan."
After a firestorm of protest from Brussels, the word "NATO" was changed to "the international community." Legend has it that the report was read by U.S. Sen. Barack Obama, D-Ill., and put the general in contention for his current job, which is national security adviser in the administration of President Barack Obama.
If that report were released in summer 2010, it could easily read: "Make no mistake: we are losing in Afghanistan."
The reasons have less to do with the current counterinsurgency campaign designed by U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal and all to do with the overarching Obama strategy produced last year. Those flaws are profound and so potentially fatal that unless rectified, the chances of a George Washington, Dwight Eisenhower or even David Petraeus succeeding aren't good.
First, the so-called AfPak strategy is backward. It should be called PakAf as Pakistan is the strategic center of gravity, not Afghanistan. Yet, virtually all of our energy and resources are going into Afghanistan.
Second, the aim of the original strategy was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida and prevent its return. Yet, there are perhaps only a handful of al-Qaida militants in Afghanistan. The rest have relocated to Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and other ports of call.
Third, the strategy was based on bringing a Western style of centralized government to Afghanistan. Yet that country and culture had always been and was likely always to be decentralized in its political structure.
Fourth, as the Taliban became the surrogates for al-Qaida, the strategy focused on them. Yet, the crux of the problem is dealing with the Pashtuns and enfranchising them into the body politic.
Fifth, while military forces can counter the Taliban, they cannot bring the necessary governance and governing process. Yet, we have failed to provide the civilian side of this equation and "government in a box" is a dangerous hoax.
Sixth, success rests on a competent and legitimate government in Kabul. Yet, the Karzai government has failed to meet either criterion.
Seventh, success is based on recruiting, training and maintaining effective and sufficient Afghan security forces. While the jury is still out, progress has been slow and episodic. Yet we haven't determined who will ultimately be responsible for paying these troops as, despite recent reports of finding a $1 trillion Afghan mineral reserve, that government will not have the billions to meet those bills.
Eighth, despite our understanding of the need to appreciate local culture, that is a work in progress. Unfortunately, reports that many of our translators aren't fluent in Pashto or even Dari suggest that the difficulty of communicating a Western message to an Afghan audience has been increased many fold. Indeed, operations are often named in Dari even when they take place in Pashtun areas reinforcing this cultural unawareness.
Finally, the strategy assumes a largely bilateral approach. Yet, only a regional solution that engages Afghanistan's neighbors is likely to produce a lasting effect.
Petraeus is experienced, gifted, canny and shrewd. While he has the authority to change the campaign plan, he will have to move subtly and cleverly to correct the strategic flaws that threaten and impede success in Afghanistan.
First and most importantly, he needs to reverse AfPak to PakAf. Fortunately, he knows and is respected by Pakistan's political and military leadership. Finding the equipment the Pakistan army desperately needs will expedite this shift to PakAf.
Second, a regional approach and strategy are vital. Recommendations to that end up the chain of command can begin this process.
Third, few better understand the need for the closest political and military interactions. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker did this brilliantly in Iraq and Petraeus knew how to deal with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. This must be duplicated in Kabul.
Fourth, while protection of the Afghan people is key, Petraeus knows this must conform to their and not our cultural norms. That will include greater reliance on reintegration and dialogue with insurgent groups. The downside is that there is no equivalent to the Iraqi awakening that stood up to the mass religious killings and persecutions. The magic will be finding or inventing an equivalent.
Finally, the December assessment and the ambiguities inherent in the July 2011 date to begin considering or withdrawing troops will weigh very heavily as will the November elections here. Petraeus will be under great pressure to perform his magic. Yet, he needs time and time may be his biggest enemy.
Petraeus is among the best we have and President Barack Obama picked the right general for the job. Let us hope that under his dress uniform or desert fighting gear the general wears a blue suit with a big Red S on his chest. For that is what is needed.
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(Harlan Ullman is chairman of the Killowen Group, which advises leaders of government and business, and senior adviser at Washington's Atlantic Council.)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
to read, thanks
No matter what we do in Afghanistan, we won’t change a 1000 years of their culture. When we leave, this year or ten years from now, nothing will have changed. People in Afghanistan will go back to what they know...........14th Century way of living.
We need a world of free nations agreement that all free nations’ special operations units and intelligence agencies should go full time after any Al Qaeda member (or associate group) anywhere they find them with shoot to kill authorization.
I never thought Afghanistan was that important. Sure, hang around and stomp down any training camps that spring up but bringing them out of the 14th century? They can do that themselves. In Iraq at lest there was a somewhat educated society with plenty of natural resources that in the hands of someone like Saddam or Iran would be extremely dangerous. Priorities, I guess. The Democrats were intellectually dishonest about Afghanistan during the election and now they are paying the price.
I agree on an “exterminate the roaches” plan for Afghan, but the nation doesn’t have the will to carry it out.
Leave Afghan...everytime the roach population grows, go back in and exterminate them.
It’s the “leave...go back” part that we don’t have the will to follow through on.
Forgot #10: he hates his own country.
I wouldn’t leave entirely... I’d keep a foot in the door in order to wack-a-mole the roaches while they’re small. Once you leave, there’d be no will to go back and the roaches would just grow as large as they did in the 90s.
Are you saying that we should keep our kids over in Afghanistan forever? I don’t agree with this. We don’t raise our children to live in Afghanistan. We can, if need be, handle this from the air. No more boots on the ground.
From the air might work but not everything can take off from air craft carriers or fly overland so ground bases are sometimes needed. Also we have “our children” (who are actually grownups who volunteered to serve our country) in desolate places all over the world (countries you’ve probably never heard of) as well as cold war places they may no longer be needed. Why are ground troops in Korea, Japan, Germany, Spain, Egypt all OK but not OK in Afghanistan?
How to keep a foot in the door? America will have a hard time with that one, too. (See post #10) I have a relative there now. We’ve had close family in one or the other of our war fronts continuously since 2004. It does get old.
Personally, I sort of like the create relations with each of Afghan’s umpteen prefects and treat them like separate governments approach. If they want national disintegration, then let them have it.
Yeah not nearly as much fun as duty in Germany or Japan or maybe even Korea where our feet are firmly planted "in the door".
I sort of like the create relations with each of Afghans umpteen prefects and treat them like separate governments approach.
Sure, if it gets the job done.
Because we don't have as large a military as we used to have. It's gets to the point where you just can't stretch that few people that far.
Germany, Japan, and Korea are a strategic advantage: forward staging areas.
Then you redistribute based on current priorities. What are we afraid of in Japan? Germany? Seems obvious. How many times have we tried to wash our hands entirely of a bad tasting war only to get bit in the arse again down the road. People can say we made the same mistake of Vietnam but the only difference between Vietnam and Korea is that we hung around in Korea and didn’t show the world that America = Paper Tiger.
Forward staging areas for where?
Our troops in most all other countries are making a difference. I do not believe we will make any difference in Afghanistan. We are not at war in Korea, Japan, Germany, Spain or Egypt........right?
Excellent point
Staging areas: America has been protected by its geographic location away from the other large landmasses, separated by oceans. Having bases ourselves on other continents removes any necessity to seize one if that became an issue. They are also strategically located to quickly project substantial power.
OK, I'm confused. We have troops in Korea, Japan, Germany, Spain and Egypt to...make a difference? You lost me. I thought we were talking about squashing roaches a minute ago. We should only have troops in places where we are NOT at war??? I ain't talking about thousands and thousands here... just enough to keep the terror camps from rebuilding. This forward position in Afghanistan could also be useful for the NEXT war which could be close by.
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