Those are the findings of a new investigation into the Sept. 8 ambush involving a team of U.S. military trainers embedded with Afghan troops in Kunar province.
But even though the deaths of the team members were the result of “negligent” leadership — “contributing directly to the loss of life” — it appears no one involved in the botched planning or execution of the mission will get more than a letter of reprimand for contributing to the deaths of five fellow service members.
Three Army officers were cited as a result of the incident, but their names, ranks and units were not disclosed. Officials with Combined Joint Task Force 82 in Afghanistan, which oversaw the unit, have declined to say whether any of them may face more serious discipline, and whether any of them have been relieved of command.
The investigation’s findings
Overseen by CJTF-82’s commander, Army Maj. Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, the investigation found a slew of mistakes, according to a executive summary report released Feb. 18. Among them:
• Poor planning.
The acting battalion commander and operations officer were not involved in the mission’s planning and coordination. It was devised instead by field-grade officers and the military trainers without participation from fire-support personnel, the summary said.
• Bad intel.
The embedded trainers were told to expect “light harassing fire” from about 10 insurgents while traveling to meet with village elders in Ganjgal, nestled in mountainous terrain near the Pakistan border. The team instead was forced to face between 100 and 150 well-armed insurgents, Defense Department officials now say.
• Battalion-level leadership absent.
The first shots rang out at 5:30 a.m. At 8:10, the ETT reported it was taking numerous casualties. While the trainers and their Afghan counterparts endured the 2½-hour attack, the battalion’s commander, operations officer, fire support officer, intelligence officer and noncommissioned officers in charge “were not continuously present in the operations center.”
“The actions of key leaders at the battalion level,” the report states, “were inadequate and ineffective.” Unit leadership “reacted appropriately” when they realized how serious the situation was, the summary said, but by then the five U.S. troops and nearly a dozen Afghan troops had been killed or mortally wounded.
• Inexperience.
During the ambush, the officer manning the operations center’s battle captain slot was “not adequately experienced, qualified or trained,” the summary said. The position typically helps manage information coming from the field. A more experienced officer took over at 8 a.m., but it was too late.
• Advice ignored.
While several personnel were missing from the operations center early during the engagement, a battalion NCO overseeing artillery requests “took action to provide immediate support to the units in the Ganjgal valley early in the engagement.” An Air Force joint terminal attack controller also acted swiftly to support the requests, but both “were overruled by higher echelons,” the summary said.
• Lack of preparation.
Complacency within the command post and poor training standards also contributed to the incident, the summary said. The operations center failed to competently track the battle, preventing higher headquarters from intervening in time to save lives. There was no experienced field-grade officer and senior noncommissioned officer in the command post, and it “contributed directly to mission failure,” the report said.
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/03/marine_ambush_030310w/
“While several personnel were missing from the operations center early during the engagement, a battalion NCO overseeing artillery requests “took action to provide immediate support to the units in the Ganjgal valley early in the engagement.” An Air Force joint terminal attack controller also acted swiftly to support the requests, but both “were overruled by higher echelons,” the summary said.”
And this absolves McC exactly how. He was the top commander. His ROE prevented action that could have saved these men’s lives.
How many internal investigations are going to lay the blame at the feet of the man whose rules they followed? NONE.
The fact that no one was charged, or eveb named here should tell you something.
This is NOT rhe only deadly incident these ROE have been responsible for.
And it wasn’t McClatchy who broke the story. I have the link on my profile page, but it was dead, so I had to search for the story elsewhere.
Like I said. Defend McChrystal to your heart’s content. He is/was unfit for command and the way he got out of it proves the point.
“While several personnel were missing from the operations center early during the engagement, a battalion NCO overseeing artillery requests “took action to provide immediate support to the units in the Ganjgal valley early in the engagement.” An Air Force joint terminal attack controller also acted swiftly to support the requests, but both “were overruled by higher echelons,” the summary said.”
And this absolves McC exactly how. He was the top commander. His ROE prevented action that could have saved these men’s lives.
How many internal investigations are going to lay the blame at the feet of the man whose rules they followed? NONE.
The fact that no one was charged, or even named here should tell you something.
This is NOT rhe only deadly incident these ROE have been responsible for.
And it wasn’t McClatchy who broke the story. I have the link on my profile page, but it was dead, so I had to search for the story elsewhere.
Like I said. Defend McChrystal to your heart’s content. He is/was unfit for command.