The Army uses the terms lower enlisted (E1 - E4), non-commissioned officers (E5 - E9), company grade officers (O1-O3), field grade officers (O4-O6), general officers (O7 - O10)
Keane was the behind the scenes architect of the Surge as you mention in another post. Don’t confuse this with Phase IV, or post Saddam Baghdad, it came much later after it was clear that the Rumsfeld Plan failed. Keane played a key role because he was retired and could work directly with the White House, bypassing the Pentagon. He was the go between working with Petraeus in Iraq and a few key guys in the White House. Unfortunate that we had to do that to come up with a plan to win.
Are we better off because the surge succeeded than we would have been had we left Iraq immediately after Hussein’s capture?
I am not thinking about the General officers as they see them selves, but in a more basic organizational/human form.
It seems like what I get from Keane is that the Army had very little plan wise to offer Rumsfeld. Keane said that they basically had to dust off 20 year old, Vietnam era counter insurgency manuals. Who’s fault was that that the Army, the Generals, had ignored, let waste a era so costly to the Army? It wasn’t the enlisted. It’s not the political appointees. Who does that leave?
If a individual isn’t responsible, then the group is, right?