Posted on 05/11/2010 5:22:12 PM PDT by thackney
Supermajor BP may have been struggling with lost circulation and other problems controlling the Macondo well six weeks prior to the 20 April blowout onboard Transocean semisub Deepwater Horizon according to testimony this afternoon at the joint Coast Guard - Minerals Management Service safety hearing in Kenner, Louisiana.
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Chief Mate Paul Erickson with Tidewater vessel Damon Bankston testified to being on board the supply vessel during an earlier hitch to ferry additional mud to the Transocean rig. Erickson said he heard comments about problems with the well but he could not identify precisely who gave him that information.
"We carried extra mud "because of circulation problem of some kind" and he understood that the "well was difficult".
Erickson also testified to the explosion of mud prior to the blaze, and that it was strong enough to kill birds hovering over the vessel and drop them onto its deck.
He also said he could see what he described as a white liquid "boiling" out of the main deck just aft of the derrick.
Shortly after he said he saw the "flash fire" just above the liquid.
Erickson could not say for certain what the liquid was, suggesting possibly seawater, but at such volumes and pressure he was not sure.
It was distinct from the mud, however.
In earlier testimony, the hearing panel also uncovered an apparent lack of firefighting coordination at the scene and the Coast Guard's inability to respond in that role.
Coast Guard Captain H M Nguyen himself cast the light on the Coast Guard's lack of marine firefighting skills and resources.
It also is not a priority for the Coast Guard as it was busily engaged in search and rescue for the survivors of the rig.
However, even that was mostly accomplished by a private vessel, Tidewater's Damon Bankston, helmed by Captain Alwin James Landry.
Testimony from Captain Landry indicated that four to six supply vessels and crewboats responded to the rig and dumped water on the Deepwater Horizon with permission from the rig's captain.
However, as per customary, no certified fire marshal or other coordinator was directing the firefighting effort, the hearing questioners learned.
"I don't know if there was a formal coordinator out there," said Coast Guard official Kevin Michael Robb, one of the watchstanders at the time of the incident.
Robb said also that the vessels dumping water on the rig had to "back off" around 3am because of the intensity of the blaze.
Captain Landry also said there was fire on the water, which motivated him and his crew to search by spotlight for survivors in the water. Landry said at least three had jumped in the water, including the Deepwater Horizon's captain, who was among the last to abandon ship.
Captain Nguyen observed that the firefighting effort was not coordinated and blasting water onto a vessel in an "uncoordinated action" on any vessel, can cause it to sink.
Robb answered that firefighting in a marine environment requires "significant amount of training" and assets, and "commandant policy" does not restrict Coast Guard involvement in dousing vessel fires, it takes a minimal, "conservative" approach to it.
Gregory Linsin, representing the Marshall Islands, the rig's flag nation, asked who would fulfill the role of fire marshal, to which Robb responded that usually the "owner of the platform" would do it, but since it is not part of the Coast Guard's "response policy", he could not comment more.
The first Coast Guard responders were not on the scene until just over an hour, when the first helicopter arrived.
Indeed, the helicopter actually "slid" on the deck of the Damon Bankston vessel due to the mud splattered all over the vessel, which occurred just prior to the rig explosion, according to Captain Landry.
Captain Landry's testimony garnered rapt attention as the described, to his perception, what happened the minutes before and after the blowout.
According to Landry, his dynamically positioned vessel was assigned to transfer several thousand barrels of drilling mud to the Horizon.
The mud weight was around 14 lbs per gallon, and Captain Nguyen asked if any combustible chemicals were in the mud. Landry could not specifically say, but he confirmed that the mud is stored in unpressurised tanks away from sources of ignition like the engine room.
He said the mud transfer by hose to the rig stopped around 17:17 pm, "I assumed it was for dinner break," he said.
Landry contacted the rig after 21:00 pm the status of the transfer. The rig told him it would be "displacing the riser" he said, meaning mud downhole would be evacuated out of the well and pumped back to the Damon Bankston.
Next thing Landry observed was a hissing sound. He said the noise is not unusual for deep-water, high pressure wells, but it lasted longer than he was accustomed, maybe half a minute. Shortly after that, it was raining mud on the Damon Bankston.
"I saw mud falling on back aft of boat. I thought it might have been a ruptured hose," Landry said.
After an explosion, he saw a "green flash" of light and "bits of debris fly through the air", but he later said all he could visually note was the slick mud on his vessel.
Landry said the rig lost power, lights went off, and then the first three or four crewmembers jump into the water, all within the first 10 minutes.
The Damon Bankston recovered all the survivors, also with the aid of a sport fishing vessel, the Ramblin Wreck.
Secondary explosions also occurred on the rig, according to Landry, who presumed it was from "chemicals" and other items on the rig catching fire.
Landry's course was also questioned. Once Coast Guard was on the scene, the Bankston made for the Ocean Endeavor semi-submersible for medical supplies and "tobacco products", Landry said.
It then made way for the Matterhorn tension leg platform where the vessel picked up Coast Guard, MMS and Tidewater personnel for "interviewing" the survivors.
Once arrived in Port Fourchon, the survivors -- including Captain Landry -- were subjected to drug tests, which Landry described as standard procedure after such an event.
Landry said the Horizon captain made mention of a "kill switch" not working, presumably to shut in the blowout preventer.
Attorney representatives from the following companies are present for the hearing, which continues this afternoon till 5pm: Anadarko, BP, M I Swaco, Cameron, Halliburton, Weatherford, Tidewater, and Transocean.
Wow, sounds like a script submission for a new Keystone Kops movie.
Wow, sounds like a script submission for a new Keystone Kops movie.
Just called this # and requested Lieberman's office. I got right through and left a message. Jam their voice mail and shut the switchboards down
BP gave up to 1,000,000 dollars to obama, they’re a foreign corporation...why is this not news??
For me, a couple of key points:
explosion of mud prior to the blaze
blasting water onto a vessel in an “uncoordinated action” on any vessel, can cause it to sink.
They sank it. Then the riser broke apart.
Drilling Mud ping
At that point, the riser breaking really didn’t matter. Without the BOP closed, oil was going to be coming out.
I think I had mentioned to you before the story of the long class on preperation of drilling mud. After it was all over, our veteran mud man asked “So if I don’t add water - it’s just dirt - right?”
Great article! I appreciate the ping.
Great read, and please keep posting these as you find them. It’s important to get the testimony out there without anyone’s interpretation or spin on it.
There was other testimony today from survivors who saw “frozen slush” ejecta on the drilling platform itself and saw it boiling off natural gas as they jumped over the side. That slush is made from methane gas under tremendous pressure, and once it hits sea level it immediately generates enormous quantities of gas. Just the idea of being near that stuff gives me the willies...
Last week there was a different report from a fellow on the rig who heard the rig’s diesel generators wind up out of control as they ingested natural gas...
I just can’t understand why they pumped the mud out of the column if they knew they had major gas problems from the start, and I cannot understand why the BOP could fail so completely, and why it apparently has no alternate method of emergency activation. These BOPs have been sold as “failsafe” and are specifically what allow this kind of drilling in the first place.
Accidents are almost always caused by a chain of events, as opposed to one single event. Remove one link of the chain and the accident never happens, and in the wake of the investigation I think it is going to be staggering when we realize how many chances there were to keep this one from happening.
Sounds a lot like the Ixtoc 1 blow out
NO mud, too much pressure.
THe difference? THe Mexicans owner/operator refused to pay a dime (or peso) in losses or damages.....
I have thought a fair bit about this, and wonder if the FiFi would have such an effect on a semi, in which case the principal flotation is provided by closed tanks well below the WL. As the explosion and ensuing fire occured above the rig floor, I do not see how the pontoons could have been damaged.
Seems to me that all the enclosed topside spaces would have scuppers or drains, albeit undersized to cope with the water ingress from the FiFi. Perhaps the water went into the columns, as in photos that I have seen the DH took a steep list.
Do you know if she capsized, or went down keel first? Again, even if capsized, would not the pontoons, were their WT integrity not compromised, have kept her afloat?
Thank you for posting these reports.
Your explanations are very helpful, too.
I have asked others numerous times over the weeks about the use of nitrogen injected cement on a high pressure gas wells with no response until earlier today..."it is common".
She sank while listing, maybe 25 degrees but did not roll over. It was a gradual slow sinking.
There are connections on Topsides to the Pontoons to raise and lower with water ballest.
Latest I’ve heard
Ping
Deepwater Horizon Well Failed Key Test ( Some hours before the blowout & explosion )
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