Baghdad Politics and the U.S.-Iranian Balance

Stratfor ^ | April 20, 2010 | George Friedman

[arthurus]

The status of Iraq has always framed the strategic challenge of Iran. Until 2003, regional stability — such as it was — was based on the Iran-Iraq balance of power. The United States invaded Iraq on the assumption that it could quickly defeat and dismantle the Iraqi government and armed forces and replace them with a cohesive and effective pro-American government and armed forces, thereby restoring the balance of power. When that expectation proved faulty, the United States was forced into two missions. The first was stabilizing Iraq. The second was providing the force for countering Iran.

The United States and Iran both wanted to destroy Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, and they collaborated to some extent during the invasion. But from there, their goals diverged. The Iranians hoped to establish a Shiite regime in Baghdad that would be under Tehran’s influence. The United States wanted to establish a regime that would block the Iranians.

[Ben Ficklin]

Here is another analysis on the same subject written by the same author and also published at Stratfor on March 1, about 7 weeks ago.

Thinking about Unthinkable: A US-Iranian Deal