Taiwan’s Navy: Able to Deny Command of the Sea?

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36266&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cH ^ | 4/16/2010 | James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara

[ErnstStavroBlofeld]

The first installment of this series on the Republic of China Navy (ROCN), or Taiwan Navy, presented a skeptical assessment of the ROCN’s ability to fulfill the expansive requirements set forth in its “ROC Navy Vision” (Xin shiji haijun), which in essence directs the navy to network its operations, extend its reach and amplify its combat punch in order to take control of offshore waters [1]. Yet the Taiwan Navy submarine fleet barely rates the name, the surface fleet is ill-suited for sea control, and even according to a recent Taiwanese Defense Ministry assessment, the tactical air power on which its surface operations depend is also in serious decline (Defense News, March 8).

That does not mean, however, that the Taiwan Navy is without options for defending Taiwanese shores. Reconfiguring the fleet and devising inventive tactics could let the ROCN take advantage of the island’s geography. As a result, Taiwan’s chances of withstanding a Chinese invasion, as well as the air and missile blitzkrieg that would likely precede it, would increase commensurately. Denying the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) use of the waters around Taiwan would be nearly as effective from the standpoint of homeland defense as fighting for outright sea control.

A navy prosecuting a sea-denial strategy has little need to control the seas itself; it merely wants to keep a superior foe from using critical expanses. Observes Admiral Stansfield Turner, putting a Maoist spin on the concept, sea denial is “essentially guerrilla warfare at sea.” It is a mode of combat in which a lesser navy—measured by numbers, capability, or both—“hits and runs” at a time of its own choosing, wearing down a stronger foe

[A.A. Cunningham]

The Jamestown Foundation

[ErnstStavroBlofeld]

Yep