[jwalsh07]

"Shinseki’s claim was based on a “straight-line extrapolation from very different environments” — an analysis by the Army’s Center for Military History that based its figure of 470,000 troops for Iraq on the service’s experience in Bosnia and Kosovo. But as Tom Ricks pointed out in an article for the Washington Post, this effort was criticized as naïve, unrealistic, and “like a war college exercise” rather than serious planning.

The best that can be claimed on Shinseki’s behalf is that he was right for the wrong reasons. His claim that more troops would be needed in Iraq was based on his incorrect assumption that humanitarian operations rather than counterinsurgency would be the main driver of U.S. force requirements."

Here's part of the memo, courtesy of Mackubin Owens, that you missed Lefty.

[Favor Center]

“Here’s part of the memo, courtesy of Mackubin Owens, that you missed Lefty.”

Which agrees with me: that on the single issue of needing “more troops” was correct. Since you can never really plan what the threat on the ground will actually be, the reasons for those troop levels is less important.

There was NO REAL PLANNING on the part of the WH for post-war Iraq. Otherwise, they might’ve left Garner in charge instead of flailing around with the State Department.