Posted on 01/03/2010 10:10:56 PM PST by myknowledge
The failure to stop Nigerian Islamic terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, before he could attempt to blow up an airliner on Christmas Day, has caused a media uproar over the failure of the American counter-terrorism system. Various intel agencies have released, or leaked, details of who knew what and when about Abdulmutallab. He was turned in by his father, to the American embassy in Nigeria, a month before the attempted bombing. As a result, Abdulmutallab was placed on a "persons of interest" list, along with another half million people. Abdulmutallab was not placed on the "no-fly" list, nor did anyone check to see if he had a visa to enter the country (which he did.)
The CIA had been collecting information on al Qaeda in Yemen, and knew that someone named, "the Nigerian" was being prepared for a mission. There was also some chatter about an attack during late December. The intel agencies have been accused of "not connecting the dots" and catching Abdulmutallab before he got on that plane to Detroit.
There are some institutional reasons for the failure to effectively analyze all this data and catch Abdulmutallab earlier. First of all, there are many similar patterns of potential terror attacks than the public never hears about. The counter-terror agencies have limited resources, and they cannot put a lot of effort into every potential attack. Then there is the personnel quality problem. The government has to compete with corporations for people, even in the area of intelligence gathering and analysis. The corporations tend to get the best people. But worst of all, the people who run the many counter-terror organizations, and subdivisions thereof, are either political appointees (selected more for loyalty to the boss, than administrative or counter-terrorism skills) or civil servants (those who were not hired away by corporations, and rose through the ranks, usually because they kept their heads down and didn't make waves.) While there are some extraordinary people in the government counter-terror bureaucracy, they are the exception, not the rule.
Then there is the reluctance of intelligence agencies to share information, lest another organization's sloppy security reveal "sources and methods" to the enemy (usually via the mass media, always eager for a hot headline.) Given the small number of actual terrorist attack attempts, the intel agencies are more concerned with protecting their sources (often very vulnerable people, very close to the terrorists) and methods (how they eavesdrop on enemy communications, or recruit informants).
Finally, let us not forget that something similar happened with the 19 Moslem men who carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks. After numerous investigations, it was found that there were diligent and alert personnel who detected these killers, but they were outnumbered and overwhelmed by political and civil service hacks who were not on the ball. So remember that, after the dust settles on the Abdulmutallab screw-up, the organizational culture that created it will very likely not change. And it will happen again. Happy New Year.
Abdul Mutallab was inspired to repeat Richard Reid's Shoe Bomber feat.
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab aka “Bill Ayers Jr.”
http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=ODVlZTZlM2M5NTMxMzllMjJkODVkNzQ3YTFjMTY0NzE=
"Grathwohl also testified about an unsuccessful Weatherman bombing in Detroit, which he said Ayers had planned to be executed when the maximum number of people would be present:
The only time that I was ever instructed or we were ever instructed to place a bomb in a building at a time when there would be people in it was during the planning of the bombing at the Detroit Police Officers’ Association building and the 13th precinct in Detroit, Mich., at which time Bill said that we should plan our bombing to coincide with the time when there would be the most people in those buildings.
Grathwohl tipped off police to this latter plot, and they cleared the area. When they finally found the Detroit bomb, it was unexploded. It contained 13 sticks of dynamite with an M-80 firecracker to detonate them, along with a burnt-out cigarette.
“The only thing Bill didn’t take into consideration in making his bomb,” Grathwohl testified, “was the fact that these wicks, those fuses on those firecrackers are waterproof with heavy paraffin, and a cigarette burning by itself does not always have enough heat to melt that paraffin and light the powder. And I didn’t volunteer any information to the contrary.” Grathwohl did not know who had actually planted the bomb."
“person of interest” requests “most vulnerable seat” on the airplane. Welcome aboard! No problem!
Of course we should prevent anything we can, but the sad truth is that the next suicide bombings could be during a nationally televised football game in a stadium. Imagine the horror of 2 or 3 suicide bombers on an Amtrax train, at the Eagle- Dallas game, an NBA contest. Maximum damage, video for the entire world, death and mayhem. And if you don’t think there are homegrown muslim asshole terrorists in this country planning such an attack, think again. Airports? Sure! But even these morons can’t be dumb enough to just blow a hole in an airplane. Not predicting, just saying................................
His failure let the cat out of the bag. If another airliner goes down and the administration tries to blame it on faulty wiring nobody is going to buy it.
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