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First on the losses sharing agreement. The original pool of assets was about $300 billion, but it has run off to $250 billion as of its termination (mostly from loans being repaid, especially mortgages in the pools refinanced, and the like). Citi took $8.1 billion in losses on this pool. Under the loss sharing agreement, it was responsible for the first $39.5 billion in losses, from the beginning. The Treasury got around $8 billion in preferred stock for agreeing to cover 90% of anything beyond that (actually split between the UST, the FDIC, and the New York Fed, for the next $5 billion, $10 billion, and remainder, respectively). So none of the government counterparties were going to owe anything unless Citi took a giant bath on this asset pool. It was mostly a confidence building measure, and a rather expensive one for Citi, but useful at the time.

As part of its repayment of TARP, Citi is exiting this loss sharing agreement, in return for retirement of the preferred stock it issued in exchange for it. Citi is booking a $2 billion loss on that part, largely related to repaying the warrants it issued along with the preferred (it was also paying interest etc).

Here is the press release filing at the SEC announcing their exiting the loss sharing agreement -

Edgar filing on Citi repayment and stock offering

Next as to what happened to those asset classes. Here is a link to the standard tracking pool used to measure the performance of subprime mortgage pools, from "Markit", which is a data provider in this area. Note that Citi owned primarily the AAA tranches of its subprime securitizations, with a large position in the 2006-2 vintage in particular. The worst "vintages" of those hit 23 cents on the dollar back in March of 2009, but now trade for 34 cents on the dollar (those are 2007 originations), while the 2006-2 originations are around 45 up from 29.

Markit ABX indices on subprime mortgage pools

As for what was in the covered asset pool, naturally it was not all subprime mortgages. The following is the breakdown as of the end of September.

$81 billion in consumer first mortgages
$50 billion in consumer second mortgages
$11 billion in auto loans
$18 billion other consumer loans
$11 billion in commercial real estate loans
$11 billion in other corporate loans
$9 billion in Alt-A securitizations
$6 billion in SIV securitizations
$2 billion in commercial real estate securitizations
$8 billion "other" securitizations (subprimes, here)
$18 billion in unfunded commitments, 2nd mortgages
$4 billion in unfunded commitments, commercial real estate
$2 billion in unfunded commitments, other consumer
$21 billion in unfunded commitments, other corporate

Understand, "unfunded commitments" means unused portions of lines of credit and possible borrowing on revolving credit facilities and the like, and those are $45 billion of the $250 billion total amount.

The "toxic assets" in the sense most commonly used during the crisis peak, meaning subprime mortgage securitizations and CDOs and such, are all in the $23 billion "securitizations" classes given above, with the highest loss subprime portion already run off or written down to $8 billion by the end of September.

Citi's loan loss reserve (already charged to earnings for anticipated losses) was $36.4 billion as of the same date.