Posted on 12/14/2009 11:26:44 AM PST by Paul Ross
Airbus/Northrop Threat Revealing
by George Landrith
Human Events, 12/04/2009
The Air Force has issued a preliminary Request for Proposal (RFP) specifying how companies can bid on the $35 billion contract to build the next fleet of air refueling tankers. A final RFP is due out soon.
The two bidders reviewing the preliminary RFP are Chicago-based Boeing, and a team made up of Airbus, based in Toulouse France, and Northrop Grumman, based in Los Angeles. Boeing has proposed building a tanker on its medium-sized B-767 commercial jetliner platform, while Airbus and Northrop have proposed building a tanker on Airbuss larger A-330 commercial jetliner platform.
The last competition was overturned after the Government Accountability Office issued a report highly critical of the Air Forces conduct, which they found had favored Airbus by conducting separate and unequal negotiations, offering Airbus extra credit for criteria Boeing was not made aware of. And, importantly, the GAO noted that the Air Force had waived critical requirements to keep the Airbus in the game.
This second competition was meant to offer each bidder clearer criteria, and treat both equally. Now, Airbus and Northrop are threatening to pull out of the competition unless the Air Force changes the RFP criteria to favor its larger, more expensive, less capable, and less survivable airplane.
On several fronts, Airbus threats to pull out unless its demands are met takes real nerve.
For starters, consider that Airbus has recently been found guilty by the World Trade Organization of taking illegal trade subsidies from European governments. Airbus has used these subsidies to undercut competitors like Boeing in bids just like the one being conducted by the Air Force. In what could only be called an abundance of generosity, the Air Force has said it will ignore Airbus illegal subsidies. This alone should be enough for Airbus to sit down and be quietly grateful, but apparently the French firm has come to feel entitled to the American defense contract, having been so pampered during the last competition.
Secondly, its a simple fact that the larger Airbus offering cannot operate from a large percentage of the runways currently used by Air Force tankers. This would mean the A330 tanker would either be less available, or US and allied airfields around the world would need to be reinforced and widened at huge expense. The previous competition did not take these construction costs or opportunity costs into account. This time around, these costs are being taken partially into account, for the very good reason that they will eventually have to be paid. If a homeowner were deciding between two boats, and the larger of the two would not fit in his garage, requiring him to build a new larger garage, then the larger boat might well be a poor bargain, no matter what its sale price might be. Same with the tanker. New runways and hangars are expensive, and the Air Force should take that into account up front.
Third, the larger Airbus A330 is less maneuverable than the Boeing B767, and -- as HUMAN EVENTS Editor Jed Babbin reported in July 2008 -- is unable to perform breakaway and overrun maneuvers critical to the safety of its mission. If for any reason, the tanker and the aircraft it is refueling fly too close together, the tanker is supposed to climb and accelerate, while the aircraft receiving fuel dives, thus ensuring a clean, safe separation, called a breakaway. The problem is that an Airbus A330 laden with fuel cannot climb and accelerate steeply or quickly enough to perform this maneuver. Its larger size and weight also prevents it from being able to speed up and overrun aircraft that end up positioned in front of the tanker, rather than behind it, at their rendezvous point. These are not trivial issues: they are essential to safe flight operations.
The Airbus-Northrop team has attempted to portray the larger size of the A330 as an asset, claiming that it carries more fuel, which is certainly true, and that it would also have lots of cargo and passenger space, which it would. But a tanker should first and foremost be a tanker. Secondary missions as a cargo or passenger plane would distract from its primary mission. Conducting secondary missions, and fitting on fewer runways means that the A330 tanker would be less available as a tanker, and all the extra fuel in the world does not help if it is not where it needs to be, when it needs to be there.
So, what Airbus and Northrop are demanding is that the Air Force ignore Airbus illegal trade subsidies, that it ignore all the additional construction and opportunity costs the A330 would add to the tanker program, and that it ignore the inability of the A330 to perform important safety maneuvers. And, Airbus and Northrop are also demanding that secondary missions are to be counted in their favor, even though warfighters are not asking for those secondary missions.
In other words, Airbus and Northrop seem to be demanding that the Air Force do what it did last time -- rig the bidding process so that Airbus cant lose. Or else, they will not even bother to offer a bid. This is a haughty attitude indeed. The Air Force should not dignify the threat with a response.
Airbus has been given every conceivable courtesy, to the point of receiving unfair advantages in this competition. If with all these advantages it still cannot compete, and cannot even be polite, then the Air Force should thank them, and move on.
George Landrith is the President of the Frontiers of Freedom Institute and a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law, where he was Business Editor of the Virginia Journal of Law and Politics. As an adjunct professor at the George Mason School of Law, Mr. Landrith has taught constitutional law, appellate advocacy, and legal writing.
But they don't. And they won't. You surmise that..."why give away your best bargaining chip by announcing that you are going to set up shop in the US anyway.
Bargaining chip?!!
That is nuts from a procurement and political standpoint...if you are trying to persuade Americans that you are credible when a European State-run make-work operation purports to be interested in transferring its European jobs to the U.S....
Rooooooooight....!
The reluctance to set up shop is not for bargaining purposes. It is because they never intend to. Instead, once they get the contract, they intend to stiff Alabama...and America. And they will then get away with it. Just like they are with their subsidies right now.
Poland is not EADS/Airbus.
The IFARFA model was disproved by the GAO evaluation. Garbage in, garbage out.
You mean the ones refueling bombers dating to the Eisenhower administration?
Alabamian? So? I am from Minnesota (the state which looks forward to global warming). We have our own idiosyncracies, but you don't here me making a big deal out of your possible ignorance thereof.
It is my understanding that EADS has every intention of building those planes here
You mean modifying, and final assembly. Their proposal was a meager 1,200 Alabama jobs before they "politically corrected" it upwards...
Actually, that isn't quite true. Boeing is being run by mostly MDD execs.
You want U.S. competition...force a divestiture with an antitrust action.
Notice, they aren't state-run. They aren't state-subsidized over 30% like Airbus. And they didn't wait for a huge defense contract.
>Yes, but that’s standard operating procedure, Boeing has just as much tried to influence the RFP in their favor.<<
Correct. Pre-RFP release, as did EADS. POSTS RFP, now, that is a different story as the whining of EADS proves.
>> And do you really believe that Boeing had nothing to do with overturning the previous decision for Northrop/EADS?<<
Yes, that was GAO, not the Air force, not the Congress, not the president. Boeing filed a legal protest, the first time in 10-years, and the GAO conducted an independent analysis. . .not congress.
>>The first thing they did was certainly to call their congressmen. In the end it always comes to playing politics.<<
Calling your congressman post selection is a risky deal unless you are confident an independent analysis can prove ineptness, grievous error or just plain mistake was done. Congress can only bluster and perhaps withhold funding (wasn’t done in this case). Congress can support the call for GAO analysis, but the congressman is at risk because, as you proved quite clearly, any interest will be seen as partisan and not motivated by the public interest.
It is hard to overturn a decision the customer made. . .unless it was done badly, and GAO recommended, not directed, the selection be set-aside. GAO had no power to throw out the selection, it was the Air Force and OSD that did that (once a closer look was done).
>>You have to keep in mind that the USAF already agreed to lease Boeing tankers - at criminally overpriced rates. Only after Boeing’s bribery became public was the deal nixed.<<
Let’s see, Darlene Druyan had no role to play in that? She was the most corrupt SAF/AQ in the history of the Air Force and went to prison for it, as did a Boeing executive. . .and one paid hefty fines. Oh, by the way, it wasn’t the government that cried foul and turned in the CEO and COO, it was Boeing personnel and the crime was limited to TWO people in the company and the company turned them in.
So, the CEO and the COO were found to be guilty and yet you tar the entire company, the honest people, for something that was done nearly a decade ago, and with none of the guilty players still in the company?
Curious your thoughts; given the recent WTO ruling that EADS received subsidies and these subsidies were never factored into the RDT&E, procurement and O&M estimated costs submitted by EADS in their proposal to the Air Force, is that somehow fair? Boeing had to factor in those costs. . .why shouldn’t EADS?
I am waiting to read about the WTO and the sanctions EADS has to pony-up. . .like adding past subsidies to current prices (as is WTO history of assessing and collecting fines). In that case, it would be a monumental over-inflated price to pay for an EADS tanker, as the fine/penalties would have to be added to the tanker price, and those costs would be pushed to the American taxpayer. . .is that fair, for Americans to pay the European fines of a European company? Curious again, how fair is that, to punish the American taxpayer for EADS/European crimes?
>>Then they agreed to buy the planes from Northrop/EADS, but that was also overturned due to political pressure alledging a sloppy selection process.<<
GAO succumbing to political pressure? Interesting. . . .”alleged sloppy” selection process that was fully and factually documented in the GAO ruling. You have read the GAO ruling, right? Point by point factual refutation of the “alleged” sloppiness, please.
>>This isn’t the first round, we’ve been here twice before! And blaming the other guy for trying to get a competitive advantage when you yourself resorted to bribery the first time, well, that’s chuzpa.<<
The lease was nearly a decade ago and Boeing’s first proposal did nothing of the kind (bribery and such). Boeing KNEW they were under a microscope and took pains to keep it clean and upfront.
For the European and EADS to threaten to take their ball and go home if the entire USAF doesn’t bend to their will, to change the requirement POST RFP RELEASE is chutzpa to the extreme.
Let the RFP fly as it is, as Gates signed off on it, as the Air Force vetted it through OSD/ATL all the way to Gates.
Besides, as one of the talking heads on Good Morning Briton said on the day of the first announcement, “This will give Europeans power to influence Americans if they try and do something silly like Iraq again.” Then the conversation briefly said just stop deliveries and parts to make the “Americans behave.” (I was there, leaving my hotel on Piccadilly, when that statement was made. heard it myself.)
McDonnell-Douglas is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boeing. . .just to be clear.
KC-135
Was Northrup the outfit that sold missile/satellite technology to China, back in Clintoon’s day?
yea, I know the designation..
Which is why strategic American military assets should come from an American supplier. And while I understand that said supplier can and do contract out to foreign suppliers for parts, they can if need be, pull those back "in-house" so to speak.
Which is kinda hard to do when your primary airframe is being designed AND built overseas by a foreign company, controlled by foreign governments.
Really? Can you show me on which page?
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.pdf
I found that:
IFARA Factor Evaluation
Boeing also challenges the Air Forces evaluation of the firms proposals under the IFARA evaluation factor. Boeing complains that the Air Force unreasonably concluded that Northrop Grummans proposed aircraft was superior to Boeings under this factor based only upon the fleet effectiveness value and without considering evaluated major insights and observations, which Boeing asserts favored its proposal. See Boeings Comments at 146. Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA did consider the agencys evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms proposals under this factor, and therefore find no basis to object to the agencys evaluation.
Air Force has to replace its KC-135 tanker fleet but that doesn't mean Air Force has to stop thinking about the future and therefor couldn't choose a bigger aircraft.
Basically, I would like to see a line-by-line analysis of the GAO report and any fact-based arguments refuting the GAO report.
GAO decision: http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.pdf
Nowhere you could find a statement by GAO that the Boeing offer was compliant. The new RFP dropped the wing mounted refueling system because Boeing isn't able to deliver them. So how honest was Boeing's last offer with wing pods?
What NG/EADS is upset about you can read here:
http://leehamnews.wordpress.com/2009/12/07/usaf-used-criteria-gao-rejected-in-new-drfp-kc-30-backers/
1. The GAO rejected a Boeing complaint that the USAF valued the KC-30s short-field performance yet the USAF now calls this a non-mandatory factor;
2. The GAO rejected a complaint that the USAF unfairly lengthened Boeings delivery schedule; the current DRFP removed this entirely;
3. The GAO rejected Boeings complaint that the USAF assigned Boeing an unacceptable high risk for its schedule but this risk assessment was removed from the new DRFP;
4. Boeing complained the USAFs past-performance criteria was unreasonable, a complaint rejected by the GAO; but the Air Force significantly diminished past performance in the current DRFP;
5. Boeing complained the Air Force undervalued Boeings advantage in technical manuals, a complaint rejected by the GAO; Northrop says this is now a mandatory requirement and that Boeings design is specified.
Air Force calculats fuel costs according to this formular:
costs = (Offeror's Fuel Burn)x(40 years)(179 aircraft)x(KC-135 Average Yearly Flying Hours (489h))x(Adjusted Annual Fuel Price)x(Present Value Discount)
I can see two errors within this formular.
That isn't true. Water flow at lavatories is as important as fuel offload capabilities.
Senator Jeff Sessions gives an overview about how the new RFP is prefers a less capable aircraft.
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2408699/posts
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.