Counsel, at least superficially, appears to understand that she
must structure her claim to overcome the standing hurdle. She
attempted to clear that hurdle on her way to the prize (verification
of the President’s place of birth) by having her client challenge her
deployment orders. This leap from a concern about a President’s
Constitutional eligibility to hold the office to a private legal cause
of action by an Army Captain to avoid deployment pursuant to an
otherwise valid order is where counsel entered the thicket of legal
frivolity. Counsel and her followers certainly have the right, as
citizens, to seek from their President proof of where he was born.
Counsel does not have the right, however, to file an action in federal
court on behalf of an Army officer to avoid deployment when the only
basis for seeking the Court’s aid to prevent deployment is speculation
and conjecture that the President is not eligible to serve.
Plaintiff’s counsel ignored the well-established precedent that
disfavors judicial interference in the internal affairs of the armed
forces. She pointed to no legal authority supporting her contention
that an alleged “cloud” on the President’s eligibility to hold office
violated one of her client’s individual constitutional rights. And
she provided no legal authority to support the proposition that even
if the President were found not to be eligible for the office, that
this would mean all soldiers in the military would be authorized to
disregard their duty as American soldiers and disobey orders from
their chain of command.
Adoption of counsel’s legal theory would make the judiciary the
arbiter of any dispute regarding the President’s constitutional
qualifications. Our founders provided opportunities for a President’s
qualifications to be tested, but they do not include direct
involvement by the judiciary. In addition to the obvious opportunity
that exists during a presidential campaign to scrutinize a candidate’s
qualifications, the framers of the Constitution provided a mechanism
for removing a President who “slips through the cracks,” which is how
counsel describes President Obama. Upon conviction by the Senate of
treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, the President
can be removed through impeachment. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4; see
also id. art. I, §§ 2 & 3. Thus, if the President were elected to the
office by knowingly and fraudulently concealing evidence of his
constitutional disqualification, then a mechanism exists for removing
him from office. Except for the Chief Justice’s role in presiding
over the trial in the Senate, that mechanism does not involve the
judiciary. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
One can readily see the wisdom of entrusting the elected
representatives of the people with the ultimate decision as to whether
a President should be removed from office rather than litigating the
issue in our courts. Although counsel’s present concern is the
location of the President’s birth, it does not take much imagination
to extend the theory to his birthday. Perhaps, he looks “too young”
to be President, and he says he stopped counting birthdays when he
reached age thirty. If he refused to admit publicly that he is older
than the constitutional minimum age of thirty-five, should Ms. Taitz
be allowed to file a lawsuit and have a court order him to produce his
birth certificate? See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Or perhaps
an eccentric citizen has become convinced that the President is an
alien from Mars, and the courts should order DNA testing to enforce
the Constitution.7 Or, more to the point, perhaps the Court should
issue a nationwide injunction that prevents the U.S. Army from sending
any soldier to Iraq or Afghanistan or anywhere else until Ms. Taitz
is permitted to depose the President in the Oval Office. The federal
courts were not established to resolve such purely political disputes
or to assist in the pursuit of a political fishing expedition,
particularly when that intrusion would interfere with the ability of
the U.S. Army to do its job.
Contrary to counsel’s suggestion, the courts do not refrain from
entering political debates because of bias or personal disinterest.
They do so because the Constitution, within which counsel attempts to
wrap herself, prevents their encroachment into the political sphere.
That does not mean that judicial decisions do not often have political
consequences, nor does it mean that the judiciary cannot rule upon
issues that may overturn actions by the political branches when they
are contrary to the Constitution. But it is clear that the
Constitution does not contemplate that the judiciary will participate
in the selection or removal of the President, unless an individual can
clearly demonstrate that his individual constitutional rights are
somehow violated by the process. A generalized claim that the
President is unqualified does not fall within this narrow exception
and is best addressed to the First branch of government, not the
Third.
The absolute absence of any legitimate legal argument, combined
with the political diatribe in her motions, demonstrates that Ms.
Taitz’s purpose is to advance a political agenda and not to pursue a
legitimate legal cause of action. Rather than citing to binding legal
precedent, she calls the President names, accuses the undersigned of
treason, and gratuitously slanders the President’s father. As the
Court noted in an earlier order, counsel’s wild accusations may be
protected by the First Amendment when she makes them on her blog or
in her press conferences, but the federal courts are reserved for
hearing genuine legal disputes, not as a platform for political
rhetoric and personal insults. Simply put, no reasonable basis
existed for counsel to believe that her legal cause of action was
legitimate under existing law or under a reasonable extension or
modification of existing law. Thus, counsel’s Complaint on behalf of
Captain Rhodes was frivolous.
What a pantload from this judge.
The judge nails it here.