This Mission Is Not McChrystal Clear: Our troops are not in Afghanistan for a social experiment.

National Review Online ^ | Oct. 2, 2009 | Andrew C. McCarthy

[TomasUSMC]

The muslims they knew were Barbary pirates, and we battled them fiercely, with no THOUGHT of nation building, only punishment and instilling fear of our armaments and marines.

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That is my favored way of going about it.
Can’t have ‘em love US without giving US our due respect. I don’t see much respect for US from moslem nations, certainly not now that we have a President who everyone knows has never loved nor respected this Land.

Although this is the first time in my life that I am proud of the IOC.

[TomasUSMC]

The Soviets went in with overwhelming force and no qualms about killing civilians. They eventually lost.

They lost because
they wouldn’t go into Pakistan and take out the supply bases, thus the SAMs we gave got to take out the Russian Air.
They lost because they had a weak leader who did not believe in their Political System.

You can’t allow the enemy sanctuary. He can’t be allowed to hide safely while attacking and killing your troops. We learned that in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and anywhere.

And you can’t win with a weak leader who is afraid of continuing the fight

Will obambi grow a pair??? Hell he can’t even beat the IOC. Maybe Michelle will take over, she’s gotta have a bigger pair.

[TomasUSMC]

the general says of the Afghans. “This conflict and country are [theirs] to win — not mine.” And because we are in Afghanistan primarily to make life better for the Afghans, he argues, “our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces; our objective must be the population.”
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WTF? Tell that to the Marines, don’t focus on destroying the enemy? When you getting shot at? Don’t focus on killing the enemy?

We have only one military mission in Afghanistan, and it is not to protect the Afghan population, who are not properly our concern so long as they don’t allow their country to be a launching pad for attacks on the United States. Our troops are in Afghanistan because we, not the Afghans, are in a war to destroy al-Qaeda and its enablers

TELL THAT TO obambi.

[anglian]

October 2009
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Spooling Up in Afghanistan
By Adam J. Hebert
Executive Editor
The expeditionary air war is drawing in more airmen and aircraft for the long haul.
Air Forces Central, the command that oversees US airpower operations in Southwest Asia, reports US aircraft flew some 19,000 close air support sorties over Afghanistan in 2008. This year, AFCENT forces are on pace to nearly double that number.

Expeditionary airpower is in growing demand.
For US military leaders, the war in Afghanistan now has moved to center stage. US goals are clear: Defend Afghan citizens from depredations of insurgents, support civil development, and, in the process, crush a resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda threat.

In Afghanistan, things are heating up and will become deadlier as more US troops pour into the nation. In July, the US upgraded to wing status the 451st Air Expeditionary Group at Kandahar Airfield. It is now commanded by a brigadier general, reflecting the new scope and importance of the operation in southern Afghanistan.

Limited Conditions

The primary mission for the Predators and Reapers is ISR, but the UAVs can immediately switch to an attack role if necessary. Manned aircraft perform most strike missions.

Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top military commander in Afghanistan, recently issued a tactical directive ordering troops to “scrutinize and limit the use of force such as close air support (CAS) against residential compounds and other locations likely to produce civilian casualties.” The directive came on the heels of a series of attacks that killed Afghan civilians in addition to the intended terrorists.

Of particular interest to coalition air forces is McChrystal’s guidance that “use of air-to-ground munitions and indirect fires against residential compounds is only authorized under very limited and prescribed conditions.”

This matters greatly because US and allied forces are battling an enemy that courts civilian casualties for propaganda purposes, deliberately hides among civilians, and frequently fights from residences and towns.
“Basic US self-defense policy has not changed,” said Col. James G. Bitzes, CAOC legal advisor—friendly forces will defend themselves. Bitzes and others said the directive makes clear that the top priority is protecting civilians, without unduly restricting the Air Force.

“I really don’t think it’s different today,” said Holland. “We pretty much hit what we’re aiming for—and it’s vetted.”

http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/October%202009/1009afghanistan.aspx “Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond” looks to address the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by examining how leadership has often meant the difference between success and failure, and how it can be improved. Gen. David Petraeus, CENTCOM Commander, gives the keynote address.
Washington, DC : 1 hr. 24 min.
http://www.c-span.org/Watch/Media/2009/09/23/HP/A/23595/Marine+Corps+University+Symposium+on+Counterinsurgency+Leadership.aspx

[LS]

And don't get preachy to me. There is simply no alternative to SOME sort of "nation building" when you defeat an enemy. The alternatives are: a) absorb them as subjects or slaves (the way the Brits and Persians did); b) absorb them and give them citizenship (some Roman, typical U.S. policy in many territories); c) return them to independence after a period of occupation in which they are ensured to be "survivable" and not a threat (Grenada, Cuba, the Philippines, to a lesser degree, Panama, Iraq); d) just leave and hope they don't return to pre-war conditions (Iraq after 1991).

There is also the Wilsonian approach which is to nation-build the wrong way by using arbitrary and unfair boundaries and groupings. Then there is the Truman/Marshall method which worked DARN WELL and thank God for it.

Anyone who thinks walking out of Afghanistan will not require an Iraq-type return in a few years---at a MUCH higher cost---is smoking something.

[LS]

Above I list the options after winning a war. Any nation must follow one or the other of these courses. Since I don’t think any Americans want to make Afghanistan a “state,” one of the options is off the table immediately. BTW, think of the trouble we could have saved ourselves if we had indeed retained large parts of Mexico as U.S. territory or even a state.

[Travis McGee]

Others have put forward a viable approach, so I'll repeat it. It does NOT involve “nation building” in a geographic area of tribal warlords that has NEVER been a nation, and never will be. That is a fool's errand, and doomed to fail.

The only viable alternative is to choose some tribal warlords to be our allies, build a powerful military presence there, and use it as a base for punitive raids and strikes against any new terrorist bases or training camps in the rest of that god forsaken region (not nation).

If you think we are going to stay in Afghanistan until that entire region sees the error of their thousands of years of history and joins to hold hands and sing Kumbaya with us.......well I just cannot fathom the depth of your naivete. If you and Mcrystal carry the day for now, we are going to lose a lot of great troops for no gain, before we wise up.

[LS]

You just outlined a "nation building" approach. Did I say they had to look like Britain or the U.S.? What I did say was you can't leave a vacuum. Nor do I think they have to sing Kumbaya in order to be a form of democracy.

But I'll say this and we're done, because I'm not debating this any more: if we just pull out of Afghanistan and do not leave a stable nation behind, we'll do this all over again in 10 years, just like we did with Iraq, only after a lot more than a "few troops" die. It will be very, very bloody.

The naivete is on your side, pal.

[CodeToad]

Define “stabel nation”. They’ve never had one, don’t want one, and prefer to keep their tribes.

[LS]

Stable (not "stabel") nation is of course conditional. A stable nation in the ME would be much different than Canada or the U.S., but probably not much different than, say, Serbia or Slovenia.

You probably really aren't interested in an answer or a discussion, since it seems you've made up your mind, but I'll give you some conditions: it would have a working government under which various tribes or warlords submit and pay taxes while retaining their identities (can you say, Saudi Arabia?); it would be an ally working against terrorists rather than a safe haven for them; preferably it would be a democracy (democracies can be run by votes of tribes---it could be one tribe one vote, I suppose); and it would modernize along the lines of the scientific method and the rights of man.

[CodeToad]

“Stable (not “stabel”)”

Gosh, sorry my typing wasn’t perfect. Stop being such an obvious idiot. “submit and pay taxes” is a property of a stable government?? So much for you understanding civics.

[Interesting Times]

Counterinsurgency critique ping.

[zot]

Thanks for the ping.

These rules of engagement make nation-building an impossible dream. Many Afghans don’t want to be ruled by the Taliban. They are afraid of the Taliban, and they want us to stay and fight, but they can’t afford to come over to our side as long as we don’t fight effectively, because doing so gets them killed.