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Indeed, Rosen described life as closed to efficient cause.

Indeed, he did. As he put it, “a material system is an organism if, and only if, it is closed to efficient causation.”

Rosen is coming at these problems from the “side” of mathematical modeling and complex systems theory, as supplementary to physics. His approach culminates in a theory of “relational biology.” This theory presupposes that what is truly distinctive about biological organisms is not the “stuff” out of which they are made, but the way that “stuff” is organized: That is to say the Whole is never the simple summation of its parts. Rosen maintains that any organizational system displays a pattern of causal entailment that can be mathematically modeled. And when we do model them, we find that simple, “mechanistic” systems in nature look very different from complex, “biological” ones. The network of causation tells the tale between inorganic and organic systems in nature.

The root of Rosen’s approach is to be found in the classical, i.e., Aristotelian categories of causation. Especially since such this problem touches on a conversation I’m having with spunkets right now, maybe it’s finally time for me to say a word or two about Aristotle’s theory of causation, since it is now so alive in my mind just now, and bears on that conversation.

Rosen bottom-line seems to be a Natural Law theorist; so it’s not surprising he would look back to Aristotle — the very guy Francis Bacon tried to exorcise from “natural philosophy” [the term “science” didn’t become popular until the 19th century] altogether! (Who was the very father of natural philosophy; so much for the irony here….)

In the spirit of full and fair disclosure, the picture of Aristotelian causation I’m about to present is the work of a life-long student, not of any kind of “expert” in the “field” of Aristotle….

One has a very strong sense that Aristotle perceives a hierarchy of causes, that might be summed up as (1) the cosmic-level description (or category); and (2) the phenomenal-level description (or category).

At the cosmic level, we have First Cause (usually associated with the idea of the Prime Unmoved Mover); Final Cause (the purpose for which the original “moving” was done in the first place, the telos); and in-between these two ultimate causes of the universe, the Immanent Cause. First and Final seem intuitively clear. But what is this Immanent Cause? And how does it express in space and time? Whatever it is, it seems to mediate in such a way as to connect the first with the last….

Of course already it is clear that we are not speaking just of “epistemological things” here [i.e., things within the compass of the "science" of knowledge]; we are firmly landed in the domain of ontology, of metaphysics, of theology [i.e., things within the compass of the "science" of Being, or existence]. The latter of which ostensibly has no relation to the conduct of scientific inquiry, for the simple reason that the cosmic-level causal inquiry is not directly relevant to the conduct of empirical science.

But then again, in all fairness, neither does it ever entirely go away. Just because science shifts attention away from it, in the course of working its own methodology, this does not extinguish the reality of the cosmic-level background.

It’s the foreground that the scientific method is best suited to capture — the phenomenal world, the world of observation. Aristotle posits four fundamental causes there — and moreover says that no phenomenon in nature can possibly be truthfully described without recourse to all four causes: Formal, Material, Efficient, Final.

Oh, here’s a hoary old sketch offered to get us all on the same page:

The formal cause (eidos) is the pattern or design according to which materials are selected and assembled for the execution of a particular goal or purpose. For example, in the case of a Boeing 747, the blueprint (or schematic) would be its formal cause. This is the key “explanation” for the jet; for its construction materials and subcomponents would be only a pile of rubble (or a different jet) if they were not put together in the particular way its blueprint specified.
The material cause is the basic stuff out of which something is made. The material cause of a Boeing 747, for example, would include the metals, plastics, glass, and other component materials used in its construction. All of these things belong in an explanation of the 747 because it could not exist unless they were present in its composition.
The efficient cause is the agent or force immediately responsible for bringing that material and that form together in the production of the Boeing 747. Thus, the efficient cause of the jet would include the efforts of engineers, materials fabricators, hydraulics specialists, and other workers who use the designated materials and components to build the jet in accordance with its specifying blueprint. Clearly the Boeing 747 could not be what it is without their contribution: It would remain unbuilt.
Lastly, the final cause (telos) is the end or purpose for which the Boeing 747 exists. The final cause of the jet would be to provide safe, reliable, comfortable air transportation for human beings. This is part of the explanation of the 747’s existence, because it never would have been built in the first place unless people needed a means of air transportation.

Now arguably the Newtonian Paradigm recognizes only three of these causes: Formal, Material, and Efficient.

Formal cause is “initial conditions”;
Material cause is “matter present”; and
Efficient cause is “the gravitational effects of matter present,” as captured at coordinates x, y…. [???]

Noticeably absent is any idea of Final Cause — to Francis Bacon’s enormous relief I imagine. :^) RIP.

The problem seems to be a confusion WRT the categorical distinction obtaining between a “final cause” in the cosmological sense, and a “final cause” in the phenomenal (direct observational) sense. In the former case, we had to speak of a telos — a cosmic, or even divine, goal and/or purpose as implicit in primal form and subsequent evolution of the universe. Since this sort of thing can never come within the range of direct human observation, it is not an object for science.

But “final cause” in the phenomenal sense does not invoke the idea of telos on cosmic scale. It only invokes the idea of finality of a process in nature. Such as a biological function.

Finality in this sense pertains to the causal closure necessary for efficient causation to depend solely on the resources of the “isolated” system in which it operates. A further indispensable insight is, from the standpoint of the biological Whole, there are no isolated systems; there are only a multiplicity of particular systems, each of which produces its “desired” effect in contribution to the already elaborate, multifarious multiplicity of other effects which altogether are necessary to sustain the integrated biological Whole.

Which I gather is why Rosen thought he ought to seek out complex systems theory for guiding helps…. Stochastic methods having already shown their shortcomings….

Isolated systems are not biological ones as a rule. Or at least, not for long. It seems to me that one cannot speak of a “function” absent the idea of system closure, which can be described at the causal level if the idea of final cause can be admitted to the table.

If these ideas seem overly abstruse, we can easily simplify them just by taking a hint from Robert Rosen. He suggested that the entire idea of “final cause” is exactly equivalent to positing the natural human question, “Why?” Anytime we ask the question, “Why?” about anything in natural experience, we are invoking — or soliciting — a final cause explanation.

Oh, I’m sure there’s more to be said on this subject, but I just can’t say it right now.

Dearest sister in Christ, thank you ever so much for writing, and for your kind words!