Mark R. Levin: Not So Fast - A response to Andy McCarthy on the democracy project.

National Review Online ^ | September 04, 2009 | Mark R. Levin

[neverdem]

---

September 04, 2009, 0:00 p.m.

Not So Fast
A response to Andy McCarthy on the democracy project.

By Mark R. Levin

It is quite a challenge to disagree with my brother Andy McCarthy. Both the substance and length of his arguments are compelling. But let me address a few of the points in his excellent piece today.

The decision to invade Iraq was not motivated exclusively or even primarily by the democracy project. Indeed, the Bush administration’s case to the international community, presented over a period of months, was mostly based on national- and international-security arguments. The arguments made to the United Nations focused on Saddam Hussein’s threat to the region (given his past invasions), his funding of terrorism (e.g., supporting suicide bombers in Israel), his giving safe harbor to al-Qaeda elements in Iraq, and his attempt to secure weapons of mass destruction (let’s put aside, for now, the issue of the extent of his WMD arsenal). Saddam had also attempted to assassinate Pres. George H. W. Bush, which is an act of war in and of itself.

While Pres. George W. Bush and several of his supporters made the case for democracy, as I believe presidents have in virtually every major war in which we’ve been involved, I don’t believe it can credibly be asserted that democracy was the primary factor that drove us to war in Iraq. However, there is the practical issue of what you do with a nation once you’ve attacked it and destroyed the regime that once ruled it. Do you just pick up and leave and hope the regime that replaces it is less dangerous to our national-security interests and the larger region? Or do you attempt to influence what becomes of the country whose government you attacked and destroyed?

In our history, we have done both: We have stayed and built up nations after defeating them, and we have left nations after defeating them. The proper strategy depends on the best interests of American national security under the circumstances. That is the only coherent and morally justifiable doctrine. Support for or opposition to the democracy project as a general doctrinal matter seems misplaced. As I have written before, the Marshall Plan was framed at the time as a democracy project. But it was pursued to prevent the Soviet Union from conquering the rest of Europe. Pres. Harry Truman rightly concluded that the United States needed to pour billions of dollars into these defeated countries to build up their governments and economies. We did the same in Japan and, after the Korean War, in what is now South Korea. It cannot be said that those “democracy projects” were failures. Indeed, they were huge successes. And they did not happen overnight.

In Afghanistan, the Reagan administration’s policy of forcing the Soviet Union out of that country without formally engaging in war with either the Soviets or the Afghan regime was extremely effective. The aftermath was not. Yet the Reagan administration’s decision not to get “bogged down,” as it were, in Afghanistan after the Soviets were defeated was perfectly sound given what it knew at the time. However, there is no disputing today that the vacuum was filled by the Taliban, which gave safe haven to al-Qaeda, which in turn launched a brutal attack on American soil on 9/11 (and numerous other terrorist attacks against Americans before 9/11). Now, after the U.S. has defeated the Taliban and forced al-Qaeda to other parts of the world (no small achievement), the argument is made that there is no reason to keep our military in Afghanistan, let alone increase our military presence there, as the Afghan government is weak, ineffectual, and corrupt, and we cannot prop it up forever. Essentially the same argument is made about Iraq. In short, the democracy project is a failure, or at least these new governments should be left on their own to either survive or crumble.

Is that in America’s best national-security interests? Brother Andy argues that we need to be more honest with ourselves about Islam. He is absolutely right, in my view. There is no question, as a matter of historical fact, that Arab and Islamic culture and societies are less hospitable to democracy than others. But there are exceptions. Turkey, although an imperfect example, is a functioning democracy — not a Western democracy, but a democracy nonetheless. Jordan is less of a democracy but not a genocidal dictatorship. There are other examples, but Andy’s point is well taken. Unlike in the West, where it is the rule, democracy is the exception in the region where we are fighting two wars. Still, it cannot be said that the attempt to build democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan was irrational or utterly unworkable. And the effort is a proper one if its purpose is to secure our nation’s security interests.

My objection to the democracy project is that it is irrational as a general doctrine. The Shah of Iran was a crucial American ally. However, as a result of Jimmy Carter’s human-rights project (not altogether different from the democracy project in some ways), his government was toppled and replaced with the current Iranian regime, whose lust for terror, expansion, and weapons of mass destruction poses an enormous threat to the United States and the rest of the world. Clearly many of those associated with the democracy project reject Carter’s foreign policy and previously opposed his refusal to support the Shah, who sat on a very elaborate throne but was a steadfast ally. There are many more examples of such regimes.

Although democracy-project adherents have their own irreconcilable arguments and objectives, so do those who insist that all is lost, Iraq was a bad idea from the start, we’ve done all we can in Afghanistan, and it is time to pull back. Pull back to where? Regarding Iraq, I see no political support for staying there much longer. Even President Bush set a timetable for pulling out most of our troops. I don’t know if this was wise or not. It seems to me that if staying for a few more years would make a big difference, we should commit to it. If Iraq collapses, what then? This is the question that George Will and others leave unanswered. I don’t blame them. It’s a tough question. But it is one that must be considered, particularly by those who are responsible for our country’s national security. Andy writes of Iraq’s coziness with Iran. But Iraq is by no means an appendage of Iran. It is not a terrorist base from which the United States or its allies can be effectively attacked. Can we insist that those who argue for departure now, or soon, at least present some coherent case for the possible consequences of their position?

Regarding Afghanistan, the argument (as best I understand it) for leaving now is very weak. The bottom line seems to be that the Taliban would defeat the corrupt, inept Afghan government but for our support. Therefore, since the government cannot stand on its own, we should leave. Say what you will about Iraq, the war in Afghanistan was certainly never launched as part of a democracy project. It was launched, as Andy argues, to rid the country of al-Qaeda. But the purpose of ridding the country of al-Qaeda was to punish and destroy, as best we could, the perpetrators of 9/11. Those perpetrators included the Taliban. (By the way, if we are going to cite President Bush, he was quite clear about dealing with regimes that give safe harbor to al-Qaeda.) Both al-Qaeda and the Taliban remain a dire threat to our country. They have now taken over large rural parts of Pakistan, an imperfect American ally with nukes and a weak democratic government. They are active and growing in another dangerous region of the world. The fact that the Obama administration doesn’t seem to have a coherent policy for addressing the threat argues in favor of developing such a policy, not our departure from Afghanistan. Again, the consequences of leaving now or soon, given the situation there, must be addressed by those who urge it. In his column, George Will makes a couple of rather silly suggestions for positioning special forces on the border, thus acknowledging that we should do something about Afghanistan (just not enough to be meaningful).

Andy makes several additional excellent points about U.S. foreign policy, including the idiocy coming out of our State Department. But these points do not address the real and serious problems associated with the steps urged by Will et al. I do wish to emphasize, for what it’s worth, my concurrence with Andy’s criticism of a doctrinal democracy project. While the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are God-given (as the Founders believed and asserted in the Declaration of Independence), we are not obliged to promote or defend those rights everywhere in the world to the detriment (if not destruction) of our own society.

— Mark R. Levin is the author of the New York Times bestseller Liberty and Tyranny and a nationally syndicated talk-show host.

[Mr. Jazzy]

The Great One, Dr. Levin is c3 again.

Clear, concise and CORRECT!

[BGHater]

’ we are not obliged to promote or defend those rights everywhere in the world to the detriment (if not destruction) of our own society.’

Wow. From Mr. Levin.

[nathanbedford]

A couple of weeks ago I offered my own two cents which in many ways anticipates the considerations raised by McCarthy and Levin:

There are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world and we cannot kill all of them. The way to deal with any Islamic (Islamicist) movement is to enlist the sane Muzzies to liquidate the insane Muzzies because we have convinced them that if they do not police the crazies in their own religion either we will kill them or the Islamists will. Even if we could kill them all, the mothers of America will never tolerate the kind of casualties required to do so unless you want to go nuclear in which case we in America will not be able to tolerate ourselves..

It’s time to get down to the business of thinking about America's strategic interests. What do we want to accomplish in Afghanistan? Obviously, we want to leave a country in place which does not support terrorism. That would be nice, but does it make us any safer? No. Because, so long as Waziristan provides a sanctuary for terrorism, it doesn't matter whether the terrorists also have Afghanistan. The problem compounds, if you want to leave Afghanistan a place which is not safe for terrorists you must also convert northwestern Pakistan into a place which is not safe for terrorists. If one of these places is not permanently "pacified" the other will equally not be pacified.

How do we propose to do that, with American boots on the ground? With 50% of America against the war in Afghanistan, what percentage of America do you judge will support putting troops into Pakistan? Assuming you can get public support for putting troops into Pakistan, can you be sure that the Pakistani government will not oppose our troops? Can you be sure that the Pakistani government will not threaten to use nuclear weapons against our troops? Even if such a threat were hollow when made, can we afford to disregard it? Can you see an end game to the pacification of Waziristan? I cannot. Neither could Winston Churchill more than a century ago.

Could it be done with drones and conventional air power working in close alliance with the Pakistani government and with some tribes in Waziristan? I do not know. As in every war America fights, we are in a foot race between our own casualty count and the enemy. Some might argue that the Serbs were pacified by air power alone, but is Afghanistan the same as Yugoslavia? Does not history teach us that "pacification" unavoidably means occupation? Have we figured out how to do that in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan without unacceptable casualty counts?

If casualty counts are not problematic enough, do we have the money? How broke are we? Is the debt growing to 11 trillion? Will the entitlements inexorably carry us to $26 million, as recently reported? It has now become a real question whether we can finance such a war.

While we are exercising our vision about how to pacify Waziristan, can we be sure that our efforts will not radicalize the reasonably sane portion of the Muslim population of Pakistan further against America? Will it turn the military against us? The Secret Police? What about those people who control the nukes? How much would take for people like A. Q. Khan who sold nuclear secrets to turn over some nukes to the Taliban or other terrorists in retaliation?

Would an American invasion with ground forces into the Northwest of Pakistan make that more or less likely? How do you know? But can we conduct our foreign policy out of fear or should we simply pursue our own best interests and let the chips fall where they may? According to Michael Scheuer, ex-of the CIA and responsible for watching bin Laden, we are not acting and have not been acting in pursuit of our own interests for years. He says that's why we are fighting these wars in the first place.

So we come back to my initial premise which is we must enlist the sane Muzzies to fight our war for us. We cannot win it alone. The way we enlist support from Muzzies is to show them who is boss. They respect power and they despise appeasement.

But let us not deceive ourselves. It required only 19 Muzzies to bring down the World Trade Center and kill 3000 Americans. We can kill all the Muzzies in Afghanistan, and they will still be able to scrape up from somewhere among the godforsaken corners of the world another 19 Muzzies to deliver what this time might be a weapon of mass destruction. And that weapon might just come from Pakistan. We cannot hope to conquer and hold every square inch of territory between the Atlantic coast of Africa and the western border of China in order to stop the formation of a terrorist squad only nineteen men (or women) strong.

So the war is primarily a war of intelligence. After we wring all the benefits we can out of our listening devices, we need indispensable local knowledge. Human intelligence must primarily come from the Muslim world because they have the language, the culture, and the tribal affiliation which we could never hope to penetrate. But we can hope to suborn them, turn one tribe against another, as the French did in North America and the British did so successfully in India and Pakistan. But conquering and holding territory is not the answer; it is probably not even the means to the answer.

A war of intelligence is primarily a war of alliances.

So when we do our strategic thinking about what the interests of America are in places like Afghanistan, we ought to consider what our goals are there and how we can accomplish them. Putting boots on the turf and holding it as an end in itself is worse than useless, I fear it is self-defeating.

Putting boots on the ground and fighting only to a stalemate is the equivalent of defeat because unnerves our allies, encourages our enemies, and dispirits our grieving mothers. Rather than intimidating Muslim governments to cooperate with us, it encourages them to pander to their street. Intelligence suffers. When intelligence suffers it actually makes us more vulnerable, not less.

Whatever we do, must be done decisively and successfully or not at all.

Until we're able to answer fundamental questions and articulate exactly what troops there can accomplish and at what cost, we are just spending blood and treasure without purpose.

[gibsosa]

my favorite mp3 download is Mark’s show...keeps me walking fast on my daily jaunt!

[Blue State Insurgent]

Of course the Iraq War was a democracy project from the very start. Why else would it had been called “Operation Iraqi Freedom”?

[Reagan Man]

The bottom line hasn’t changed since 911, since Pearl Harbor or before. If the US is attacked, Americans should respond accordingly and with the proper military action. Our elected officials have a duty as prescribed in the Constitution to protect and defend the people from all enemies.

However, the federal government should NOT make nation building mandatory. As always, the notion of spreading real democracy to the Islamic world remains a fallacy.

[dsc]

“Until we’re able to answer fundamental questions and articulate exactly what troops there can accomplish and at what cost, we are just spending blood and treasure without purpose.”

It is always right to oppose evil, and to thump those who attack America.

The real problem here, as it has been in every presidential administration during my lifetime, is that the civilian leadership is tying the hands of the military so that they cannot win.

[sig226]

It would be nice if we could adopt self interest as the primary motivation for foreign policy. We could walk out of the corner into which we painted ourselves. It only takes one additional word to make U.S. policy a rational extension of economic and military power. We care about people and democracy is easily changed to We care about OUR people and OUR democracy (BTW it’s a republic.)

That the rest of the world has problems and sometimes needs assistance from us is a given, but our primary responsibility is to ourselves. We must not pander to the self-loathing fools among us who see attacks on our people as a good thing.

[nathanbedford]

In discussing this topic, how do we identify and pursue the national interest of the United States, we stipulate that we have a president in power who wants to advance our national interests. It is astonishing and terribly revealing that we have to stipulate this about our president merely to have a coherent discussion of American foreign policy. I am well aware that there is a body of evidence which indicates the contrary of the stipulation. Let us assume that we have a president who will consciously choose the options which he believes will advance America so we can at least get on with an analysis.

When a chief executive and commander in chief weighs new strategic options you must consider whether a particular option will cost more than it gains. This is the analysis which I am asking us to undertake concerning Afghanistan. Even our military officers whom you want to turn loose are divided in this judgment.

When we "oppose evil and thump those who attack America" a Commander-in-Chief must ask himself to I have resources, including the support of the American people, sufficient to see this option through or am I pursuing a feel-good policy which ultimately weakens America in a generational asymmetrical world war? If I do this, will America be stronger 20 years from now to contend with an enemy who can move from Afghanistan to Waziristan to Cairo or even to Detroit at the speed of commercial air transportation? As president, do we have the wherewithal in the midst of a financial and economic crisis, the dimensions of which we still do not know, to wage wars in places like Iraq and Afghanistan at the cost literally of millions of dollars a day? If we indulge our emotions to wage war in Afghanistan, whose war are we fighting, ours or the enemies? Who must ultimately win a war of casualty count?

Can I honestly tell my people, as president, that if they pour their blood and treasure into Afghanistan they will be safer against a stealth strike in the homeland? Can I honestly tell them that we will be stronger after we spend our treasure and our blood? Can I say to them, "my fellow Americans, we are not just shoveling flies in Afghanistan, we are making the homeland safer?" Can I say, "this is the best use of our precious resources?"

What are our strategic interests? Certainly high on the list comes the issue of nuclear proliferation to Islamicists. Clearly the Taliban in Afghanistan is not a threat in this regard. Is the Taliban in Pakistan a very real threat to acquire nuclear weapons? Obviously the answer is yes. Can I honestly represent to the American people that to pursue an asymmetrical war against the ragtag Taliban in Afghanistan makes it less likely that the Taliban will acquire nuclear weapons in Pakistan?

Another strategic interest is to enlist Muslim countries in support of a war against the Islamicists. Concededly, if we are just flat whipped in Afghanistan the whole Muslim world, especially the Arab world, will feel emboldened to confront America openly and through terrorism. But what if we only fight to a stalemate in Afghanistan? Will we have gained the support of the Muslim world? How many lives is the propaganda value of a victory in Afghanistan worth? How much treasure?

I think the Mister Obama should ask himself, why is the war in Afghanistan differed from the war in Iraq? Does the whole thing turn in the accident of a choice by bin Laden to locate a few dusty tents and ramshackle buildings in Afghanistan? Of what significance is that?

I think the president should also ask himself, why, by all accounts from our senior military observers, are we losing the war to a bunch of rag tag illiterates after seven years? Our initial invasion was done with the help of some Afghan tribes, why have we been so unsuccessful in building upon that model? Why are the tribes against us and against the national government and why did the national government have to resort to voter fraud in order to retain its majority? Do these questions indicate that our fundamental strategy in Afghanistan is utterly flawed?

Do these questions indicate that there is no realistic possibility of substituting Afghan boots on the ground for American boots on the ground even if we supply logistics and air power for the Afghan boots? It has, after all, been seven years.

I as a president who actually wants America to prevail, must know that our resources are stretched and our reserves are virtually exhausted. A miscalculation here could cause the decline and fall of the American century. Is the game in Afghanistan worth that?

[dsc]

You make some good points, Nate, but in the end, I am not persuaded.

“we stipulate that we have a president in power who wants to advance our national interests.”

Or one whose personal interests happen to coincide with our national interests. The Bamtard cannot be seen to cut and run this early.

“It is astonishing and terribly revealing that we have to stipulate this about our president merely to have a coherent discussion of American foreign policy.”

Worse that we cannot stipulate it. I don’t see any sign that the COOTOO (current occupant of the Oval Office) has America’s best interests at heart.

“you must consider whether a particular option will cost more than it gains.”

As Churchill said, “If you will not fight for right when you can easily win without bloodshed; if you will not fight when your victory will be sure and not too costly; you may come to the moment when you will have to fight with all odds against you and only a precarious chance of survival. There may be even a worse fate. You may have to fight when there is no hope of victory, because it is better to perish than to live as slaves.”

“Even our military officers whom you want to turn loose are divided in this judgment.”

Unfortunately, too many of the wrong kind of officers are being promoted. Neither Patton nor MacArthur would stand a chance in today’s military.

“…a Commander-in-Chief must ask himself do I have resources, including the support of the American people, sufficient to see this option through or am I pursuing a feel-good policy which ultimately weakens America in a generational asymmetrical world war?”

I have no idea what you mean by a generational asymmetrical world war, but there are times when the president has to ask, “Must this be done at all costs?” and “Is my political viability more important than the survival of the country?”

“If we indulge our emotions to wage war in Afghanistan”

I’m not indulging any emotions. I think it’s better to fight the mooselimbs there than here.

“whose war are we fighting, ours or the enemies’? Who must ultimately win a war of casualty count?”

If the right people were put in charge and the military allowed to win, they could achieve a satisfactory resolution in short order.

“Can I honestly tell my people, as president, that if they pour their blood and treasure into Afghanistan they will be safer against a stealth strike in the homeland?”

Hell, yes!

“Can I honestly tell them that we will be stronger after we spend our treasure and our blood?”

It doesn’t matter if we are stronger or weaker, so long as we render our blood enemies unable to strike at us.

“Can I say, “this is the best use of our precious resources?”

Absolutely. Especially when you look at the rest of the crap that the ruling class pours money into.

“What are our strategic interests? Certainly high on the list comes the issue of nuclear proliferation to Islamicists. Clearly the Taliban in Afghanistan is not a threat in this regard.”

Every time we cut and run, we strengthen our enemies’ resolve. Si vis pacem, para bellum. And if bellum comes upon you, the only sure road to peace is to win.

“Is the Taliban in Pakistan a very real threat to acquire nuclear weapons? Obviously the answer is yes. Can I honestly represent to the American people that to pursue an asymmetrical war against the ragtag Taliban in Afghanistan makes it less likely that the Taliban will acquire nuclear weapons in Pakistan?”

I don’t know why you would want to, when that is not the strategy that should be followed.

“Another strategic interest is to enlist Muslim countries in support of a war against the Islamicists.”

Never gonna happen. The only mooselimbs that side with us are bad mooselimbs. Better people, but not faithful to the doctrines of their own religion.

“But what if we only fight to a stalemate in Afghanistan?”

I’m trying to understand what you are thinking. The only way we could “only fight to a stalemate” is if traitors in our own government refuse to allow our troops to win.

“How many lives is the propaganda value of a victory in Afghanistan worth? How much treasure?”

That depends on how many lives will be lost when the sons of Satan nuke a couple of our cities, or use a biological agent.

“Does the whole thing turn in the accident of a choice by bin Laden to locate a few dusty tents and ramshackle buildings in Afghanistan? Of what significance is that?”

It turns upon the extremely dangerous resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Instead of killing each and every one of them, we gave them the respite they needed to recruit young terrorists and rearm. I don’t think I have to explain the significance of that.

“I think the president should also ask himself, why, by all accounts from our senior military observers, are we losing the war to a bunch of rag tag illiterates after seven years?”

He knows why. Our “civilian leadership” forces our troops to fight with one hand tied behind their backs and only one bullet in their shirt pockets.

“Our initial invasion was done with the help of some Afghan tribes, why have we been so unsuccessful in building upon that model?”

State Department and other civilian officials.

“Why are the tribes against us”

Because the Taliban has shown them that we are unwilling or unable to protect them.

“and why did the national government have to resort to voter fraud in order to retain its majority?”

You assume that the leftard press is telling the truth about that? Really?

“Do these questions indicate that our fundamental strategy in Afghanistan is utterly flawed?”

The rational response to a flawed strategy is to replace it with a good strategy, not to cut and run.

“Do these questions indicate that there is no realistic possibility of substituting Afghan boots on the ground for American boots on the ground even if we supply logistics and air power for the Afghan boots?”

Nixon’s Vietnamization program succeeded, until Ted Kennedy and other traitors in congress cut off the logistics we had promised.

“It has, after all, been seven years.”

More time by far than it took us to utterly defeat both the Germans and the Japanese. Wonder why that is?

“I, as a president who actually wants America to prevail, must know that our resources are stretched and our reserves are virtually exhausted.”

Then you must transfer resources from less vital areas. Get our troops out of the Balkans, for instance, and the next time it looks like the Christians are winning that centuries-long war with the mooselimbs, stay the Hell out of it.

“A miscalculation here could cause the decline and fall of the American century. Is the game in Afghanistan worth that?”

It is not a game. The mooselimbs are once again on the march, and will destroy the West (which is to say, civilization) if they are not stopped. How long are we going to ponce around like PeeWee Herman before we do something effective about that? How long are we going to allow our “civilian leadership” (read, America-hating commie scoundrels) to sell us down the river?

[neverdem]

I as a president who actually wants America to prevail, must know that our resources are stretched and our reserves are virtually exhausted.

Finances might be stretched, but reserves are exhausted? Show me. Casualties have been remarkably light in both theaters. Our reserve components are more experienced than at any time since Korea almost 60 years ago. Our active duty ground forces, especially combat support and combat service and support units, have had more infantry experience than you can shake a stick at. Some equipment is getting worn out, but if the fight is existential, who cares? IMHO, the only thing being stretched is the will to win on the home front. The US has problems, but exhausted reserves escapes me.

[nathanbedford]

A quick Google of, "military readiness report" yielded the following from Associated Press in February. I haven't spend any more time looking it may be that the situation is changed but probably not significantly:

Report casts doubt on military's readiness

Strains from long, repeated tours are cited

One senior military official said that while there have been security gains in Iraq, military units leaving there have been sapped by repeated war tours that have also battered their equipment and vehicles. It will take time to restore the force and repair or replace the equipment. In other cases, equipment has been left in Iraq for use by the steadily growing Iraqi security forces.

Two years ago, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace raised the risk level from moderate to significant, pointing to an overall decline in military readiness that he said would take several years to correct. A year later, Mullen maintained that risk level, saying that strains on the military, persistent terrorist activity, and other threats had prevented the Pentagon from improving its ability to respond to any new crises. (emphasis supplied)http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2009/02/20/report_casts_doubt_on_militarys_readiness/

[neverdem]

Do a search on reenlistment rates. How does that square with an exhausted armed forces? I wouldn’t give much credence to selected reports from the drive by media.

[nathanbedford]

Two years ago, then-Joint Chiefs Chairman Peter Pace raised the risk level from moderate to significant, pointing to an overall decline in military readiness that he said would take several years to correct. A year later, Mullen maintained that risk level, saying that strains on the military, persistent terrorist activity, and other threats had prevented the Pentagon from improving its ability to respond to any new crises.

Last year, Gates listed increased intelligence gathering as a key need to address military shortfalls.

These are not "selected reports from the drive-by media" these are official actions by Chairmen of The Joint Chiefs of Staff taken sequentially over two years, one confirming the other.

If you want a search done on reenlistment levels you do it. This has started because you challenged my point that the American armed forces are stretched and there reserves and resources are severely taxed ("exhausted" is the term I used which I think should be accorded a certain amount of literary license to make a point). Two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with me.

You said, "show me." I just did so. I suppose the official actions of America's senior military men are as nothing compared to the assertions of an anonymous Freeper?

[neverdem]

If you want a search done on reenlistment levels you do it.

Here you go.

re-enlistment rates

IMHO, chiefs of staff are always hedging their bets in times of war. Combat experience is probably at an all time high.

Be that as it may. If we leave Afghanistan, won't the Taliban and Al Qaeda claim that they defeated the Great Satan?

[nathanbedford]

Another strategic interest is to enlist Muslim countries in support of a war against the Islamicists. Concededly, if we are just flat whipped in Afghanistan the whole Muslim world, especially the Arab world, will feel emboldened to confront America openly and through terrorism. But what if we only fight to a stalemate in Afghanistan? Will we have gained the support of the Muslim world? How many lives is the propaganda value of a victory in Afghanistan worth? How much treasure?

I think the foregoing passage from my second post makes it clear that I am not unmindful or indifferent to the consequences of undisguised defeat in Afghanistan. The question is not so much what is desirable but what is possible. If we get to the point where we conclude that it is possible to "win" in Afghanistan, we then have to decide whether the win is worth the cost.

That in turn means that we must be clear in our definition of what it means to "win." I've tried to articulate some of the problems with waging a war in which our war aims are not clearly understood much less achievable and cheap. You might recall I began my first post on this thread with my definition of what our war aim should be:What do we want to accomplish in Afghanistan? Obviously, we want to leave a country in place which does not support terrorism.

I asked whether that is possible without also "winning" in northwest Pakistan. In my judgment that is not possible. What must be done to win in northwest Pakistan? In my judgment it cannot be done with air power alone therefore requires boots on the ground. Can it be done without American boots on the ground? In my judgment it cannot and I believe I am supported by this by senior American military. Is there American support for putting American troops into Waziristan? Clearly not. In fact there is not support for keeping American troops in Afghanistan. Even if we put American troops into northwest Pakistan and "won" there how long would such a victory last? Until the last American is gone.

If we put troops into northwest Pakistan what does that do to our desire to keep nukes under control? I think it makes less likely and proliferation to Al Qaeda more likely-which is precisely the opposite reason why we got involved in Afghanistan in the first place!

So when we say, in effect, we should wage war to maintain our reputation perhaps we ought to think how many lives how much treasure is our reputation worth? We ought to ask how in the world would we enhance our reputation by getting sucked into the wilds of Waziristan?

I would wage war for oil in a heart beat but are you going to be the one to tell the American mothers that their sons must die for reputation? You might be able to persuade me that it is necessary to wage war for intimidation if that would bring the Muslim world over to our side and put a stop to terrorism but hardly would America consent to the sacrifice of its children for reputation.

I started off this reply talking about "undisguised" defeat in Afghanistan. It might well be that we have just sustained a rather well disguised defeat in Iraq according to Kevin McCarthy who thinks the victory goes to Iran. But respecting Afghanistan, there are many ways to define victory and many ways to extricate ourselves without the appearance of defeat. If the Pakistan problem means there is no prospect of victory, we might begin to examine those options.