Third and forth rate. Most of the people( worlds number one resource) and most of the wealth, albeit grossly mismanaged, lays in third world dumps. And that who we have and will continue to fight against.
The Army can deliver infantry in fighting vehicles, or duce’n halfs. It can deliver artillery by Blackhawks or trucks. Trucks are cheaper. Budgets are not unlimited. Conservation of money, and it’s efficient use is critical.
Much of the billions the Army spends upon helicopter CAS could be done cheaper by dedicated fixed wing. But neither bureaucracy seems willing. (Yeah, yeah, the Joints are victims of elderly legislation).
The Army does the same thing. Supposedly observing third world warfare for five decades, and having some experience with mines in Vietnam, the Army found its self with no MRAPs at all, even though they are multi generation experienced technology.
For the Navy it was not having a near shore force. Somehow all battles were to be in some vast open ocean space.
You can not tell me, that since WWII, in spite of near every war fought, the services haven’t been intellectually and thus materially captivated by ‘the big one’. A major war against a equal or superior foe.
No, zero, zip language, cultural skills at all. And all those relatively dirt cheap.
Sure.
I was there on the West/East border in the late 1980s when The Wall came down.
It was our fixation on “The Big One” that gave us ALL the tools to defeat the second, third and fourth rate powers of the last thirty years. The same tools that we’re putting to good use in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Those IFVs weren’t designed for fighting the Taliban.
Those Blackhawks weren’t designed for Afghanistan, but they’ve proven invaluable.
Remember, losing The Big One was a game-stopper.
Struggling in LICs isn’t going to mean the death of the US, and we still have the time to develop and deploy MRAPs (albiet, at a real cost) and other systems in a fight that will be DECADES, across more than just Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Big One would have been THE “come as you are” war.
No time to bring in materials and reinforcements (regardless of what the NATO “pie in the sky” plans were).
No time to develop new systems.
We are far better off for looking forward and preparing for the greatest threat, than we would have been retooling for another Vietnam.